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This thesis is about the ontology of living beings as natural systems, their 
behavior, and the way in which said behavior, under special conditions of 
social coupling, may give rise to mental phenomena. The guiding questions 
of the thesis are: 1) What kinds of systems are living beings such that they 
behave the way they do? 2) How, through what kinds of mechanisms and 
processes, do living beings generate their behavior? 3) How do mental 
phenomena appear in the life of certain living beings? 4) What are the 
natural conditions under which certain living beings exhibit mental 
phenomena? To answer these questions the thesis first assumes, then justifies 
and defends, a Strict Naturalistic (SN) stance with respect to living beings. 
SN is a metaphysical and epistemological framework that, recognizing the 
organizational, dynamic and structural complexity and peculiarity of living 
beings, views and treats them as metaphysically ordinary natural systems; 
that is, as systems that, from the metaphysical point of view, are not different 
in kind from rivers or stars. SN holds that if in natural sciences rivers and 
stars are not conceived as semantic, intentional, teleological, agential or 
normative systems, then living beings should not be so conceived either. 
Having assumed SN, and building mainly on the second-order cybernetic 
theories of Ross Ashby and Humberto Maturana, the thesis answers question 
1) by saying that living beings are (i) adaptive dynamic systems, (ii) 
deterministic machines of closed transitions, (iii) multistable dissipative 
systems, and (iv) organizationally closed systems with respect to their 
sensorimotor and autopoietic dynamics. Based on this ontological 
characterization, the thesis answers question 2) by showing that living 
beings’ behavior corresponds to the combined product of (i), (ii), (iii) and 
(iv). Points (i) and (ii) support the idea that living beings are strictly 
deterministic systems, and that, consequently, notions such as information, 
control, agency or teleology—usually invoked to explain living beings’ 
behavior—do not have operational reality but are rather descriptive 
projections introduced by the observer. Point (iii) helps to understand why, 





observer, appear to be teleological, agential or “intelligent”. Point (iv) 
suggests that living beings’ sensorimotor dynamics are closed circuits 
without inputs or outputs, where the distinction between external and 
internal medium is, again, an ascription of the observer rather than a 
functional property of the system itself. Having addressed the basic 
principles of living beings’ behavior, the thesis explores the possible origin 
of (truly) mental phenomena in the particular domain of social behavior. 
Complementing Maturana’s recursive theory of language with Vygotsky’s 
dialectic approach the thesis advances, though in a still quite exploratory 
way, a sociolinguistic hypothesis of mind. This hypothesis answers questions 
3) and 4) by claiming that the essential properties of mental phenomena 
(intentionality, representational content) appear with language, and that 
mind, as a private experiential domain, emerges as a dialectic transformation 
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This thesis is about the ontology of living beings as natural systems, their 
behavior, and the way in which said behavior, under special conditions of 
social coupling, may give rise to mental phenomena.  
The guiding questions of the thesis are:  
 
1) What kinds of systems are living beings such that they behave the 
way they do?  
2) How do mental phenomena appear in the life of certain living 
beings?  
 
The thesis answers the first question by claiming that livings are: 
 
1) Adaptive dynamic systems 
2) Deterministic machines of closed transitions 
3) Multistable dissipative systems, and 
4) Organizationally closed systems with respect to their autopoietic 
dynamic and sensorimotor activity 
 
The thesis answers the second question by claiming that mental phenomena, 
essentially understood as intentional and representational phenomena, appear 
with language, and that language, in turn, emerges as a recursive 
phenomenon in the domain of communicative behaviors of third-order 
biological systems.  
To elaborate these answers the thesis first assumes, then justifies and 
defends, a Strict Naturalistic stance with respect to living beings. Strict 
Naturalism is a metaphysical and epistemological framework that, 
recognizing the organizational, dynamic and structural complexity and 
peculiarity of living beings, views and treats them as metaphysically 





point of view, are not different in kind from rivers or stars. Strict Naturalism 
holds, basically, that if in natural sciences the behavior of rivers and stars is 
not explained by appealing to semantic, intentional, teleological, agential or 





I am not alone in this enterprise. My allies are two cyberneticists whose 
works, in my opinion, have set bases for a Strictly Naturalistic understanding 
of living beings, their behavior and adaptation. They are Ross Ashby and 
Humberto Maturana.  
Ross Ashby and Humberto Maturana are present, in one way or another, 
in almost everything that is said in this thesis. They have become to me, for 
better or worse, not only allies but models of how to approach those 
phenomena that interest me, elaborate the concepts and terminology, 
formulate the questions, and build the answers.  
After reading and studying them with effort and dedication over these 
years, I wish I could have assimilated a bit of their analytic power, their 
conceptual depth and intellectual courage. Most likely this has not been the 
case, but more important to me is that I have found in them a way of viewing 
living beings, including human beings, that I think is worth exploring, 
developing and deepening.  
This thesis might be viewed, in a sense, as an invitation to reconsider the 
cybernetic tradition not from a merely historical point of view, but rather as 
a living source of ideas and theoretical tools that may help us to illuminate, 
with a different light, certain areas, topics and problems in cognitive 
sciences.   
 
Why (old fashioned) Cybernetics and not (more contemporary) 
Dynamical Systems Theory?  
 
Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) has usually been identified as the 





1998; Grush, 1997). If this is the case, why in this thesis do we stick with 
cybernetics instead of using ‘new brand’ DST?  
The cybernetic research program, considered as a whole, contains two 
main streams: first-order cybernetics and second-order cybernetics (Dupuy, 
2009; Müller and Müller, 2007). First-order cybernetics basically 
corresponds to the study of living beings and artificial systems in terms of 
dynamical systems, most of the time, through the use of mathematical 
formalisms (the canonical example here is Wiener, 1948). Second-order 
cybernetics, instead, corresponds to an epistemological reflection about the 
observer (the scientist, the cyberneticist) and her descriptive/explanatory 
practices (von Foerster, 2003). A good part of second-order cybernetics, 
especially in Maturana’s work, has to do with identifying and preventing 
certain descriptive or explanatory fallacies that are more or less recurrent in 
the study of living beings. As von Foerster points out, whereas first-order 
cybernetics is the study and theory of the observed systems, second-order 
cybernetics is the study and theory of the observing systems (von Foerster, 
2003).  
DST constitutes, in many aspects, a development and sophistication of 
first-order cybernetics, and in that sense, effectively, one can see it as an 
updated version of cybernetics. Nonetheless, DST, at least until now, has 
almost entirely disregarded the epistemological work developed in second-
order cybernetics. There is nothing in DST, or at least I have not seen 
anything, like an explicit and systematic epistemological theorization about 
the observer and her descriptive/explanatory practices; i.e., anything like a 
Second-Order Dynamical Systems Theory.   
The epistemological reflection concerning the observer and her 
descriptive/explanatory practices is, as we shall see, a central component of 
this thesis. A good part of our research problem has to do with examining the 
way in which the observer (i.e., the cognitive scientist) approaches living 
beings (observed systems), frames her descriptions and elaborates her 
explanations. A basic strategy in our research, as we shall see, is to try to 
reveal the observer-relative character of more or less popular notions and 
explanatory constructs in cognitive sciences (e.g., intentionality, internal 





DST, thus, takes just a half of the cybernetic tradition, whereas in this 
thesis we need the entire armory.  
Another relatively absent aspect in DST that plays a key role in our 
research is the metaphysical analysis of dynamic systems. DST has a certain 
tendency to focus on the effectiveness and parsimony of its explanatory 
models, without taking too much care about the metaphysical aspects. DST 
develops useful and very sophisticated mathematical models for describing, 
explaining and predicting some behaviors in biological and artificial 
systems, and, as long as these models work, does not seem terribly worried 
about the metaphysical specifications of the modeled systems.  
For example, for DST, the structural dynamic of a concrete system may 
be either deterministic or stochastic (van Gelder, 1995b); there seems to be 
no particular (explicit, justified) metaphysical position on this point. For us it 
is, on the contrary, very important to specify the way, whether deterministic 
or not, in which dynamic systems undergo their changes of state.  
Ashby and Maturana take, make explicit, and defend a deterministic 
metaphysical position with respect to dynamic systems in general and living 
beings in particular. They, and I with them, as we shall see in Chapter 2, 
think that a deterministic conception of living beings is crucial to properly 
explaining and understanding their behavior.   
DST has also displayed, I think for the same reason, a rather liberal or 
ambiguous attitude toward the cognitive notion of internal (neural) 
representation (van Gelder and Port, 1995; Kelso, 1995). The partial hostility 
DST shows towards this notion comes, mainly, from methodological 
considerations rather than from an explicit and systematic metaphysical 
analysis of dynamic systems.  
In this thesis we will reject the notion of internal (neural) representation 
as a way of explaining living beings’ behavior, but we will do it on the basis 
of ontological and metaphysical arguments. We will not say that internal 
representations do not have explanatory value because they are overly 
simplistic descriptive tools (van Gelder, 1995b), or do not add anything to 
our understanding (Chemero, 2000). We will not say that (minimal, weak) 
internal representations are dispensable because, from an epistemological 





challenge” (Ramsey, 2007). We will not recommend avoiding the overuse of 
internal representations for the sake of some healthy scientific pragmatism 
(Haselager, 2004).  
What we will hold, building on Maturana’s metaphysical principle of 
structural determinism, is that internal representations are explanatory 
fictions that do not have biological reality.  
These, I guess, are the main reasons why, for the specific purposes of this 
thesis, we have preferred good and old cybernetics rather than ‘brand new’ 
DST.  
 
Style and relation to the literature 
 
Ashby and Maturana are not philosophers (though many of their conceptual 
developments and theoretical reflections might be interpreted as 
philosophical works in their own right). Ashby is a cyberneticist who 
focuses, mainly, on the neurophysiology of adaptive behavior. Maturana is a 
neurophysiologist who develops, basically, a cybernetic theory of cognitive 
phenomena in general. Both of them are well trained in empirical research, 
and develop their respective theoretical systems in dialogue with 
experimental works. 
The way in which they present their ideas and results is, however, to a 
large extent, axiomatic and theoretically self-contained. In Ashby these 
features are reinforced, in part, by his tendency to mathematical formalisms; 
in Maturana, perhaps, by his tendency to the creation of neologisms. When 
presenting their ideas, they do not compare or contrast them with the ideas of 
alternative approaches, and very rarely do they engage in direct discussions 
with rival theories. They proceed rather by building their own theoretical 
systems trying to preserve, as much as they can, a strict internal coherence in 
the conceptual structure of their explanatory models. 
This is a philosophical thesis in the field of cognitive sciences, or so I 
want to think. However, inspired by the styles of Ashby and Maturana, many 
times I behave more as an outsider than a philosopher of cognitive science. 
During the exposition, there are many topics and discussions that might have 





literature, identifying the different positions about the points at issue, and 
placing, highlighting the contrasts, this thesis’s position within that context. I 
have, however, deliberately chosen to do something different.  
I have preferred to concentrate on exposing, as clearly as I can, with a 
considerable degree of detail, and allowing plenty of time for numerous 
examples and illustrations, the basic cybernetic concepts and intuitions that 
ground the philosophical ideas defended in this thesis.  
The payoff, I want to believe, is that the reader will find a quite 
accessible presentation of views and theoretical constructions which, 
especially in the case of Maturana, sometimes are difficult to follow.  
On the negative side, the thesis, because of this, somehow lacks the kind 
of dialectics that is more or less usual in philosophical works. Occasionally, 
I make reference to certain cognitive theories or approaches that might have 
played the role of ‘philosophical opponents’, but I do not engage in direct 
and open discussions. (I have done some of this dialectic exercise in separate 
papers. See “Notes on publications”). I hope, in future works, to do the job 
of explicitly confronting the main ideas of this thesis with the more or less 
established approaches and theories that compose the contemporary 




The way in which I use and present the works of Ashby and Maturana in this 
thesis may give, at times, the impression that they are two authors who, 
surprisingly, agree about almost everything. That, of course, is not the case. 
Ashby and Maturana have very important points in common, but also several 
significant differences. In this thesis I only concentrate on the shared aspects, 
and, mainly for the sake of the exposition, I make them appear entirely lined 
up.   
 
Outline of the thesis 
 
The plan of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1, roughly, we present the 





will be assumed throughout the thesis. We start, building on Maturana’s 
second-order cybernetics, by talking about the observer and her explanatory 
practices in general. Then we concentrate on a particular explanatory system, 
namely the naturalistic system. There we introduce the notion of Strict 
Naturalism, and make explicit the way living beings will be conceived of, 
treated and studied in the thesis. The chapter ends by clarifying the precise 
sense in which living beings can be viewed as adaptive dynamic systems 
(point 1 in our ontological characterization of living beings).  
Chapter 2 introduces, examines and justifies a series of metaphysical 
principles that are taken to be valid for dynamic systems in general and 
living beings in particular. We start by reviewing the precise sense in which 
living beings may be understood as ‘machines’, and illustrate, through a nice 
example provided by Ashby, the potential significance of this idea for 
certain explanatory practices in cognitive science (a point that will be fully 
developed in Chapter 5). Then we move on to argue that living beings are 
not only machines but deterministic machines. We pay special attention to 
the Maturanian ‘principle of structural determinism’ (PSD), and draw some 
important consequences for the study of living beings’ behavior.  
In Chapter 3 we focus on the apparent teleological character of living 
beings. We argue that said appearance is, ultimately, just that, an 
appearance, and that the real phenomenon behind it is a complex form of 
(deterministic) stability. The appreciation of living beings as far-from-
equilibrium thermodynamic systems, and the Ashbyan notion of 
‘ultrastability’ play a central role in this line of argument. They lead us to the 
conclusion that living beings are ‘multistable dissipative systems’ (point 3 in 
our ontological characterization), and that at least a good part of what we 
take to be their “purposeful” behavior corresponds in reality to complex 
forms of stability. 
Chapter 4 addresses what is, perhaps, one of the most counterintuitive 
aspects of the thesis; the sensorimotor closure of living beings. First, we start 
by considering the notion of organizational closure at the level of the 
autopoietic dynamic of living beings, but, for reasons that are explained, we 
do not assume with respect to this point any special philosophical 





level of living beings’ sensorimotor dynamic. Here we draw important and 
metaphysically loaded conclusions about perception and action in living 
beings. We argue that living beings’ sensorimotor systems, including the 
nervous system (when they have one), work as closed systems wherein 
neither inputs nor outputs exist. We discuss and defend some philosophical 
consequences that follow from this view, and prepare the scenario for testing 
the explanatory power of our Strict Naturalistic conception of living beings. 
Chapter 5 is a brief but important chapter. There we test, taking some 
representative cases of animal behavior, the explanatory power of our Strict 
Naturalistic conception of living beings. We conclude that at least a good 
part of living beings’ behavior may be adequately explained in Strictly 
Naturalistic terms. That is, through explanatory constructions that, as is the 
case in standard natural science, do not need to appeal to intentional, 
semantic (representational), teleological, agential or normative elements.    
Having reached this point, in Chapter 6 we face the question of the origin 
of mental phenomena.  To answer this question we elaborate, in a rather 
exploratory and speculative way, a sociolinguistic hypothesis of mind. 
Building on Maturana’s recursive theory of language, we argue that some of 
the essential properties of mental phenomena, such as intentionality and 
representational content, emerge with language, and that language, in turn, 
emerges as a recursive phenomenon in the communicative domain of social 
systems. In this view mind appears as an originally social phenomenon, 
whose private and individual dimension emerges as a process of dialectical 
transformation of language.  
ally, a brief conclusion underlines the main philosophical points of the 

















Metaphysical and epistemological 
prolegomena: some basic notions  
 
 
In this chapter we are going to fix some basic metaphysical and 
epistemological notions that will help us to address our research problem in 
subsequent chapters. Most of what we are going to say about the behavior of 
living beings in this thesis depends on the general framework that we are 
going to offer here, so I want to be explicit and transparent about that. The 
reader must not take this chapter as a mere metaphysical preliminary, distant 
and not connected at all with the ‘concretely cognitive’ stuff. On the 
contrary, this chapter should be read rather as an invitation to construe the 
problem of cognition from a particular philosophical angle. Thus, although 
the chapter speaks of ‘metaphysically abstract’ things, almost nothing of 
what is said in it is philosophically innocent. If the reader is invited to see 
the problem of intelligent behavior and cognition in a certain way, it is 
because that way will frame and condition in turn the manner in which we 
are going to formulate the questions and construe the answers.  
The metaphysical and epistemological framework that I will present here 
corresponds, to a large extent, to the metaphysical and epistemological 
framework that Maturana has built around his autopoietic theory through the 
years (Maturana, 1975, 1978, 1987, 1988, 1992, 2002, 2003). This 
framework is expanded, refined and developed in several ways, but always 
remaining loyal to the original spirit of Maturana’s work, or so I honestly 
think. Since I consider that my conceptual contributions in this field are 





as ‘mine’ in the text.  
On more than one occasion the reader, especially the philosopher, will 
find that there are some connections, similarities or resonances between 
Maturana’s metaphysical frame and one or more philosophical systems 
already established in the literature. I am not going to do the job of flagging 
those similarities, and the reader is, of course, free to make the associations 
that she finds pertinent and useful for her understanding. But at the same 
time I recommend not to go too far with that kind of exercise. Maturana is a 
biologist who, although not ignorant or innocent about the history of 
metaphysics, has constructed his own conceptual system without situating it 
within the standard philosophical literature. This has given, for better or 
worse, enough room for commentators to make connections between 
Maturana’s system and certain allegedly akin philosophical schools. While 
some people connect Maturana’s metaphysics with Kant and some versions 
of contemporary pragmatist antirealism (Dougall, 2000, 1999), others put 
him in company of phenomenologists such as Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty 
(Dicks, 2011; Mingers, 1995). None of these associations, in my opinion, are 
necessary or particularly useful to grasp what is at play in Maturana’s 
metaphysical system. Many times, actually, they may be rather misleading. 
In this sense, I hope the chapter can speak for itself. 
 
 
1.1 Observers, explanations and metaphysical 
frames: steps towards a Strict Naturalistic 
conception of living beings  
 
We humans act as observers every time we perform an act of observation. 
An act of observation, in the Maturanian conception that I will follow here, 
corresponds basically to an attentional and linguistic act that operates upon a 
determinate experiential background. In the act of observation we attend to 
what happens or appears in our experiential field, and we do it by applying, 
implicitly or explicitly, one or more linguistic operations. By ‘experiential 





also our internal experience, our subjectivity (feelings, thoughts, etc.). And 
by ‘linguistic operations’ I mean, roughly, psychological operations in which 
words or linguistic concepts
1
 are required; e.g., categorization, description, 
judgment, inference, explanation, prediction, etc.  
According to this definition, observation is an essentially linguistic act; 
therefore, reserved only for creatures with language. Non-linguistic 
creatures, even having a rich sensory life and a sophisticated behavioral 
repertory, do not count as observers. To the extent that the only creatures 
capable of language known hitherto—at least the only ones whose linguistic 
capacities we can verify directly and without ambiguity—are human beings, 
in this thesis, for all practical purposes, the expression ‘observer’ will always 
refer to a normally developed human being, to a person.  
Our acts of observation—or observations, for short—vary with respect to 
a series of aspects and dimensions. Observations may be, in relative terms, 
more or less simple or complex, direct or indirect, subjective or objective, 
rigorous or careless, acute or superficial, spontaneous or controlled, etc.  For 
example, in comparison with the standard scientific observation, which is 
rigorous, controlled and quite elaborated, our ordinary (commonsense) 
observations look rather simple, spontaneous and careless.  
We have said that observations are essentially linguistic acts; therefore, 
operations mediated by concepts or words.
2
 It is worth noting, though, that 
the central point in this idea is the conceptual mediation in itself, not the 
application of one or another concept in particular. For example, think of a 
man of an Amazonian tribe who has never had contact, direct or indirect, 
with any element of modern culture. When this man sees a laptop for the 
first time, surely he does not say “Ah, a laptop!” (not even in his own 
dialect). He lacks the concept LAPTOP, but that does not mean that his 
                                                          
1
 The qualification of ‘linguistic’ concepts is necessary because, for some 
philosophers, not all concepts are linguistic in nature (see for example Bermúdez, 
2003). Here, nonetheless, every time we speak of concepts without further 
specifications, we will be solely referring to linguistic concepts; i.e., roughly, to the 
mental equivalents of words. 
2
 This notion of observation sharply contrasts with van Fraassen’s one, for whom 
‘observations’ are basically unaided and non-conceptually mediated perceptual acts 






perception is emptied of all conceptualization. The man takes the laptop in 
his hands, focuses the attention on it, inspects, examines it, etc., and after a 
couple of minutes he concludes that he has no idea of what that object can 
be. To conclude that, the man has gone through a line of reasoning in which, 
as a minimum, he has (i) compared the object with some known objects, (ii) 
wondered about its nature or possible functions, (iii) outlined some tentative 
answers, (iv) tested these hypotheses through the manipulation of the object, 
(v) evaluated the results, and (vi) finally decided that he has no idea of what 
the object can be. Yet this negative judgment, this recognition of ignorance, 
is far from being a conceptual vacuum. In his reasoning the Amazonian man 
has applied, presumably, concepts such as OBJECT (or THING), 
RECTANGULAR, HARD, SMOOTH SURFACE, UTILITY, etc., and in 
his conclusion, actually, has put the laptop under a complex concept that is 
highly abstract: UNKNOWN OBJECT.   
Being an attentional act, the act of observation is also essentially an act of 
consciousness, of awareness. We cannot observe (conceptualize, examine, 
etc.) that which we are not aware of, that which is out of our attentional 
focus. What is left out of our attentional focus may, many times, interfere or 
modulate our observations (e.g., what psychologists study under the name of 
‘implicit memory’, ‘priming effect’ and similar), but that is something 
different. This means that, although the observer is always a human being, 
the human being is not at every moment and in every respect an observer. In 
our daily life, actually, a fundamental part of our functioning occurs in non-
observational terms. Those familiarized with the classical Heideggerian 
distinction between ‘readiness-to-hand’ and ‘presence-at-hand’ may, 
perhaps, appreciate this point in a relatively easy way. In our quotidian 
experience, we find ourselves ‘immersed’ in a series of actions whose 
realization does not require our conscious attention, or in which certain 
objects (tools) become ‘phenomenologically transparent’ to us. Such 
experiential condition is what Heidegger called ‘readiness-to-hand’. But also 
we continuously face situations in which our attention and conscious 
thematization is required. This second condition, in which the world (some 
portion or aspect of it) appears as something separated from our experiential 





cases ‘un-readiness-to-hand’; a sort of attenuated version of ‘presence-at-
hand’. See Wheeler, 2014). Without necessarily establishing a strict parallel 
with the Heideggerian scheme, one might say that, in our daily life, there is 
always a part of us that is simply ‘absorbed’ in the action, operating in non-
observational terms (i.e., without conceptualization or conscious 
thematization), and another part that, in a ‘detached’ attitude, operates in 
observational terms.  
Usually, when we speak of observation we tend to think of visual 
perception, of someone watching something (e.g., when we want to 
represent graphically an observer or an act of observation, generally we draw 
an eye). Nonetheless, the experiential base of an observation need not be 
visual. Any perceptual modality, any sensorial channel can provide enough 
experiential material for an act of observation. The act of observation, recall, 
is defined here essentially as a linguistic (conceptually mediated) attentional 
act. For example, the blind person that recognizes a laptop by touching it 
acts as an observer. The physician that, using a stethoscope, auscultates the 
heartbeats of a patient acts as an observer too. All professional tasters and 
smellers hired by the companies to test the quality of their products 
(chocolates, perfumes, etc.), act not only as observers but as expert 
observers. Even more, every time we examine introspectively our thoughts 
or feelings—whose psychological content, strictly speaking, we cannot see, 
hear, touch, taste or smell—we act as observers too. The only difference is 




1.1.1 Explanations, naturalism and naturalization 
 
One of the most common practices in us observers is asking for and giving 
explanations. Explanations—viewed not from a logical viewpoint but rather 
from a pragmatic linguistic perspective—are basically answers to certain 





that ask for explanations usually start with interrogative adverbs such as 
“how” or “why”, and may be formulated both explicitly and implicitly. 
When we ask for an explanation, what we want to know is essentially the 
“how” (the mechanism, the process, the functioning) or the “why” (the 
causes, the reasons) of something (a phenomenon, a state of affairs, a 
behavior, etc.). Asking for and giving explanations are linguistic acts that 
have to do, in the case of the interrogative act, with the feeling or recognition 
of a certain degree of ignorance (and the desire to dissipate it), and in the 
case of the explaining act, with the proposal of an answer associated to a 
certain knowledge (or presumption of knowledge)
3
. The linguistic unities 
(words, concepts, sentences, etc.) included in an explaining act may take 
different forms. Nonetheless, most of the time explanations take the form of 
a set of propositions. That is, most of the explanations consist in explanatory 
propositions.  
In every explaining act we can distinguish at least three basic elements: a) 
the explanation itself (the propositional content of the explanatory act), b) 
that which is explained (the explanandum), and c) that which explains the 
explanandum (the explanans). For example, someone asks you “Why are 
you getting to the meeting so late?” And you reply “Because there was a 
traffic jam on the way.” The explanandum is the fact that you are late to the 
meeting. The explanation is the propositional content of the utterance 
“Because there was a traffic jam on the way.” And the explanans is the fact 
in the world that there was a traffic jam on the way. There are different kinds 
of explaining acts (as we shall see), but most of them share this basic 
structure. 
I would like to remark, before going further, some trivial—and, perhaps 
thus, usually overlooked—points about explanations. Explanations are things 
that we human beings say to other human beings or to ourselves. All the 
explanations are formulated, thought, said or written by someone at a 
determinate moment. That is, there exist only human explanations. 
                                                          
3
 According to the standard pragmatic taxonomy, an interrogative act is a form of 
‘directive’ or ‘exercitive’ act, and an explanatory act is a form of ‘representative’ or 
‘expositive’ act (Searle, 1975; Austin, 1962). Here I use the notion of ‘linguistic 
act’, and not the more traditional pragmatic notion of ‘speech act’, basically to 





Explanations take place in an experiential context that has to do with human 
curiosity and understanding. We ask for explanations because we feel 
curious about something, because we want to understand something. 
Explanations, when successful, are discursive acts through which we obtain 
a particular kind of experience; the experience of understanding
4
. But 
explanations, as discursive acts, involve in turn a particular kind of 
experience, i.e., the experience of explaining. Explanations, so to speak, are 
born, live and die without ever leaving the realm of human experience. 
Nonetheless, explanations operate in an experiential metadomain with 
respect to what that they aim to explain, i.e., with respect to their 
explanandum. Explanations do not constitute, nor can they replace, what 
they aim to explain (Maturana, 1988). This distinction is trivial but 
important.  
An explanation of a phenomenon X is a linguistic construction that we 
use to understand, know or make sense of X, but it is not X. Even more, X 
may have such and such ontological structure, such and such metaphysical 
constitution, but its explanation, to be successful, does not necessarily have 
to mirror such structure or constitution. The conceptual reconstruction of X, 
with strict fidelity to its metaphysical determinations, is just one of the many 
ways in which we can explain X. For example, a child asks “Why is it 
raining?” and his grandpa replies “Because trees need water to survive.” 
Watching the rain falling over the trees, the child comments in agreement 
“Trees are happy with the rain”, and goes back to play. The explanation, 
from a pragmatic point of view, is successful to the extent that the child feels 
satisfied with it (at least until the next day). Yet although it is true that trees 
need water to survive, that condition is not the physical condition that 
produces the rain. The atmospheric event that we call rain has certain 
physical determinations that have to do with the mass, volume, density, 
altitude and electric charge of the clouds, the ambient temperature, the 
atmospheric pressure, etc. A strict reconstruction of the physical mechanisms 
that produce the rain will speak of these kinds of variables, and the fact that 
                                                          
4
 This is not to say that explanations are the only way of obtaining understanding. 





trees need water to survive will not appear in any place. That is the plane of 
the metaphysical constitution of the phenomenon of rain. But in the 
pragmatic plane of the explanatory act, in the experiential domain of 
understanding, saying that trees need water to survive works perfectly well, 
at least for the child’s requirements.  
In general, the pragmatic success of our explanations can be relatively 
independent of the degree in which they reflect the ontological 
determinations of the explanandum. In other words, explanatory goodness or 
success does not always mean explanatory correctness (Khalifa, 2013).   
The value of these trivialities will become, I hope, clearer as long as we 
begin to address the central topic of this thesis.  But the basic point to bear in 
mind is that explanations that seem effective from a pragmatic point of view, 
may well be incorrect from the point of view of their ontological adequacy. 
Many explanations, intuitive or even able to evoke a certain experience of 
understanding in the observer, prove to be linguistic constructions that have 
little or nothing to do with the metaphysical determinations, the structure and 
functioning of the system to be explained (see, for example, in Chapter 2, 
Ashby’s analysis of the concept of ‘memory’ as an explanatory construct).   
We can ask for explanations about almost everything and in a practically 
endless form (children know this very well and enjoy exasperating their 
parents with interminable chains of “Why?”). Depending on the observer or 
community of observers that receives and evaluates them, explanations may 
be legitimate or illegitimate, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, strong or weak, 
better or worse, etc. An explanation is legitimate when it meets the criterion 
of validation from the observer or community of observers that has asked for 
the explanation. Criteria of validation are sets of assumptions, principles, 
rules or conventions that define the type of linguistic act (its form and 
content) that can be accepted as an explanation. Illegitimate explanations are 
explanations that, for one or another reason, do not meet such criteria. 
Satisfactory explanations are those that satisfy, at least for a moment, the 
curiosity of the observer or community of observers that has asked for 
explanations (unsatisfactory explanations are those that fail to do so).  
To an observer, a legitimate explanation may be more or less satisfactory 





unsatisfactory. I say ‘almost’, because in certain circumstances the observer 
can negotiate her criteria of validation for the sake of other psychological 
benefits. For example, a naturalistic layperson, in normal conditions, does 
not accept explanations that resort to spiritual elements, Tarot cards or things 
like that. They are at odds with her basic ontology and are viewed as 
illegitimate explanations. For that very reason, these explanations are not 
satisfactory; they do not dissipate her curiosity. Nonetheless, under 
exceptional conditions, typically highly stressful situations (a natural 
catastrophe, the diagnosis of a terminal disease, etc.), this very naturalistic 
layperson may start to accept spiritual or occultist explanations. Not 
necessarily because she has changed her basic ontology, say, because she 
now thinks that there exist real spiritual forces in the world, but rather 
because these kinds of explanations may offer an opportune and much 
needed emotional compensation, a sort of “deep sense of life and death” that 
helps her to cope with bewilderment, fear or uncertainty. Our questions, and 
the curiosity that grounds them, have components both intellectual and 
emotional, and our attitude towards different kinds of explanations changes 
or moves according to them (Gopnik, 1998). 
Two or more explanations that are legitimate and equally satisfactory to a 
community of observers may be estimated according to additional criteria, 
such as simplicity, internal coherence, congruence with some already 
established knowledge, or others. In that way, if the observers want, they 
may come to decide which explanation is the “best one”.   
Since criteria of validation are conventions, they may take different 
forms. Some criteria may focus on the propositional aspects of the 
explanation (e.g., its semantic content), whilst others may focus on extra-
propositional or pragmatic aspects (e.g., authority of the speaker, rhetoric or 
stylistic aspects, etc.). Some criteria require the rational demonstration of the 
explanatory proposition, whilst others require, in addition, some kind of 
empirical support.  
One of the basic criteria, not the only one, with which the observer 
evaluates the legitimacy of an explanation is the degree of congruence or 
compatibility between the metaphysical frame that she subscribes to and the 





frame’ I understand, roughly, a certain ontology governed by a set of 
metaphysical principles. An observer or community of observers X 
considers that an explanation Y is legitimate if Y refers to entities and 
phenomena that form part of—or that at least are compatible with—the 
ontology subscribed to by X, and if Y does not violate any metaphysical 
principle considered as valid for said ontology. For example, to a pagan 
culture, an explanation that resorts to magic phenomena, spells, demons and 
malign forces is a perfectly legitimate explanation, basically because it 
resorts to entities (demons, malign forces) and phenomena (magic, spells) 
that form part of the pagan metaphysics. To some religious communities 
(e.g., the catholic community), an explanation that resorts to magic 
phenomena and spells is not a legitimate explanation, but one that resorts to 
miracles is (miracles have a divine origin, while magic and spells are 
considered pagan heresies). To an animistic community, the most sensible 
explanation for the occurrence of a tsunami is that the sea has got angry for 
some reason (typically the misbehavior of a member of the community) and 
has decided to punish them in an exemplary way.  
Each explanatory system—magical, religious, animist—is valid within a 
determinate metaphysical frame, and each metaphysical frame corresponds 
to a set of beliefs shared by a concrete community. These beliefs, most of the 
time, operate in implicit form; i.e., they are rarely defined in an explicit and 
systematic way. Through its metaphysical frame each community defines, 
with more or less precision, that which counts as real and that which counts 
as unreal or fictitious, that which seems ontologically possible and that 
which seems ontologically impossible. Every metaphysical frame is, 
ultimately, a particular human construction.  
Naturalistic explanations are no different in this sense. They are valid 
only within a determinate metaphysical frame, namely the naturalistic 
metaphysical frame. This point may seem quite obvious; naturalistic 
explanations are, of course, those that follow a naturalistic metaphysical 
frame. What may not be so obvious is the meaning of the expression 
‘naturalistic metaphysical frame’.  What are the main characteristics of a 
naturalistic metaphysics? What is naturalism? When we hold that something 







There are several kinds of naturalism, and various senses in which one can 
understand terms such as ‘natural’, ‘nature’ or ‘naturalism’ (Flanagan, 2006; 
Rosenberg, 1996). At the most basic metaphysical level, when we say that 
something is natural we simply mean that it is not supernatural; where 
supernatural includes, in a non-exhaustive list, entities or phenomena such as 
deities, demons, ghosts, goblins, witches, magic, spells, miracles, etc. (the 
metaphysical reasons for considering these entities and phenomena 
supernatural will be examined in Chapter 2). This is a basic distinction that 
separates the realm of the natural from the realm of the supernatural (Stroud, 
1996).  
Now, within the realm of the natural (i.e., non supernatural), we use the 
word natural to make a further distinction. We say that something is natural 
to mean that it is not artificial, i.e., that it has not been created or altered by 
human beings. For example, we distinguish between natural and artificial 
diamonds, natural and artificial lakes, etc. This is also the sense in which we 
distinguish between natural and social phenomena, and, correlatively, 
between natural and human (or social) sciences. We say that the human 
social world, and everything that human beings produce and create there 
(institutions, cities, laws, etc.), is not natural, not because it is supernatural 
but because it is cultural. That is, because it has been created according to 
the will of human beings or by means of social conventions.  
We have therefore two senses of ‘natural’ here: natural as opposed to 
supernatural, and natural as opposed to unnatural (artificial, cultural). To 
avoid confusions, I propose to use the word Natural, capitalized, to name the 
realm of everything that is not supernatural, and the word natural, in lower 
case, to name that portion of Nature that is not artificial, manmade or 
cultural. So, while planets, volcanoes, political constitutions and 
philosophical theories are all Natural entities, only planets and volcanoes are 
natural in the aforementioned narrower sense. It follows from this 
characterization, for example, that the so called formal sciences (e.g., 
mathematics, logic, cryptography, etc.) are Natural sciences too, in spite of 





numbers, propositions and codes; all of them human creations and therefore 
non supernatural.  
Under the same criterion, it also follows that a good portion of 
philosophy works in fact as a Naturalistic discipline, at least in its 
contemporary version. The overwhelming majority of the contemporary 
philosophical research, in its distinct branches, develops through 
argumentations and critical reflections that do not assume any serious 
commitment to any supernatural element (or at least this author has rarely 
found them in his readings). Philosophers may use Gedankenexperimente 
and play with many kinds of possible worlds, sometimes positing entities or 
conditions with supernatural characteristics, but they rarely take that exercise 
at face value. What they do is to use the conceivability of those thought 
elements as an argumentative tool to examine either the validity or the 
soundness of some reasoning, not to defend the existence of supernatural 
entities.  
Notice that this Naturalistic interpretation of philosophy is not necessarily 
equivalent to the metaphilosophical stance that conceives of philosophy as a 
discipline that is (or that must be) continuous with natural sciences. I am not 
saying that philosophy is or must be an extension of natural sciences. My 
characterization, as I see it, is more liberal or modest, and leaves enough 
room for establishing diverse forms of relationship between philosophy and 
science.   
Now, the distinction between the natural world and human (cultural) 
world must be understood properly. Not everything that originates with 
humans necessarily counts as manmade. For example, the gaseous 
composition of the atmosphere is constantly modified (in a minimal 
proportion, but modified nonetheless) by our respiratory metabolism as 
species, but it is also modified by the way in which we use a series of 
chemical products, many of them synthesized by us. In the first case we alter 
the atmosphere as a result of our existence as living beings, just like 
microalgae and trees do.  And we do it in the way in which our physiology, 
not our will, determines (taking in oxygen and delivering CO2).  In the 
second case, instead, we alter the atmosphere as a result of our intentional 





first case our intervention is as biological organisms, i.e., we cause a natural 
alteration of the atmosphere. In the second case we intervene as human 
beings; i.e., we cause an artificial alteration of the atmosphere. 
Within the realm of the Natural, the distinction between the genuinely 
human and the natural is not entirely neat, as it depends, to a large extent, on 
the kind of philosophical anthropology that one subscribes to (i.e., the 
features or properties that one assumes as distinctively human). Still, we can 
make some general distinctions, or better said, prevent at least a couple of 
basic and recurrent confusions. There are two main ways of mistaking the 
relationship between the human world and the natural world. The first one is 
to attribute natural character to entities or phenomena whose character is 
artificial (social, conventional). The second one is to attribute human 
character to entities or phenomena whose character is natural. The first 
mistake consists in a sort of over-naturalization, and the second one is 
typically known as anthropomorphism.  
Examples of over-naturalization can be found in what Marx understood 
as ideological conceptions of the social reality. Social orders which, being 
social, are essentially historical and in principle modifiable, are presented as 
natural orders that, because they are natural, cannot or must not be modified. 
For example, classical liberalists of the XVIII and XIX centuries, in their 
defense of the then flourishing capitalist economic system, usually engaged 
in this kind of over-naturalization. They presented the capitalist system as a 
‘natural’ order (a sort of providential harmony) in which any human attempt 
to intervene could only cause imbalance and malfunctioning. These views, 
said Marx, aimed to legitimize (consciously or unconsciously) hierarchies of 
domination and relations of exploitation sanctioning them as ‘natural’, 
namely independent of human will and unchangeable. In general terms, there 
is over-naturalization every time we assign natural character to entities or 
conditions whose origin is human (in the relevant sense). The idea of over-
naturalization will be taken up again later on in this thesis. It will be argued 
that a good part of the so called philosophical projects of ‘naturalization’—
conspicuously, the naturalization of intentionality and representational 
content, norms and purposes,—are ultimately projects of over-naturalization.  





natural entities or phenomena. When one of us attributes human features to 
entities such as planets, rivers or volcanoes, the anthropomorphic projection 
is easy to detect (as in the example of the animist community mentioned 
before). Yet when one of us attributes human features to non-human entities 
that have certain closeness to us, the task is more difficult. For example, all 
non-human entities that belong to our proximate genus, i.e., animals or living 
beings in general, are susceptible of unnoticed anthropomorphic projections. 
Ethologists, and specially primatologists, are well aware of this 
anthropomorphic tendency and maintain a permanent methodological 
vigilance toward it (Wynne, 2007, 2004; Tyler, 2003; Mitchell and Hamm, 
1996; Kennedy, 1992).  
Similarly, most of the non-human entities that are products of human 
design, i.e., artifacts, tools and artificial systems in general, are susceptible to 
unnoticed anthropomorphic projections too (von Foerster, 1970). 
Engineering systems are usually described and interpreted with notions such 
as ‘governor’, ‘controller’, ‘command’, ‘instructions’, and similar. These 
notions, strictly speaking, are social-communicational metaphors that belong 
to the world of human relations. In strictly engineering contexts, I would say, 
these metaphors are innocent. The problem, for us, arises when certain 
biological systems are studied from the viewpoint of design, by analogy to 
engineering systems. Then, we start to hear that such and such biological 
structure ‘controls’ or ‘monitors’ such and such function, that such and such 
subsystem ‘commands’ and ‘regulates’ such and such task, ‘giving 
instructions’ to such and such subsystems, and so on and so forth. 
Especially interesting is the case of entities that, whilst not being human, 
form part of the biological structure of humans. The most relevant case for 
our discussion here is that of the brain and the nervous system. These 
systems—that are not human but that have a relevant participation in the 
generation of all behaviors that we consider distinctively human—have been 
one of the favorite targets for all kinds of (sometimes very sophisticated) 
anthropomorphic projections. And philosophers of mind and cognitive 
scientists, truth be told, have not been particularly skillful at detecting them. 
Far from that, I would say that many of them have been, wittingly or 





For example, every time the brain and the nervous system are analyzed 
by analogy to engineering systems, they typically appear as control systems, 
commanding and monitoring tasks, receiving and sending instructions. Other 
times they are examined by analogy to human organizations, with plans, 
goals, tasks to fulfill, control hierarchies, communication channels and flows 
of messages, codes, etc. Or sometimes, directly, they are endowed with the 
very intellectual human abilities whose neural basis one is trying to 
understand. The brain appears ‘inferring’ such and such things about the 
world, ‘predicting’ such and such events, ‘formulating and contrasting 
hypotheses’ about such and such state of affairs, etc.  
One of the main strategies of this thesis is to insist in the idea that the 
brain and the nervous system are entities that, though they exist in us, do not 
exist like us, and that a proper naturalistic characterization of their 
functioning must exclude every kind of anthropomorphic projection.  
Some anthropomorphic projections are very difficult to detect, not 
because of the closeness of the target, but because of the high degree of 
abstraction of the projected human issue. If I say that my laptop is not 
working because it is sad and tired, you will detect the anthropomorphic 
projection easily. If, instead, a physicist says that quantum subatomic 
systems are probabilistic systems, a cardiologist that your heart is 
malfunctioning, or a botanist that the number of rings in a trunk carries 
information about the age of the tree, you will not think, at least at first 
instance, that they are committing any anthropomorphic projection. 
Nonetheless, as it will be argued later on, epistemic states, normative values, 
modal spaces, among other categories, seem to be nothing more than mental 
constructions that we use as observes to make sense of what we observe. 
They are ways of framing our observation, not properties of the observed 
systems (not at least when the observed systems are natural systems). In 
cases like these, where the anthropomorphic projection has to do specifically 
with our condition as observers, I shall speak of ‘observational projections’. 
Due to their highly abstract character, their ‘transparency’, so to speak, these 
forms of anthropomorphism are the most dangerous. They take subtle forms 
and are presented many times under apparently innocent labels such as 





moments along this thesis, several of these observational projections. Their 
detection and identification are the most important for our philosophical 
enterprise. 
Over-naturalization and anthropomorphism are unsound forms of 
Naturalism; they confuse the realm of the natural with the realm of the 
cultural-artificial, or, at a more abstract level, the constitutive conditions of 
the observation with the constitutive conditions of the observed systems. A 
sound or strict Naturalism, hereafter Strict Naturalism, is that which is free 
of over-naturalizations, anthropomorphisms and observational projections. 
Strict Naturalism is the only kind of Naturalism that we will consider 




We have distinguished between Naturalism and naturalism. Correlatively, 
we can also distinguish between Naturalization and naturalization. Let us 
start with the notion of Naturalization. What does it mean to Naturalize 
something? In a minimal sense, to Naturalize something, say a phenomenon 
X, is simply to conceive of X in terms that are compatible with a Naturalistic 
metaphysical frame (i.e., with a non-supernatural metaphysics). For 
example, to Naturalize the origin of the universe is, in the first place, to 
assume that whatever happened there happened in strict accordance with a 
Naturalistic metaphysics. Two people, a believer and an atheist, may ignore 
almost everything about the origin of the universe, but they still can hold 
different conceptions of it. The believer says that whatever happened in the 
origin of the universe, it happened by the action of God. The atheist, instead, 
says that whatever happened there it happened as a Natural phenomenon, 
without the intervention of any divine action. The atheist does not have at 
hand any explanation about the origin of the universe, her ignorance is 
almost absolute, but she does have a Naturalistic conception of it. To that 
extent, and in the most basic sense, she has Naturalized the origin of the 
universe.  
This is a minimal sense of Naturalization, but one that is fundamental, or 





conception but also an explanation in Naturalist terms. The believer might 
reply, “You can say that you have Naturalized the origin of the universe only 
once you have provided a Naturalistic explanation about it, not a mere 
conception. No Naturalistic explanation, no Naturalization.” I agree that, for 
a defense of Naturalism, it is very good to have a Naturalistic explanation at 
hand, but I think that is not the decisive point. Naturalism is essentially a 
matter of metaphysical conception, of ontology, and this aspect should have 
priority over epistemological considerations. We will analyze this idea in 
detail soon (see the example of the exorcism below). Let us now review the 
notion of naturalization.  
What does it mean to naturalize something? In a minimal sense, to 
naturalize something, say a phenomenon X, is to conceive of X in terms that 
respect a Strict Naturalistic frame. That is, if X is a natural entity or 
phenomenon, to conceive of X as being natural, and if X is a human-cultural 
entity or phenomenon, to conceive of X as being human-cultural. In other 
words, to naturalize something is to liberate it from either anthropomorphic 
projections (including observational projections) or over-naturalizations, 
depending on the particular case. Aristotelian (or ancient) physics was 
essentially a Naturalistic system (no miracles, no magic), yet within that 
category it was an anthropomorphic system (an unsound naturalism). It 
attributed psychological states such as purposes and interests to physical 
phenomena (e.g., “bodies seek their natural resting state”). Modern (or 
Galilean) physics did not need to Naturalize Aristotelian physics but only 
naturalize it; i.e., to remove any trace of psychologism and teleology in the 
physical phenomena.  
As in the case of Naturalization, I think that naturalization is primarily a 
matter of metaphysical conception, and only secondarily a matter of 
explanation. Why this priority of metaphysical considerations over 
epistemological considerations? Why should a determinate metaphysical 
conception have priority over a determinate explanatory construction? Let 
me illustrate the idea through a somewhat dramatic example. In many 
communities and for a long time, epileptic seizures were viewed as 
manifestations or proofs of demoniac possession. Their “treatment” 





Suppose we are back in the Middle Ages. A common citizen and a priest 
are having a long discussion about how to treat a child that suffers from 
epileptic fits. The citizen claims that the seizures have nothing to do with 
alleged demoniac forces—which he considers fictions—but with certain 
biological disorders, and therefore that exorcisms are useless and 
unnecessary tortures. The priest claims the contrary—for him demoniac 
forces are not fictions but real entities—and suggests that, instead of wasting 
time discussing the issue, they should start the exorcism as soon as possible. 
To close the debate about the causes of the seizures (and their consequent 
treatment), the audience suggests that the final decision must be made on the 
basis of the “best explanation”. If the best explanation is purely biological, 
then there is no need to assume the existence of demoniac forces, and 
exorcism is discarded as a treatment. But if the best explanation is in terms 
of demoniac forces, then they are entitled to believe that demoniac forces 
really exist, and hence that exorcism is justified as a treatment.  
The medieval citizen, ignorant about the physiological anatomy of the 
brain and its complex balance of neurotransmitters, manages to elaborate a 
rather poor, vague and unconvincing explanation for the seizures.  The 
priest, with triumphal air, provides a full and detailed explanation of the way 
in which evil takes over the soul of weak persons, and of how exorcisms, 
when properly executed, manage to drive away the demoniac forces.  
In a scenario like this, surely most of us would like to favor the citizen’s 
opinion, even in absence of a good explanation. We would prefer a 
Naturalistic conception of the seizures rather than a detailed supernatural 
explanation of their causes. In a case like this, I guess, we would not be 
happy with a rule of the type “inference to the best explanation” (informally 
speaking). We would like to make the audience understand, for the sake of 
the child, that these two explanations cannot be compared and measured 
under the same terms; that they belong to entirely different metaphysical 
frames, and that what should be assessed in the first place are precisely these 
metaphysical frames, not the explanations as isolated elements.  
The moral of this example should be relatively clear, but I need to make 
it explicit:  





explanations, it is a good practice to check the metaphysical frames upon 
which they are grounded. If they share the same metaphysical frame, we 
can proceed to compare them in a direct way on the base of a set of 
accorded criteria. If, instead, the explanations are grounded on different 
metaphysical frames, then we have to step back and start to evaluate the 
corresponding metaphysical frames. 
2. Sometimes it is better to have at hand a robust (well established, safe) 
metaphysical frame accompanied by a bad (incomplete, poor, unclear) 
explanation than a very good (complete, detailed, clear) explanation 
based on a weak (uncertain, unstable) metaphysical frame. A modest hut 
built on firm ground may be, in the long term, better than a luxurious 
palace built on swampy ground.   
 
What is the point of all these considerations? The point is this: What I want 
to hold in this thesis is an unrestricted commitment to a Strict Naturalistic 
conception of the world and its phenomena, irrespective of whether or not 
we are able to enrich said conception with a Strict Naturalistic explanation. 
If in this thesis, and despite our best efforts, we cannot provide a Strict 
Naturalistic explanation of those phenomena that interest us, we will 
conclude that, by this time, we have failed to provide such an explanation. 
Yet we will never negotiate, as a way of obtaining some sort of substitute 
explanation, our Strict Naturalistic conception of them. That is, we will 
never recur to anthropomorphisms, observational projections or over-
naturalizations as explanatory strategies.  
 
 
1.2 What we want to explain and understand in 
this thesis, and the way we want to do it 
 
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, in this thesis we want to explain and 
understand basically two things. First, we want to explain and understand 
living beings’ behavior. How—i.e. through what kinds of processes and 





nature of living systems that causes them to behave the way they do? 
Second, we want to understand how mental phenomena appear in the life of 
some living beings; the natural conditions under which certain living beings 
exhibit mental phenomena. Those are our questions.  
To answer these questions we will adopt, as it has been explained, a Strict 
Naturalistic stance. According to this stance, living beings are natural 
systems and must be studied as such; that is, by appealing to the same 
ontological assumptions and explanatory principles that we use to study any 
natural system in general. Which are these ontological assumptions and 
explanatory principles? We have said that Strict Naturalism is a specific 
form of Naturalism, namely that which is free of over-naturalizations, 
anthropomorphisms and observational projections. But, in concrete, how do 
we translate this requirement to the case of living beings? How strict should 
our Strict Naturalism be with respect to living beings? Let us review this 
point through some examples. 
When we study a river, we do not think of it as moving according to 
goals, purposes or ends. We do not say—when we are engaged in serious 
scientific discourse—that it tries to reach the sea, or that, in spite of the 
obstacles (rocks, cliffs), it succeeds in reaching the sea. We do not say these 
kinds of things because the river, strictly speaking, is not trying to do 
anything; it just obeys natural laws. We assume that natural systems are non-
teleological (purposeless) systems.  
In the same way, and for the same reason, we do not think of natural 
systems as acting in terms of means and ends. The Sun generates light 
through thermonuclear fusion, but the Sun does not use thermonuclear fusion 
as a means to generate light. Natural entities, strictly speaking, do not use 
things; they are not users.  A user is an entity for which certain things appear 
as means for certain ends. But the Sun, in producing thermonuclear fusion, 
does not have in view any end in particular; it just happens that the emission 
of light is a consequence of thermonuclear processes. Natural systems do not 
interact with the world in terms of means and ends; they only interact in 
causal terms. Likewise, natural entities neither face nor solve problems. 
Nature, taken in itself, has no problems. A state of affairs may turn into a 





or judges a certain state of affairs as positive or negative with respect to 
some ends. Again, the Sun generates light through thermonuclear fusion, but 
the Sun, by producing thermonuclear fusion, is not ‘solving the problem’ of 
light generation.  
When we observe a solar eclipse, we do not say that the Moon, blocking 
the Sun and shadowing the Earth, has ‘made a mistake’. The Moon’s 
movements are never right or wrong, good or bad, successful or unsuccessful 
in themselves; they just are. The Moon does not have any duty to fulfill; its 
behavior is not a matter of must or ought. We conceive of natural systems as 
non-normative systems.  
When we study a lightning flash, we do not think of it as strictly speaking 
evaluating possibilities of action, as choosing, out of a set of alternatives, its 
own path to the ground. Nor do we say that the lightning controls or 
regulates, as a pilot, its trajectory to the ground. We do not think of natural 
systems as agents that choose what to do and control their behavior. We 
assume that natural systems behave according to laws and physical 
conditions that are given.  
When we study the correlative movements of the Moon and tides, we 
observe a strict covariation. Yet we do not think of them as coordinating 
their displacements by means of messages, signs, codes, instructions, or 
some form of semantic interaction in which they act as interpreters. We do 
not think of tides as responding to the Moon’s movements on the basis of 
informational contents, representations or intentional states. We assume that 
natural systems relate to each other in strictly physical-causal terms.  
Ultimately, and perhaps for all the aforementioned reasons, i.e., because 
they are not the kinds of systems that can be evaluated in terms of success or 
failure, because they do not try to fulfill any task or goal, because their 
behavior is never a matter of choice, we do not think of natural systems as 
being more or less intelligent, or more or less stupid. Nor do we explain their 
behavior in epistemic terms. If a group of comets pass very close to Jupiter, 
and all except one of them collide and disintegrate, we do not say that this 
comet has a better knowledge of gravitational fields. Natural systems do not 





anything. Natural systems’ behavior is neither intelligent nor stupid; it is 
simply the result of laws and physical conditions that are given.  
In this thesis, Strict Naturalism is the claim that living beings are natural 
systems, and that they must be studied by appealing to the same ontological 
assumptions and explanatory principles that we use to study any natural 
system in general. In so doing, notice, we are not denying that living beings 
have unique and distinctive features as natural systems (we will review some 
of them); we only assert that those features do not set living beings apart 
from the rest of natural systems. Following this requirement, in this thesis 
we will characterize living beings’ behavior in terms of what Maturana, in 
line with Ashby’s cybernetic approach (Ashby, 1960), calls ‘structural drift’ 
(Maturana, 2003).  
The notion of structural drift has two complementary connotations. First, 
the concept of drift means that the system exists and behaves in a 
deterministic way, without purposes, possibilities of choice, or ability to 
control its behavior (as opposed to a boat controlled by a helmsman who 
chooses a route according to some goal). Second, that the drift is structural 
means that the system’s behavior is determined solely by material or 
physical factors (forces, energy, etc.), not by epistemic, normative, 
intentional or semantic factors. Assuming that living beings are systems in 
structural drift is to assume, therefore, that they (i) do not follow any purpose 
or goal, (ii) do not have possibility of choice, and (iii) do not have control 
over their behavior. If living beings are drifting systems, then they are 
strictly deterministic systems. Complementarily, if the drift of living beings 
is structural (not epistemic, normative, semantic or intentional), then (i) 
living beings do not host epistemic states or processes, (ii) their behavior is 
never intelligent or stupid, good or bad, successful or unsuccessful, and (iii) 
their relationship with the environment is strictly structural (not epistemic, 
normative, semantic or intentional).  
Thus, to say it with Ashby’s words, in this thesis “[i]t will be assumed 
throughout that [...] an animal [or a living system in general] behaved in a 
certain way at a certain moment because its physical and chemical nature at 






This is a way of thinking about living beings that we will assume as our 
starting point, but also, a way of thinking that the thesis, through its different 
chapters, will try to vindicate. That is, unless we find legitimate, compelling 
reasons to think otherwise, we will understand living beings according to the 
Strict Naturalistic framework above described, i.e., as systems in structural 
drift. (The thesis will try to show that there are not such compelling reasons).  
 
 
1.2.1 The cognitive construction of living beings 
 
When viewed from a Strict Naturalistic framework, living beings seem to 
lose the epistemic and intentional flavor to which we, cognitive scientists 
and philosophers, are used to. When we observe a living being in its 
environment, we typically tend to assume, implicitly or explicitly, at least 
four things.  
First, we tend to see the living being as trying to solve some problem or 
fulfill a task (e.g., how to get food, how to escape from predators, how to 
reproduce, etc.). Generally, we assume that living beings try to stay alive as 
much as they can, or that they want to ensure the continuity of the species. 
When we do that, we frame living beings within a normative and teleological 
context, which allows us to evaluate whether or not their behavior is 
successful or adequate. On this basis, generally, we decide whether or not 
the organism’s behavior is intelligent. By extension, and also by 
decomposition, we tend to do the same with the organism’s subsystems. For 
example, in animals, we tend to see their nervous system, and specially the 
brain, as solving sub-problems or fulfilling sub-tasks (e.g., detecting features 
of the environment, commanding responses), and through them, as 
contributing to meeting the general goals of the organism.  
Second, we tend to see living beings as agents that, before a problem or 
determinate situation, have the ability to choose what to do, or that have 
some degree of control or regulation over their behavior. In animals, for 





regulates and monitors the organism’s behavior. Basically, living beings 
appear to us as systems that, somehow, escape brute and blind determinism, 
and to that extent, as systems that manifest some degree of agency or 
freedom of action.  
Third, we tend to assume that living beings are systems open and oriented 
to the environment, with sensory ‘windows’ that allow them to pick up 
stimuli from the external world (sensation and perception), and effector 
organs that allow them to act upon said external world (action). Intuitively, 
we see living beings as having an external world before them; a world 
toward which they (need to) direct their sensory windows and their action, 
and with respect to which they need to adapt. 
Fourth, as long as living beings are viewed as agents that try to solve 
problems, their interaction with the environment (and by extension their 
internal states), are usually interpreted in epistemic or cognitive terms. 
Living beings not only exist in the world, they ‘know’, or ‘need to know’, 
the world in which they exist. The epistemic interpretation of living beings, 
or their subsystems (typically the nervous system), may come in different 
versions. One version, perhaps the more traditional, assumes that living 
beings know the world in which they live in a more or less indirect way, i.e., 
through the mediation of internal representations or some form of internal 
modeling. Other, less traditional versions, see living beings as having a non-
representational epistemic contact with the environment, either in terms of 
direct ecological information about opportunities for action (e.g., Gibson, 
1966, 1979; Chemero, 2009), or in terms of sensorimotor (contentless) 
intentionality, sense-making, meaning creation and similar 
phenomenological characterizations (e.g., enactive approaches. See Weber 
and Varela, 2002; Thompson, 2007; Hutto and Myin, 2013). What remains 
as a common denominator is the view of living beings as epistemic or 
cognitive agents.   
When combined, these four assumptions constitute what we might call 
the ‘cognitive construction’ of living beings; that is, living beings as objects 
of study for the particular interests of the cognitive scientist and philosopher. 
Our Strict Naturalism claims that the cognitive construction of living beings 





natural systems. In certain contexts, this ‘construction’ of living beings as 
cognitive agents may be a legitimate exercise. I wish, however, to 
distinguish sharply between an ontological characterization of a natural 
system and its observer-relative construction.  
For example, when a chemist sees a piece of gold, what she sees is a 
determinate molecular composition and a series of natural properties (atomic 
weight, melting point, malleability, conductivity, etc.). When the economist 
sees a piece of gold what he sees is richness, a certain amount of value and 
an associated price in the market. The ontology of gold as a natural element 
corresponds to the characterization provided by the chemist (gold as a 
natural kind). The economist deals with gold as a precious metal, as an 
object of value within the context of human interests and institutions (gold as 
a conventional kind). Atomic weight and electron configuration are intrinsic 
properties of gold; market value and price are relative and context dependent 
properties. The status of gold as a precious metal is relative to the needs and 
interests of a certain kind of economic agent that operates in a certain 
historical context. In principle, depending on the economic agent and its 
historical context, any metal might be elevated, at some moment, to the 
category of precious metal.  
The chemist, if asked, may explain the value attributed to gold as rooted, 
in part, in its chemical properties: “We assign to gold the value that we 
assign, in part, because of its non-corrosiveness, its non-reactiveness, its 
malleability, and its easy smelting.” The economist, only under a severe 
confusion, would try to explain the chemical properties of gold as rooted in 
its market value.  
The object of study of the chemist is, thus, ontologically primary (gold as 
a natural kind) with respect to that of the economist (gold as a conventional 
kind). This ontological hierarchy does not render the economist’s knowledge 
superfluous or less important than that of the chemist, or his discipline, 
economics, as less serious and rigorous than chemistry. Yet the hierarchy is 
there, and it is worth acknowledging it to prevent potential 
misinterpretations. 
For example, when the chemist says that the economic value of gold is 





economic value of gold to its natural properties. She is not saying that the 
market value of gold simply equates to its chemical properties. What she 
means is that the natural properties of gold may explain, in part, why, once 
put in the context of human institutions and interests, gold has for us the 
economic value that it has. If the economist misinterpreted the chemist as 
‘naturalizing’ the market value of gold, he would be, in reality, over-
naturalizing his object of study; i.e., taking as natural something that is 
cultural and conventional. The market value of gold is something Natural, 
not something natural. A Strict Naturalistic economist would recognize the 
constructed and conventional character of his object of study, and would not 
ask for over-naturalizations.  
This is the sense in which, as the title says, this thesis wants to speak of 
the “biological roots of cognition.” When viewed from a Strict Naturalistic 
frame, living beings appear as non-epistemic, non-cognitive, non-intentional, 
non-semantic, and non-intelligent systems; that is, devoid of those aspects 
that cognitive science cares about. This characterization corresponds to the 
primary ontology of living beings as natural systems; i.e., as natural kinds. A 
Strictly Naturalistic cognitive science, the kind of cognitive science that I 
favor, would acknowledge the constructed character of living beings as 
cognitive systems, and see, as Ashby (1962) and Maturana (2003) will show 
us, that, in principle, any physical system in interaction with its surrounding 
might be considered, under certain criteria, as an ‘intelligent’ or ‘cognitive’ 
system. Complementarily, such a cognitive science would reject any attempt 
to over-naturalize the aspects that constitute its object of study (i.e., 
intelligence, teleology, normativity, intentionality, etc.).  
In the same way that the chemist may explain, without reduction, the 
economic value assigned to gold as partially rooted in its natural properties 
(its primary ontology), so in this thesis we will try to explain the cognitive 
and intelligent status attributed to living beings as rooted, in part, in their 
primary ontology as natural systems. This explanatory construction, 
metaphysically austere and devoid of those ‘cognitive’ aspects to which we 
are used, perhaps will not be the best one, in comparison to more standard 
‘cognitive’ explanations, in terms of detail, clarity or coverage. Yet, as in the 





of placing living beings in strict continuity with the all other natural systems, 
which is one of our goals in this thesis.  
 
 
1.2.2 Ontology of Living beings 
 
What kinds of natural systems are living beings such that they behave in 
ways that we qualify as intelligent, cognitive, purposeful or intentional? 
Which are, from a Strict Naturalistic viewpoint, the main ontological 
features of living beings? Here is our answer.  
From a Strict Naturalistic viewpoint, living beings may be characterized 
as:  
1. Adaptive dynamic systems  
2. Deterministic machines of closed transitions 
3. Multistable dissipative systems 
4. Organizationally closed systems with respect to (i) their sensorimotor 
activity, and (ii) their molecular productive processes (i.e., autopoietic 
systems) 
 
These four features can explain, we think, living beings’ behavior, and also 
help us to understand why we observers tend to appraise said behavior as 
intelligent, cognitive and purposeful.  
Point 1 says that living beings are adaptive dynamic systems. What does 
this mean? What is a ‘system’? When is a system a ‘dynamic’ system? In 
which sense are living beings ‘adaptive’ systems? The rest of this chapter 
will be dedicated to examine and answer these questions. (Points 2, 3 and 4 









1.3 Distinctions, unities, domains, identities 
 
Every time we observers point out or individuate a unity (thing, object, 
event, phenomenon, etc.) in the concrete field of our sensorial experience or 
in the abstract space of our thought, we perform an act of distinction by 
means of which we separate that which is attended to from a background 
(concrete or abstract) according to some criterion of distinction that we use 
in an explicit or implicit manner (Maturana, 1975; Spencer-Brown, 1979). 
The space, ambit or domain in which a unity (and its correlative background) 
is distinguished may be any; natural, social, physical, conceptual, etc. Thus, 
planets, chairs, subatomic particles, mathematical equations, political 
constitutions, good deeds, wars, unicorns, are all unities of a certain kind 
distinguished in a certain space or domain (concrete, abstract, real, fictional)  
defined by one or more observers. A unity, to put it more simply, may for all 
practical purposes be understood as that which we can mention in language.  
The domain in which the observer distinguishes a unity defines the 
domain of existence of the unity, and the unity, in its specificity, defines in 
turn a particular domain of phenomena and ontological determinations. The 
domain of phenomena of a unity, roughly speaking, is all that may happen 
with the unity; i.e., the total space of its vicissitudes. The domain of its 
ontological determinations is all that the unity is or may be; i.e., the total 
space of its possible determinations or properties. Different unities have 
different ontological and phenomenic domains. For example, If X is a crystal 
glass, it may break; if X is a volume of liquid water, it cannot break. If X is a 
civil law, it can be derogated; if X is a galaxy, it cannot be derogated. If X is 
a human action, it can be altruist or egoist; if X is a mountain, it can be high 
or low, but not altruist or egoist, etc. In other words, each unity admits 
certain predicates (descriptions) and excludes others, which has to do with 
its particular space of existence and its specificity as a unity.  
When the observer perceives or conceives of a unity as interacting with a 
certain surrounding or medium, she deals with an interacting unity. When, 
on the contrary, the observer perceives or conceives of a unity as having no 





(e.g., the Universe, as a whole, is usually considered as an isolated unity).  
When the observer cannot (or does not want to) distinguish further unities 
within the already distinguished unity, she deals with a simple unity. When, 
on the contrary, the observer distinguishes subunities within the already 
distinguished unity (because she can or prefers to do so), the observer deals 
with a composite unity. A simple unity appears as an entity without 
components, i.e., as an unanalyzable or atomic entity, and its properties as 
simple or fundamental properties (Maturana, 1975, 1980, 1981). For 
example, if a unity X, say a cube, is solid, the observer accepts the solidity of 
X as its constitutive property without asking whether there are some 
subunities in X (components) whose properties and relations might account 
for the solidity of X (X simply is solid, period). In the case of a composite 
unity, the observer sees the unity as constituted by a set of components 
arranged in a certain way, and its properties as based on the properties of its 
components plus the particular way in which they are arranged (Maturana, 
1975, 1980, 1981). For example, the observer may explain the solidity of X 
(the cube) in terms of the cohesive force among the molecules that compose 
it.  
A composite unity corresponds to what we usually call ‘system’; an 
assembly of components interconnected in a certain way. Depending on the 
particular space or domain in which we make our distinctions, we may speak 
of physical systems, legal systems, financial systems, etc. Living beings are 
a particular version of physical systems. 
A simple unity exists as a totality. A composite unity, or system, exists 
not only as a totality but also as a set of components. These two domains of 
existence (as a totality and as a set of components) constitute to the observer 
different domains of phenomena that require, in many occasions, different 
descriptions. This means that the observer, in her descriptions, will find that 
there are some concepts or predicates that apply at the level of the totality, 
but not at the level of its components, and vice-versa. In our previous 
example the observer explained the solidity of X (the cube) in terms of the 
cohesive force of the constituent molecules. Suppose now the observer looks 
for further specifications, asking whether the constituent molecules are, in 





that she has asked the wrong kind of question. The descriptive categories 
‘solid’, ‘liquid’ and ‘gaseous’ do not apply to molecules. Rather—we 
explain to her—, it is the particular organization that molecules adopt among 
them (close together or scattered) that determines the supra-molecular 
properties ‘solid’, ‘liquid’ and ‘gaseous’.  
When two domains are orthogonal, that means, in Maturana’s 
terminology, that each domain specifies and has its own space of associated 
phenomena, and that these cannot be transferred, without committing a 
fallacy or category mistake, from one domain to the other. For example, we 
can say that a unicellular organism has died, but we cannot say the same 
about its lipidic components, as lipids, taken in themselves, are not living 
unities. An excessive accumulation of lipids may bring as a result the death 
of the cell, yet what dies is always the cell, not its lipidic components. 
When a unity is perceived (in the case of concrete unities) or conceived 
of (in the case of abstract unities) as an unchanging entity, we deal with a 
static unity. When the unity is perceived or conceived of as undergoing one 
or more changes, we deal with a dynamic unity (we will provide more 
terminological details in Chapter 2). For example, if an observer looks at a 
pebble for a couple of hours (in a room with constant and homogeneous 
environmental conditions), and ignores (for whatever reason) the dynamic of 
the subatomic particles that compose it, the pebble will appear to her as a 
static unity. The same observer, equipped with a special device that detects 
the movement of the subatomic particles, will perceive the pebble as a 
dynamic system. My ideas about international politics change from time to 
time; they are changing entities in a propositional space. Platonic Ideas, as 
conceived of in Plato’s metaphysics, are immutable and eternal entities; they 
are static unities in an ‘intelligible world’.  
The changes undergone by a dynamic unity may be internally generated 
(endogenous changes) or triggered by external factors (exogenous changes). 
In the first case we speak of ‘active’ dynamic unities (they are dynamic in 
virtue of their endogenous changes), and in the second case we speak of 
‘passive’ dynamic unities (they undergo changes only thanks to the action of 





interacting dynamic unities. Isolated unities, if dynamic, are so only in virtue 
of their own dynamic.  
Strictly speaking, as long as physical objects are conceived of as 
composed by atoms (which are in themselves dynamic unities), every 
physical object can be considered, in principle, as an active dynamic system. 
Conventionally, nonetheless, macromolecular physical objects are not 
considered active dynamic systems merely because of their atomic 
composition. Both a chair in a terrace and an erupting volcano are physical 
unities composed by atoms, but we do not see them as being dynamic in the 
same way. A chair in the terrace is usually viewed as a passive dynamic 
system, i.e., as a system that exhibits certain changes through time, but only 
because external factors (environmental humidity, solar radiation, the usage 
of people) act upon it. An erupting volcano, on the contrary, is viewed as an 
active dynamic unity, i.e., endowed with an endogenous magmatic activity. 
In this thesis we will follow this convention. 
When a dynamic system remains always passive or always active, 
depending on the case, we say that the system has a fixed dynamic regime. 
When the system is able to alternate, without loss of organization, between 
passive and active dynamics, we say that the system has a variable dynamic 
regime. A chair, for example, is a dynamic system of fixed regime (it is 
always passive). A volcano, on the contrary, is a dynamic system of variable 
regime; when dormant (inactive), it behaves as a passive dynamic system, 
and when erupting, as an active dynamic system. Artificial machines with 
energy supply, such as engines or electronic devices (TVs, radios, laptops, 
etc.), are examples of dynamic systems of variable regime too. Whether the 
regime of a dynamic system is fixed or variable depends, to a large extent, 
on its thermodynamic regime. Living beings, as it will be shown in Chapter 
3, are active dynamic systems of fixed regime (because of their condition of 
far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic systems).   
When the dynamic of a unity is exclusively endogenous or exclusively 
exogenous, we speak of ‘partial’ dynamic unities. Thus, passive interacting 
dynamic unities (e.g., a chair on the terrace) and active isolated dynamic 
unities (e.g., the Universe considered as a whole) are both partial dynamic 





endogenous factors, we speak of ‘total’ dynamic unities. By definition, only 
active interacting unities behave as total dynamic unities. Stars, active 
volcanoes, tornadoes, but also working artificial machines, are examples of 
total dynamic systems; they exhibit an endogenous dynamic, and at the same 
time, interact with a physical environment that affects them to a greater or 
lesser degree. Living beings are a particular version of total dynamic 
systems. 
Importantly, in some active dynamic systems one can distinguish not 
only internal changes but processes, operations or mechanisms that exhibit a 
certain pattern or configuration. Generically, these unities can be called 
‘systems of processes’. In a system of processes the relevant components are 
the processes performed by the system (combustion processes, oxidation 
processes, selection processes, etc.), not the elements through which said 
processes are carried out (combustible materials, chemical compounds, 
people, etc.). Depending on the particular way in which the processes are 
configured, we may distinguish between serial and parallel systems, linear 
(open) and circular (closed) systems, centralized and distributed systems, 
etc. We will come back to these systems later on when, following 
Maturana’s autopoietic theory, living beings are characterized as closed 
systems of processes of chemical production (Chapter 4).  
 
 
1.3.1 Class identity 
 
Usually, when we distinguish a specific unity, we do so by recognizing it 
(implicitly or explicitly) as a member of a certain class; i.e., we define its 
identity by its belonging to a specific class. For instance, I distinguish that 
which is in front of me as a chair insofar as I recognize it as belonging to the 
class of chairs. The class of chairs is not a concrete entity out there among 
the chairs, but rather the mental construct or formation that I use to identify 
certain objects as chairs
5
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Every class is formed according to some classification criterion whose 
nature (well defined or ambiguous, subjective or objective, constitutive or 
relational, institutive or non-institutive, etc.) determines the nature of the 
class so formed. Thus, well-defined criteria generate well-defined classes 
(e.g., the class of prime numbers under 100), and badly defined criteria 
generate classes whose extension is imprecise (e.g., the class of slightly 
pretentious intellectuals). Subjective criteria generate subjective classes (e.g., 
the class of all things that I like), and objective criteria—in the sense that 
their validity is not defined by the personal preferences or desires of anyone 
in particular—generate objective classes (e.g., the class of electrically 
nonconductive materials).  
Constitutive criteria are those that focus on the unity itself without 
considering its relations with other unities, and relational criteria are those 
that attend to said relations. In one case we specify constitutive properties, 
and in the other relational properties. Constitutive criteria may focus either 
on the superficial features of the unities (their external appearance), or on 
more essential properties such as their internal composition or organization 
(the organization of the unities will be a key notion for our subsequent 
analysis). In both cases, superficial or ‘deep’, the object or unity is 
considered as an isolated entity. Relational criteria, on the contrary, place the 
unity in a matrix of relations (actual or potential) and specify its properties in 
virtue of said relations (e.g., the way in which the unity affects other unities, 
its functional role within a certain process or mechanism, etc.). Thus, for 
example, someone may define the class of chairs as the class of all those 
material objects that exhibit a particular spatial organization among their 
pieces (constitutive criterion), while someone else may define it simply as 
the class of all those material objects on which one can sit (relational 
criterion).  
Institutive criteria are those that stipulate or institute the properties that 
will define the class members as such. For example, an academic community 
                                                                                                                                        
notion. From a conceptualist viewpoint classes are primarily logical entities, i.e., 
products of a certain intellectual activity. What may be concrete and extra-logical, in 






decides to institute an annual award for best doctoral thesis. In awarding the 
prize to a different student every year, the community is defining and 
actually creating the members of the class ‘winners of the award for best 
doctoral thesis’. Most of our social institutions work in this way, i.e., by 
creating classes whose members exist uniquely by convention (e.g., the class 
of married people, the class of prime ministers, the class of illegal 
immigrants, etc.). Non-instituted classes are classes in which the identity of 
their members (the distinctive property that defines them as members of a 
particular class) is not instituted or created by the observer. Examples of 
non-instituted classes are the so called ‘natural kinds’. For example, gold, as 
a mineral, is a natural kind (whereas as a precious metal or monetary reserve, 
it is a conventional class).   
Recall we are understanding classes as mental constructs. What is 
peculiar in the case of instituted or conventional classes, as opposed to non-
instituted classes, is the way in which one or more observers generate the 
classes in question, not the fact that the classes are generated by one or more 
observers. Let us try to clarify the difference. Someone becomes the new 
prime minister of UK in virtue of a procedure (a convention officially 
recognized) that we ourselves have created and whose application confers to 
a determinate person the property ‘prime minister’. A community of 
observers (biologists) examines a vast sample of cells and generates the 
classes (taxa) ‘prokaryotic cells’ and ‘eukaryotic cells’. Although these taxa, 
qua classes, are the product of the collective work of the biologists, it is clear 
that the biologists are not the creators of the procedure (i.e., the evolutionary 
process) by which, millions of years ago, some cells without a nucleus 
became nucleated cells. It is one thing to form a class by means of an 
abstraction that picks up or draws some generic property in the unities under 
consideration (e.g., presence or absence of nucleus in the cells), and another 
is to form a class by means of a stipulation that creates the very generic 
property (e.g., being a prime minister) that will define which unities do or do 
not belong to the class so constituted.  
By distinguishing a unity as a member of a certain class, we identify its 
‘class identity’. This operation is simple routine for us as observers, but we 





i.e., a particular that belongs to the class of ‘human beings’. Now, if Peter is 
a human being, then he is also a living being (a particular that belongs to the 
class of ‘living beings’), and if he is a living being, then he is also a physical 
entity (a particular of the class ‘physical entities’). But Peter is not only a 
human being; he is also a man, a blue eyed person, a British citizen, a 
university student, a son, a friend, a cellist in the local orchestra, a 
sympathizer of the Conservative Party, etc. Peter belongs to many different 
classes and therefore has many different identities. Some identities last for a 
couple of years (university student), some of them a lifetime (living being). 
How can so many different identities coexist in Peter? The answer is simple: 
they can coexist because they take place in different domains, and because 
their values respect the ontological dependencies that exist among these 
domains (no class identity is incompatible with any other). This equals to 
saying that Peter exists in many different domains, each one with its own 
phenomenic and ontological domain. And here is where things may get 
complicated. Sometimes it is not easy to distinguish between different 
domains, especially when they are ontologically contiguous. Let us see this 
through some examples.  
The day that Peter gets married his identity as a single man disintegrates 
and a new one appears; married Peter. Although Peter’s biological structure 
is ‘involved’ in said identity change (Peter’s body goes wherever Peter 
goes), it does not constitute per se the domain in which such identity change 
takes place. The change of marital status takes place in a domain of social 
norms or civil laws, and when we say that Peter has got married we are 
distinguishing him as a civil subject in the domain of such social laws, not as 
a biological system in the domain of physical bodies (e.g., it would not make 
sense to say that the totality of Peter’s cells have got married). All this looks 
(I hope) relatively clear and reasonable, but now consider a trickier case. 
Medical exams have confirmed that Peter suffers viral hepatitis, i.e., that 
Peter is sick. When we say that Peter is sick, what do we mean? It seems, 
prima facie, that this identity is constituted in the biological domain of Peter; 
something that goes on in his liver. Under closer examination, however, this 
does not seem so. What goes on in Peter’s liver is that a certain viral 





of morphological and physiological changes. Those are the facts. Now, 
whether this biological condition in Peter’s liver counts as a disease or not 
(or makes Peter a sick person) is something that, strictly speaking, is defined 
at a different level.  
‘Healthy’ and ‘sick’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ are essentially normative 
categories; they distinguish between the functional and the dysfunctional, 
between good and bad, adequate and inadequate, right and wrong, etc. We 
say that the viral infection alters the proper or normal functioning of the 
liver, yet what we call ‘the proper functioning of the liver’ is nothing but the 
way the liver ought to work according to our expectations as observers. And 
the whole point is that, loosely paraphrasing William James (1909), 
biological phenomena are neither normal nor abnormal, they just are. 
Biological processes or mechanisms do not have to work in this or that way; 
they do not have to meet such and such expectation. Biological processes are 
what they are and occur as they occur as a matter of fact, not as a matter of 
norms.  
A biologist and a doctor are observing the exams of Peter’s liver. We ask 
“Is there anything wrong with Peter’s liver?”  The doctor says “Well, I am 
sorry to tell you there is something very wrong with Peter’s liver. It is 
infected with a very dangerous virus that is producing a severe chemical 
imbalance.” The (Strict Naturalistic) biologist pauses and says “Well, strictly 
speaking there is nothing wrong with Peter’s liver. It is reacting exactly as an 
infected liver would do. Peter’s liver is behaving in perfect conformity with 
its actual biochemical conditions; it is not violating any natural law.”  
There is a fine line between the pattern of biological functioning that we 
find in Peter’s liver and the normative category that we use to qualify it. The 
biologist speaks from the point of view of the liver as a natural entity; the 
doctor from the normative point of view of the human expectations and 
preferences. Both points of view are legitimate and useful in their own 
terms; the crux is not to confuse them.  
These considerations reinforce, from a different angle, the distinction that 
we drew in previous sections between the primary ontology of living beings 
as natural systems and their construction as objects of study for the interests 





living beings as natural systems, and another their class identity as cognitive 
systems. Both of them are valid in their own terrain; the crux is not to 
confuse them.  
 
 
1.3.2 Systems: structure, organization, adaptation 
 
We will focus now on systems (i.e., composite unities) and on a particular 
way of defining their class identity, namely by attending to their 
organization. In every system we can distinguish, at least in principle, a 
determinate organization and structure, or better said, a determinate 
organization instantiated in a determinate structure. The organization of a 
system denotes “[t]he relations between components that define a composite 
unity (system) as a composite unity of a particular class” (Maturana, 1981, p. 
24), whereas the structure denotes “[t]he actual components (all their 
properties included), together with the actual relations that […] realize a 
system as a particular member of the class of composite unities to which it 
belongs by its organization” (Maturana, 1981, p. 24). For example, that 
material object in front of me is a chair as long as it exhibits a certain spatial 
organization such that I can identify it as belonging to the class of chairs, 
while its structure corresponds, among others things, to its concrete material 
realization (e.g., wood or metal), size (big or small) and design (baroque 
style or Bauhaus style). In an abstract domain, a logical reasoning is a 
deductive inference as long as its premises and conclusion exhibit the kind 
of logical organization that is characteristic of deductive inferences; its 
structure, on the other hand, includes aspects such as the particular 
propositional content of its premises, their respective truth values, and the 
validity of the logical connection between the premises and the conclusion. 
In the case of the chair what matters is a certain spatial organization, whilst 
in the case of the deductive inference what is critical is a certain logical 
organization.  
The relation that constitutes a determinate organization may belong to 





descriptive domain chosen by the observer. For example, we can identify the 
class identity of a vehicle engine in terms of the spatial organization (layout) 
of its pieces, in which case we speak of ‘Straight/In-line’ engines, ‘V type’ 
engines, and ‘Boxer/Flat’ engines, among others. But we can also identify an 
engine in terms of its operational organization or ‘cycle’ (the steps through 
which it converts combustible into kinetic energy), in which case we 
distinguish, among others, ‘Two-stroke’ engines, ‘Four-stroke’ engines, and 
‘Six-stroke’ engines. The engine can be viewed as a set of physical pieces 
but also as a set of combustion operations (i.e., as a system of processes). 
Notice, this means that the ‘components’ or subunities under consideration 
are different in each case: material pieces in one case, combustion operations 
in the other.  
Maturana, following a constitutive criterion, contends that what defines 
the class identity of a system is its organization, not its structure. A change 
in the structure of a unity may or may not lead to a change in its class 
identity, whilst a change in its organization leads, by definition, to a change 
in its class identity. For example, a metallic chair remains a chair as long as 
it maintains a particular organization among its pieces. While this 
organization is conserved, the chair can admit several structural changes 
without losing its class identity as a chair (e.g., we can change the length of 
its legs, or replace them by wooden legs, etc.). Now, if we set the chair on 
fire, we will observe a sequence of structural changes (i.e., the melting of the 
metal) that lead finally to the disorganization of the chair as a chair. 
Similarly, if we disassemble the chair and reorganize its pieces to make a 
table, the chair disappears as a system and a new system appears in its place. 
The chair exists as a chair as long as it maintains a certain organization that 
is recognizable for us, and ceases to exist when said organization changes or 
is lost. Its structure, on the contrary, can change within certain ranges 
without altering its class identity as a chair. In a more abstract domain, we 
can change the structure of a deductive inference within certain ranges 
without altering its identity as a deductive inference. A valid and sound 
deductive inference about the mortality of Socrates remains a deductive 
inference even if we change its content for the mortality of my pet, the truth 





follow from the premises. The result will be simply an invalid and unsound 
deductive inference about the mortality of my pet. As long as the inference 
conserves the kind of logical organization that is characteristic of the 
deductive inferences, none of these structural changes will alter its class 
identity. Now, if we keep on changing its structure in different ways, there 
will be a moment at which the deductive inference will disappear as such 
and become, perhaps, an abductive one, an inductive one, or simply a set of 
sentences that do not constitute any reasoning at all. 
Of course, what changes and what remains the same in each case depends 
on the space or domain in which the observer is making her distinctions. 
When we take a baroque chair and transform it into a Bauhaus chair, the 
specific unity that we identify as ‘baroque chair’ in the domain of ‘styles of 
chairs’ loses its class identity and disappears as such, while the more generic 
unity that we identify simply as ‘chair’ (whatever its style), remains the 
same. When we take the chair and transform it into a table, the unity chair 
loses its identity and disappears as such. Nonetheless, if our unity of 
observation corresponds to the broader category of ‘furniture’, it is clear that 
any change from chair to table or vice-versa will appear as irrelevant. In the 
physical world—let us leave aside for now the abstract domain of the purely 
thought unities—the disintegration of a unity always presupposes the 
conservation of a more basic unity with respect to which the disintegrated 
unity was a particular version. In the limit case, if our unities of observation 
are as generic and basic as ‘physical phenomenon’, ‘physical magnitude’ or 
‘physical unity’ (including massless particles, energy fields, etc.), then we 
will observe that everything is conservation through the constant constitution 
and disintegration of physical entities (we will come back to this point in the 
next chapter when talking about ‘systems of closed transitions’).   
When a system admits of one or more structural changes without loss of 
organization (i.e., without losing its class identity), we speak of a structurally 
plastic system. In our previous examples, we saw that both the chair and the 
deductive inference admitted a number of structural changes without losing 
their class identities. Chairs and deductive inferences are therefore instances 
of structurally plastic systems. When the system under consideration is a 





Maturana calls this process—conservation of organization through structural 
changes in interaction with a medium—‘adaptation’ (Maturana, 1981). 
Understood in the context of Maturana’s metaphysics, ‘adaptation’ is not an 
exclusively biological category.  
 
If the organization of a composite unity remains invariant 
while it undergoes structural changes [...] through its 
recurrent interactions in its medium [, we say that] its 
adaptation is conserved [...] Defined in this manner, [...] 
conservation of adaptation is not peculiar to living systems. 
It is a phenomenon that takes place whenever a plastic 
composite unity undergoes recurrent interactions with 
structural change but without loss of organization. 
(Maturana, 1980, pp. xx-xxi)  
 
An adaptive system, from this point of view, is simply an interacting 
dynamic system endowed with structural plasticity. Passive dynamic 
systems, such as chairs, shoes or dormant volcanoes, exhibit passive 
adaptation, whereas active dynamic systems, such as stars or erupting 
volcanoes, exhibit active adaptation. Living beings’ adaptation, as we shall 
see in chapters 3 and 4, is a particular case of active adaptation.  
Notice that, defined in this way, adaptation is a purely descriptive 
concept. It is a way of naming the conservation of integrity that takes place 
in interacting dynamic systems, not an explanation of how this conservation 
takes place. In Maturana’s conceptual system, adaptation is a condition that 
needs to be explained; it is an explanadum, not an explanans. The adaptation 
of each system, passive or active, living or not, must be explained attending 
to its particular organizational and structural features, and always respecting, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, certain fundamental metaphysical 
principles.  
There are many aspects that one can consider in the analysis of an 
adaptive dynamic system, passive or active. For our purposes, nonetheless, 
there is one in particular that is crucial: the way in which the system 





changes of state depends on, or is ruled by, certain metaphysical principles 
that have to do, basically, with the ‘actuality’, ‘conservation’, ‘continuity’, 
and ‘determinacy’ of the system (among others). One discipline that has 
studied in an extensive way the metaphysics of the dynamic systems is 
cybernetics. We will dedicate the next chapter precisely to this topic; the 
























Dynamic systems and deterministic 
machines: lessons from cybernetics 
 
 
In the previous chapter we declared our unrestricted commitment to a Strict 
Naturalistic conception of the world and its phenomena, emphasizing the 
idea that said Naturalism, if sound, has to be free of anthropomorphisms, 
observational projections and over-naturalizations. After that we offered a 
basic metaphysical terminology in which we spoke of unities, systems, class 
identities, organization, structure, and other general categories. Toward the 
end of the chapter we focused our attention on dynamic systems, especially 
those endowed with structural plasticity and adaptation.  
In this chapter we will analyze dynamic systems more in depth. Our 
central concern will be, once again, essentially metaphysical. We will 
concentrate on the way in which dynamic systems undergo their changes of 
state; the ‘deep logic’, so to speak, of their transitions, trajectory and 
behavior. For this metaphysical analysis we will use the conceptual tools of 
cybernetic theory, mainly in the versions of Ross Ashby and Humberto 
Maturana.  
The metaphysical analysis of dynamic systems is important because it 
will help us to understand a bit more about the nature of living beings. 
Living beings are dynamic systems, and all that applies to dynamic systems 
applies to them too. Recall that one of our purposes in this first part of the 
thesis (Chapters 1 to 5), is to construe a Strictly Naturalistic characterization 





the environment. To this purpose, of course, it is important to understand 
what is peculiar about living beings, their exclusive mark within the natural 
entities. But it is equally (or even more) important to understand what is not 
peculiar about them. We have said in the introductory chapter that living 
beings, from a Strict Naturalistic viewpoint, may be characterized as: 
 
1. Adaptive dynamic systems  
2. Deterministic machines of closed transitions 
3. Multistable dissipative systems 
4. Organizationally closed systems with respect to (i) their sensorimotor 
activity, and (ii) their molecular productive processes (i.e., autopoietic 
systems) 
 
As we shall see along this thesis, out of these features, only 4 (ii) (i.e., 
autopoietic organization) seems to be an exclusive mark of living beings. All 
the rest are features that living beings share with all or some of the non-
living physical systems. The important point for us is that living beings, in 
spite of their peculiar autopoietic organization (if they have such 
organization), must be treated as ordinary physical entities subjected to the 
same laws, principles and constraints that rule any physical system in 
general.  
In Chapter 1 we already saw that living beings are adaptive dynamic 
systems (point 1). And we immediately remarked that they are not the only 
adaptive dynamic systems in the world, that many non-living systems are 
dynamically adaptive too. Now in Chapter 2 we will review the idea that 
living beings, like all the rest of the dynamic systems, are deterministic 
machines of closed transitions (point 2 in our list). We will see that, for those 
who subscribe to a Strict Naturalistic frame, it should be relatively trivial to 
point out that living beings are machines (or ‘state-dependent systems’, 
according to the cybernetic jargon that we will use later on) that instantiate 
closed transitions and whose configuration, trajectory and structure are 
deterministic.  
Out of these metaphysical features, probably the most important for us, is 





them think that to assume and understand the deterministic nature of the 
living beings (with respect to their configuration, trajectory and structure) is 
crucial for understanding their behavior, especially when this is appraised by 
us as “intelligent”.  
Most of the conventional explanations about the (intelligent) behavior of 
living beings tend to appeal to notions or concepts (e.g., agency, control, 
teleology) that, in one way or another, violate or overlook the deterministic 
conception of living beings. That is, many of them manage to explain living 
beings’ behavior at the cost (unjustified to our eyes) of conceiving of them 
as non-deterministic dynamic systems. Why such a conception constitutes a 
cost, and moreover a high one, should become clear in this chapter. 
Strictly speaking, determinism is a metaphysical assumption, a certain 
basic interpretative commitment about reality and its phenomena. As such, it 
might or not be true—speaking in a strong realistic metaphysical sense—
about the world. (The same runs for indeterminism, its metaphysical 
opposite)
6
. Those who, like me, want to build a Strict Naturalistic cognitive 
science, do not need to hold that the physical world is really deterministic. 
We only need to hold that determinism, in comparison to indeterminism, is a 
more reliable and secure metaphysical assumption for the scientific study of 
natural phenomena in general, and, by extension, of living beings in 
particular. Even more, we do not need to claim that determinism is the best 
metaphysical assumption in every respect and under every circumstance. For 
example, to those whose priority is not a Strict Naturalistic study of living 
beings but rather, as in the case of Hans Jonas (1966) and his contemporary 
enactive followers (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007; 
Di Paolo, 2005; Froese and Ziemke, 2009), an existentialist and 
phenomenological interpretation of their constitution and behavior, the right 
kind of assumption is indeterminism and not determinism. If one wants to 
see living beings as free agents that face possibilities of action and act 
according to goals or purposes, what one needs is to conceive of them as 
non-deterministic systems, not as deterministic systems. Nonetheless, if what 
we want is a Strict Naturalistic explanation of living beings and their 
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behavior, then, so I will argue, it is determinism and not indeterminism that 
stands as our best metaphysical ally.  
Now, if we are not going to be realistic about determinism, if we will 
offer it only as an adequate metaphysical assumption for the exclusive 
purposes of the scientific study of living beings, what is its philosophical 
force? Why determinism and not indeterminism? Although we cannot (and 
do not need to) show that the physical world is truly deterministic, it will be 
interesting to observe in this chapter that determinism, and not 
indeterminism, seems to form part of our primary metaphysical attitude as 
spontaneous observers (i.e., previous to the subscription to more elaborated 
metaphysical commitments, Naturalistic or not).  We will see that 
determinism constitutes, so to speak, a sort of ‘basal’ metaphysical 
assumption that spontaneously rises from the regularities and coherences of 
our ordinary dealing with physical objects. In that sense, because of its 
closeness and smooth coordination with the operational coherences of our 
quotidian experience, it will be argued that determinism offers us a more 
intuitive and austere metaphysical frame than its indeterministic counterpart.  
We will see that metaphysical indeterminism (not epistemological or 
moral indeterminism) always strikes us as something exceptional and 
extravagant, something that does not belong to the regularities of our 
ordinary experience. Actually, as we shall see, the violation of metaphysical 
determinism stands as one of the typical marks (though not the only one) of 
those entities and phenomena that we usually qualify as supernatural. People 
and cultures that believe in supernatural phenomena do not escape this basic 
attitude. They too interpret, tacitly, the violation of determinism as 
something entirely exceptional, something reserved only for extraordinary 
agents with special powers (deities, witches, etc.). The only difference 
between them and us Naturalistic people is that whereas they accept said 
exceptionality as real, we sanction it as fictitious. Yet both they and we 
recognize the extraordinary character of any physical phenomenon that 
escapes determinism.  
Of course, being nothing more than an assumption, we might choose not 
the treat living systems as deterministic systems, and I am not here to claim 





project’s only merit, perhaps, is that we make explicit the metaphysical 
assumption that guides our descriptions and explanatory attempts, and that 
we try to follow it with fidelity. Cognitive theories that, in one way or 
another, implicitly or explicitly, do not follow the restrictions derived from 
assuming a deterministic metaphysics for living systems owe us at least a 
justification of their choice. In the same way that it is not given, say, as an 
evident and proved metaphysical truth, that living beings are deterministic 
systems, so it is not given that they are—or must be seen as—indeterministic 
systems.  
We hold that, when determinism is assumed, a series of ideas about the 
nature of living beings (conspicuously: agency, freedom of action, control, 
self-control, teleology, and others) are revealed as explanatory fictions; more 
or less useful depending on the interests of the observer, but fictions in the 
end. Cognitive theories that characterize living beings or their nervous 
systems, implicitly or explicitly, as possessing such properties (e.g., enactive 
theories that speak of agency and freedom of action (Di Paolo, 2005; 
Thompson, 2007), embodied theories that conceive of the nervous system as 
a control system teleologically oriented to certain tasks (Clark and Grush, 
1999; Wheeler, 2005)) have a non minor pending task in their agenda. They 
have to 1) show how such properties are possible in deterministic systems, 
or, alternatively, 2) justify and elaborate an indeterministic metaphysics for 
dynamic systems in general, or a regional indeterministic metaphysics for 
living beings in particular. This, to my knowledge, has not been done so far, 
and until we receive some news about such a metaphysical justification, I 
think we are entitled, in the name of a prudent and conservative attitude, to 
assume determinism as our best version of Naturalism.  
In a conservative version of Naturalism, also called classical Naturalism, 
physical systems are assumed to be deterministic systems. This doctrine, as 
we all know, has been questioned by some interpretations of quantum 
physics, where the behavior of the systems under measurement appears to be 
non-deterministic. The problem with this challenge is that there is nothing, 
even remotely, like a final word or general consensus among the physicists 
about the correct metaphysical interpretation of quantum theory (Sklar, 





philosophers of physics have been struggling, since the very inception of the 
theory (which is almost a century now), to find a way of making 
metaphysical sense of it (Goyal, 2011). (Just to give an idea, you can count 
in contemporary texts, easily, more than ten different metaphysical 
interpretations, some of them directly incompatible, of quantum theory. See 
for example Laloë, 2012). The reason has to do, in part, with the very point 
under discussion. Many interpretations of quantum theory suggest that 
fundamental physical reality is non-deterministic, and, as we will see, the 
violation of physical determinism cannot but strike us, against the 
background of the coherences and regularities of our ordinary experience, as 
something metaphysically extravagant and tough to swallow, something that 
requires exceptional metaphysical conditions.  
Physicists and philosophers of quantum theory acknowledge that they 
have not been able, at least until now, to give us a unified and coherent 
metaphysical picture of the world and its phenomena (Goyal, 2011; Jenann, 
2009; Jaynes, 2003, 1990, 1989). If this is the case, the challenge posed by 
quantum theory to the classic deterministic version of Naturalism should be 
taken rather with moderation. It may well be the case that, in the future, 
quantum theory manages to mature as a coherent and unified metaphysical 
paradigm (Goyal, 2010), replacing the classical one and giving us a whole 
new and comfortable ground for building a non-deterministic ontology of 
living beings, their biological processes and behavior. It may also be the case 
that, in line with new findings and theoretical developments, quantum theory 
is reabsorbed into a broader metaphysical frame that remains deterministic 
(Jaynes, 2003). Who knows? What is clear is that for now, and at least for 
the specific purposes of a cognitive science, it does not seem very prudent to 
embrace a non-deterministic conception of living beings on the base of such 
an uncertain scenario.  
Ashby, Maturana, and I with them think that the deterministic conception 
of biological systems is consistent with our best established Naturalistic 
metaphysics, and that it is both prudent and reasonable to assume it as a base 
for the study of living beings.   
We will now move on to addressing, point by point, the characterization 





questions will be: 1) In which sense can it be said that living beings are 
machines? 2) What does it mean to say that their transitions are closed?  3) 
In which sense or senses are they deterministic systems? The answers will be 
given in terms of some fundamental metaphysical principles. 1) Actuality 
principle (AP): living beings, like any other physical system, are machines in 
the sense that they exist as actuality. 2) Conservation principle (CP): that 
living beings instantiate closed transitions simply means that, like any other 
physical system, they are transitory organizations of a physical substratum 
that is conserved. 3) Determinacy principle (DP): living beings, like any 
other physical system, are deterministic systems with respect to their 
configuration, trajectory and structure.  
As with Maturana’s metaphysics in the previous chapter, here I also 
reconstruct, expand and modify to some extent Ashby’s cybernetic 
terminology. Likewise, since I consider that my conceptual contributions in 
this area are continuous with, and completely loyal to, Ashby’s theoretical 
system, I do not flag them as ‘mine’ in the exposition.   
 
 
2.1 Machines   
 
Cybernetics, in Ashby’s classical version, is essentially a formal discipline 
dedicated to the study of machines in general (Ashby, 1956), whatever their 
constitution (material or formal, real or ideal) and their origin (natural or 
artificial). From a cybernetic point of view, machines are simply ‘state-
dependent’ systems, or better said, systems whose trajectory is ‘state-
dependent’.  
Every system exists—or may be conceived of as existing—in a certain 
time. Concrete systems exist in real time, whilst abstract or formal systems 
can be thought of as existing in a virtual or logical time. The passing of a 
system from one instant to another (in real, virtual or logical time) is called 
‘transition’, and a sequence of transitions is called ‘trajectory’. The transition 
of a system may be invariant or variant. It is invariant when the state of the 





When all the transitions of the system are invariant, we speak of a static or 
constant system. When one or more of its transitions are variant, we speak of 
a dynamic or transformer system. By convention, I will use the notions 
‘static’/‘dynamic’ when talking about physical concrete systems, and 
‘constant’/’transformer’ when talking about abstract or formal systems. In 
the following example we have a dynamic system X with a trajectory of 
seven transitions, one of which is invariant (every transition is represented 
by an arrow ): 
                  
 Temporal sequence        ...   1         2        3       4      5       6      7       8 … 
        System’s states        ...  A  B  C   D  E   F  F  G … 
 
In the following example we have a static system with a trajectory of 
seven transitions: 
 
  Temporal sequence        ...   1         2        3       4      5       6      7       8 … 
          System’s states        ... A  A   A   A A  A A A … 
A system, dynamic or static (transformer or constant), is a state-
dependent system, i.e., a machine, if its current state, at every moment, is the 
result of the transition (variant or invariant) of its previous state, or, which is 
the same, for every current state of the system, the next state arises as a 
result of the transition (variant or invariant) of its current state.  
According to this definition, the dynamic system X in the previous 
example is a state-dependent system. We can see that the state B at the time 
2 is the result of the variant transition of the state A at the time 1, C at the 
time 3 the result of the variant transition of B at the time 2, D at the time 4 
the result of the variant transition of C at the time 3, and so on and so forth. 
The key point in this pattern of transitions is that, at every moment, only the 
actual existing (current) state of the system is object of transition. Whether 





system in the previous example is also a state-dependent system, i.e., a static 
machine, because every one of its states arises as a result of the invariant 
transition of the previous state of the system. A state-dependent system, in 
other words, is essentially a system governed by AP. Let us examine this 
idea. 
The past state of a system is a state that existed at some moment but that 
does not exist anymore (it has gone). The future state of a system is a state 
that still does not exist. Both past and future states are inexistent (non-actual) 
states at the moment in which the transition of the system takes place. In the 
previous example, at the time 2 the system is in state B, so B is the only state 
that can undergo a transition and give rise to the state which follows at the 
time 3  (i.e., C). Why cannot C be obtained from D, for example? Well, 
simply because at the time 2 D still does not exist. And why can C not be 
obtained from A? Well, simply because at the time in which the transition 
that results in C takes place (i.e., time 2), A does not exist anymore, it has 
gone.  
A state-dependent system is a system governed by AP, in the sense that 
only that which exists as actuality (in the ‘now’) can be an object of 
transition (variant or invariant). That which does not exist (because it has 
gone or because it has not been instantiated yet) cannot be the object of any 
transition (variant or invariant). In other words, to be a machine is to be a 
system in which only the existent states can be objects of conservation 
(invariant transition) or modification (variant transition).  
Now, if we think about the essential feature of machines, we will realize 
that although not every machine is a real physical system (e.g., formal 
machines such as the Turing machine), every real dynamic system (natural 
or artificial) is actually a machine. We said that a machine is a system whose 
transition is state-dependent. Well, real physical systems are systems whose 
succession of states follows precisely that metaphysical order. The reader 
can go back to the example of system X and see that, for a physical system, 
there is no way in which C could be obtained from D or A; i.e., from states 
that do not exist at the moment in which the transition that results in C takes 
place (the reader will find that this is the rule for every state in particular). 






So, what does it mean to say that living beings are machines? It simply 
means that living beings are state-dependent systems; that they, like any 
other ordinary physical system, exist as actuality.  
But the reader might say “Fair enough, we can say that we are clear now 
about the meaning of the concept ‘machine’, yet that does not mean that we 
have accepted the idea that living beings are state-dependent systems.” What 
is the alternative, then? Why should not we think that living beings are 
‘state-independent systems’? Let us review, to appreciate the force of the 




     (i)                        Temporal order         ...   1         2        3       4       5 …      
                                   System’s states        ...  A   B   C  D  E …  
 
    (ii)                         Temporal order        ...   1         2       3        4       5 …      
                                   System’s states        ...  A  B       C        D E ... 
 
 
In (i) we have that, at each moment, the present state of the system is the 
result of the transition of its future state, and that the past state of the system 
has been the result of the transition of its present state, and so on and so 
forth. The system is, somehow, ‘running in reverse’. This is not a state-
dependent system because the states of the system that are objects of 
transition are non-existent (non-actual) states. For example, a cat has had an 
accident and, after suffering for some minutes, has died. According to (i), the 
cat suffers as a consequence of the fact that in the next minute it will be 
dead; its current state is a modification (a variant transition) of its future 
state. Is this possible? Well, I do not know. What I do know is that this is not 
the standard way in which we interpret the dynamic systems that we find in 





suffers now as a result of its previous condition, not as a result of his future 
condition.  
In (ii) we have a situation in which, at the time 5, the state E of the 
system arises as a direct modification of a state that is not its immediate 
previous state (D at the time 4).  According to this regime, for example, the 
way you look now might not be the result of your accumulated history 
during the last years but, surprisingly, the direct and immediate modification 
of your body when you were ten years old. Your body directly jumped, so to 
speak, from your childhood to your adultness, bypassing all the moments, 
hours and years in between. The moments that you lived as a teenager were 
real; it just happens that they took place in metaphysical discontinuity with 
the rest of your life. Is this kind of metaphysical tunneling possible? Well, I 
do not know. What I do know is that this is not the ordinary way in which 
we interpret the historical dynamic of the physical systems.  
In our daily life, we assume AP and the state-dependent character of 
physical systems as a kind of tacit metaphysical commitment, as a condition 
of intelligibility to interpret their changes over time.  
 
 
2.1.1 The observer and his ‘miraculous machine’: the 
case of memory 
 
Every time we appeal to an inexistent (absent) state as if it were determining 
in some way the current state or behavior of a concrete system, we are 
treating that system as if it were not a machine but a ‘state-independent 
system’, or, as Ashby would say, as if it were a machine with ‘miraculous’ 
properties.  
 ‘Miraculous machines’, though fictitious from a cybernetic point of 
view, are not arbitrary creations but well-motivated conceptual 
constructions. They have to do, essentially, with the kind of epistemological 
relationship established between the observer and the observed system, and 





properties of his own observational practices.  
In this section we will review the particular case of the concept of 
‘memory’. Based on Ashby’s studies (1960), we will see that ‘memory’ is a 
notion that usually emerges as a product of a) the observer’s inability to 
observe the system in all its significant variables, and b) the observer’s 
ability to compensate this ignorance by appealing to non-actual states in the 
system.  
When a system X is not completely observable in all its variables, i.e., 
when we ignore a part or the totality of its internal mechanisms, it is said that 
X appears to us as a “black box”. When this is the case, what we usually do 
is to try to infer, on the basis of some observable indicators, the internal 
mechanisms of the system. This strategy is both legitimate and necessary, 
but, as Ashby (1960) insists, we have to be very careful in applying it, as we 
can easily project into the system, without noticing it, properties that belong 
to our own inferential maneuvers and take them as if they were properties of 
the internal mechanisms of the system. When we do that, says Ashby, the 
system may appear to us as endowed with exceptional, abnormal or even 
miraculous properties. Let’s review this idea through some examples 
provided by Ashby.  
Think of a system X composed by two connected parts (A and B) having 
a common input I.  
 
 
                  
 





Suppose the interest of a community of observers is focused on A’s 
behavior; specifically, on whether A exhibits a particular behavior Z. 
Suppose we are the engineers who have designed and built the system, so 








simultaneous conditions: (1) I is at the state p, and (2) B is at the state q. 
Suppose additionally that B assumes the value q only after I has assumed the 
value s.  
Now, let’s imagine that two observers are studying A’s behavior. One of 
them has access to I and to every part of the system (A and B); she is a 
complete observer (CO). The other one, due to certain limitations, has access 
to I and A, but not to B; he is an incomplete observer (IO). Missing the part 
B, X appears to IO as a ‘black box’, i.e., as a system whose internal 
mechanisms are to a large extent unknown. After following the system for a 
while, CO arrives (correctly) to the conclusion that Z appears in A whenever 
I is at p and B is at q. Thus, if at a given moment the input exhibits the value 
p, she just needs to check the concomitant value of B in order to predict the 
appearance of Z in A. IO, on the contrary, cannot achieve this predictive 
accuracy. He observes that A exhibits Z only when I is at p (he realizes that I 
at p is a necessary condition for Z), but he also observes that A does not 
always exhibit Z when I is at p (he realizes that I at p is not a sufficient 
condition for Z). Observing that I is at p, IO tells us that all that he can assert 
is that Z might appear in A with a probability of, say, z.  
IO, nonetheless, does not feel satisfied with this probabilistic prediction. 
He reviews his records, analyzes his notes, and suddenly he finds something! 
Attending to earlier states, he realizes that Z appears in A when I is at p, but 
only if the previous state of I has been s. His strategy is now different. 
Observing that I is at p, IO relates the occurrence of Z to whether I showed 
or not the value s in a previous moment. Since the sequence sp in I leads 
invariably to the appearance of Z in A (due to the fact that the transition sp 
in I leads to the state q in B), IO has now the same predictive power as CO. 
Though IO does not know the internal mechanism that mediates the relation 
between I and A (the transitions of state in B), he can use the history of 
changes in I to fill in the gap and predict with accuracy the appearance of Z 
in A.  
IO estimates now that the system’s behavior in relation to I is regular and 
fully predictable (he does not need to talk about probabilities any more). But 
at the same time, he estimates that such regularity has to do with the past 





their respective findings, IO explains to CO that the system, somehow, 
exhibits a sort of ‘memory’ because its behavior is determined, to some 
extent, by the past states of I. CO, perplexed, cannot see any room for such a 
fancy feature in the system; to him Z appears in A simply whenever the 
current conditions are I at p and B at q, without needing the consideration of 
any past event. At this point IO and CO might engage, if they are 
quarrelsome, in a long discussion about whether X exhibits memory or not. 
Yet they could not arrive at any agreement. Why? The reason, says Ashby, is 
simple. Although they seem to be discussing the same entity, they are 
actually talking of two quite different systems. When CO talks about the 
system X he refers to the connected parts A + B, but when IO talks about the 
system X he refers uniquely to A, as he does not have access to B. CO deals 
with the system X, while IO deals with the black box X.  
The interesting point is that when IO appeals to the notion of ‘memory’, 
what he does is substitute his ignorance with respect to X (his inability to 
observe the part B in X) with a notion that reflects the way in which he 
manages to predict X (i.e., by contemplating past events), but that does not 
reveal the way in which X actually works. Past events are important for his 
predictive strategy, no doubt, but as we already saw in the previous section, 
past events have a null participation in the determination of the current 
system’s behavior. Yet IO does not invent ‘memory’ in a free and arbitrary 
way. Given his limited observational conditions and the way in which he 
manages to predict X’s behavior, the idea that certain past events play a role 
in determining X’s behavior is quite reasonable. The notion of memory 
introduced by IO has to do with an ignorance that is real. That is why Ashby 
claims that “to invoke ‘memory’ in a system as an explanation of its 
behavior is equivalent to declaring that one cannot observe the system 
completely” (1960, p. 116).  
The final (reconstructed, inferred) system for IO is equivalent to I(A + 
memory), where ‘memory’ is a feature of his own epistemic strategy 
projected into X as a substitute of the missing part B. In this way X becomes 
a ‘miraculous’ machine, i.e., a machine whose behavior is determined, in 
part, by past (inexistent) states. At the same time, though miraculous, X 





If a determinate system is only partly observable, and 
thereby becomes (for that observer) not predictable, the 
observer may be able to restore predictability by taking the 
system’s past history into account, i.e. by assuming the 
existence within it of some form of “memory”. (Ashby, 
1960, p. 115. Original emphasis) 
 
Now, while it is true that IO, by taking the system’s past history into 
account, reaches the same predictive power as OC, it is not the case that he 
reaches the same explanatory power. CO can not only predict the appearance 
of Z in A but also point out the mechanisms that generate the appearance of 
Z. CO can tell us what are, in the observed system, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that determine the behavior Z in A: (1) I at the state p, 
and (2) B at the state q. These conditions are pointed out at an ontological 
level. That is, they denote the conditions that, once given in the system, 
trigger the behavior Z in A. IO, not knowing the internal mechanisms in X, 
can predict Z but not expose the mechanisms that generate it. Of course, he 
can hypothesize about a ‘memory’ mechanism, but by doing that he is not 
revealing any mechanism in X but a feature of his particular observational 
condition. He also can give us his own version about the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that determine the appearance of Z in A: The transition 
sp in I. Yet this particular transition is not the necessary and sufficient 
condition that determines the occurrence of Z in A, but that which is 
necessary and sufficient to know, for him or for any observer under similar 
conditions, to be able to predict the occurrence of Z in A. When IO says that 
sp in I is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of Z in A, what he 
means is that, in order to predict Z in A, one needs to know not only that I is 
at p but also that the previous state of I has been s. His necessary and 
sufficient conditions are epistemological conditions, not ontological ones. 
But why are these conditions not ontological? Why, if both s and p are states 
in I, and sp is a transition that takes place in I, not in the mind of IO? The 
answer is that the only condition in I that plays a role in determining Z in A 
is p, because p (not s) is the state that in concomitance with q in B 





previous state to the states that determine Z in A; therefore, an inexistent 
state at the moment in which Z is determined. And we already know that that 
which does not exist cannot determine anything because it cannot be the 
object of any transition.  
What is the moral of the example? Ashby summarizes it as follows:  
 
Clearly, “memory” is not an objective something that a 
system either does or does not possess; it is a concept that 
the observer invokes to fill in the gap caused when part of 
the system is unobservable. (Ashby, 1960, p. 117) 
 
As I read it, what Ashby is telling us is that ‘memory’ is more a property 
of the explanation than a property of the entities being explained.  
Now, we have reviewed here an example in which the observed system is 
extremely simple, composed only by two parts (A and B), and where the 
internal mechanism mediating between the input (I) and the observed 
behavior (Z in A) consists just in a transition of state undergone by one 
element (B). In concrete real systems, nevertheless, the situation is quite 
different as we face complex mediations that involve hundreds, thousands or 
millions of components (just think of the brain and its massive connections 
among millions of neurons), and where the epistemic gap with respect to the 
internal configuration that determines the observed behavior is so gigantic 
that the observer, for practical reasons, deliberately ignores it and prefers to 
explain the observed behavior by making reference to the history of the 
system and by assuming a sort of internal memory. Let me quote Ashby for a 
more colloquial illustration.   
 
[S]uppose I am in a friend’s house and, as a car goes past 
outside, his dog rushes to a corner of the room and cringes. 
To me the behavior is causeless and inexplicable. Then my 
friend says, “He was run over by a car six months ago.” The 
behavior is now accounted for by reference to an event of 
six months ago. If we say that the dog shows “memory” we 





explained, not by reference to his state now but to what his 
state was six months ago. (Ashby, 1960, p. 117) 
 
In principle, there is nothing wrong in referring the current behavior of 
the dog to an event of six months ago. We as observers operating in 
language can make reference to the past, and that reference is a legitimate 
tool in the construction of an explanatory proposition. It is a poor 
explanation (because it does not reveal the internal mechanisms of the 
organism), but is one that at least satisfies our curiosity. What is the problem 
then? The problem begins when we assume that the reference to the past is 
not only a strategy that we, as incomplete observers, use to make sense of 
the dog’s behavior, but also the internal mechanism through which such 
behavior is generated. Ashby warns us about this point: 
 
If one is not careful one says that the dog “has” memory, 
and then thinks of the dog as having something […]. One 
may then be tempted to start looking for the thing; and one 
may discover that this “thing” has some very curious 
properties. (Ashby, 1960, p. 117. Emphasis added) 
 
“Very curious properties”? Yes, quite curious. Just think about the 
following point. In which way, if any, could the dog or any other concrete 
system be in contact with a past event, i.e., with an event that existed in 
some moment but that does not exist anymore? How could a concrete system 
recover something from the past? An obvious answer to these questions 
would be that the past event is not present in the literal sense; the dog does 
not deal with a presentation of the past event but with a re-presentation of it. 
The past is not recovered in a physical dimension (something that looks 
impossible or metaphysically extravagant) but rather in a referential 
dimension; something in the present makes reference to the past. This 
answer, although intuitive for most of us, is misleadingly simple. In order to 
make intelligible the ‘memory mechanism’, which we have argued—let’s 
not forget—is an explanatory fiction projected by the observer, we have 





semantic properties. Like the debtor that has to ask for additional money to 
amortize the original debt, so the observer resorts to more curiosities to 
explain the already curious properties of his miraculous machine.  
We might disregard these questions and leave the issue there, but if the 
observer is one of those philosophers committed to the ‘naturalization of 
cognition’, he will not rest until he finds some way to accommodate these 
curious phenomena within a naturalistic picture. He will think that the 
memory mechanism, understood as a representational mechanism, must take 
place ultimately as a biological mechanism in the organism. He will assume, 
typically, the existence of internal (neural) representations.   
Indeed, this is one of the frequent motivations to invoke (and try to 
vindicate) the notion of ‘internal representation’ in cognitive sciences. The 
observer assumes that the organism’s behavior is coordinated or connected 
with an absent element, temporal or spatially, and since this connection 
cannot be understood literally in physical terms, he reformulates it in 
semantic terms positing the existence of internal representations in the 
organism. Such is, for example, the kind of strategy followed by Andy Clark 
in his attempt to vindicate the existence of internal representations. He calls 
attention to those “skills by which some animals [...] are able to maintain 
cognitive contact with [...] absent states of affairs” (Clark, 2001, p. 109). 
Clark considers the coordination of behavior with non-existent elements a 
typical instance of what he calls “representation-hungry problems” (Clark 
and Toribio, 1994); i.e., situations that the organism cannot manage unless it 
resorts to a certain kind of internal representation.    
 
The ability to track […] the non-existent requires, prima 
facie, the use of some inner resource which enables 
appropriate behavioral co-ordination without constant 
ambient input […]. Whatever plays that kind of inner role is 
surely going to count […] as some kind of internal 
representation. (Clark and Toribio, 1994, p. 419) 
 
Coming back to our example, the story is as follows. The dog, or his 





particular behavior in the present has to do with the presence of such internal 
(neural) representation. The problem with this explanation, although it may 
be psychologically satisfactory to one or more observers, is that it leaves us 
in front of an even bigger mystery: how can a portion of matter, in this case a 
set of neurons, be about something or hold referential-semantic relations 
with certain events of the world? The notion of internal representation, as 
invoked by Clark’s  considerations, may well be a way of making the 
animal’s behavior intelligible, and in that sense, a way of explanation. We, 
who have assumed a Strict Naturalism, are not interested in questioning the 
psychological goodness of this kind of explanation, its power to make the 
explananda intelligible or understandable. We are interested in preserving a 
Strict Naturalistic conception of the neurological mechanisms as biological 
phenomena, and avoiding any form of over-naturalization, 
anthropomorphism or observational projection in their description and 
explanation (we will come back to this point in Chapter 5).  
Let us review now, very briefly, the notion of ‘closed transition’ and the 
metaphysical principle that grounds it. 
 
 
2.2 Closed transitions 
 
The Conservation Principle (CP) states that the origin and end of physical 
unities is always another physical unity or unities. When a new physical 
unity appears, what appears is a new configuration of a physical reality that 
was already there; it does not come out of nothing. Similarly, when a 
physical unity disintegrates or ceases to exist, that means that its physical 
reality has become something different, not that it has been confined to the 
absolute nothingness. In cybernetic terms, this can be expressed by saying 
that the physical universe is a system of ‘closed transitions’. A transition is 
closed if it has both an initial and a final state. A transition is open or 
undefined if it lacks either an initial or a final state. In the following example 






     Temporal order      ...   1         2        3       4      5       6      7        
System’s states           ?  B   C   D  E   ? 
                
Recall in the previous chapter we said that if our unity of observation is 
as generic or basic as ‘physical phenomenon’, ‘physical magnitude’ or 
‘physical unity’, then what we have is that everything is conservation 
through the constant constitution and disintegration of particular entities (be 
they massless particles, antimatter, dark matter, some kind of energy field, 
etc.). It is in this sense that physical unities are systems of closed transition. 
When they arise, they arise as modifications of certain physical reality that 
was already there. When they disintegrate, their physicality does not 
disappear but takes form in new unities. In other words, their physicality is 
always conserved.  
Under this assumption, open or undefined transitions occur because of 
the epistemic limitations of the observer, not because of a sudden 
metaphysical creation or vanishing of the unity under observation. An open 
transition simply means that its observation is incomplete over time (the 
observer has missed the antecedent condition of the unity or has ceased to 
observe it), or that the unity has arisen from, or transformed into, a form of 
physical existence that the observer ignores or cannot recognize.   
Living beings are systems of closed transition simply because that is a 
trivial condition of any physical unity or system. When living beings 
appeared on the Earth they appeared as a novel organization of a certain 
amount of matter and energy that was already there, and the day they 
extinguish the matter and energy they are will take form in a myriad of inert 
unities. A living being is a temporary organization of a fundamental physical 









2.3 Deterministic systems 
 
The Determinacy Principle (DP) states that physical systems are 
deterministic systems. Determinism, as a philosophical thesis, may be 
understood in different ways. In its most austere expression, determinism is a 
thesis restricted only to the field of physical phenomena (their regularity or 
law-like nature), without aiming to say anything in particular about the 
(moral) problem of human free will. In a more ambitious philosophical 
version, determinism is usually appealed to in order to say something about 
human free will; for example, that free will does not exist because the world 
is deterministic. Here I will speak of determinism in an austere sense, and 
concentrate mainly on three essential sub-principles: 1) Principle of 
Configurational Determinism (PCD), 2) Principle of Evolutionary 
Determinism (PED), and 3) Principle of Structural Determinism (PSD).  
These three forms of determinism, we will see, seem to operate as basic 
metaphysical principles in our quotidian experience as spontaneous 
observers. All or most of the explanatory systems—magic, religious, 
animist, naturalistic—seem to recognize determinism as a primary 
metaphysical element, and the violation of determinism as something 





The Principle of Configurational Determinism states that the configuration 
of the system (i.e., the total set of its variables) has, at every moment, only a 
unique value. In cybernetic terms, the configuration of a system is 
deterministic if its variables are single-valued, i.e., if they assume, at each 
given moment, a unique value. The configuration of a system is non-
deterministic if its variables are multiple-value; i.e., if they assume two or 
more different values at the same time. Generally, non-determinate machines 





probabilistic machines. But they can also be conceived of in purely 
conceptual or propositional terms, in which case we can speak of modal 
machines.  
It is important to note that PCD is a principle restricted only to physical 
variables. Other kinds of variables are not necessarily subject to PCD. For 
example, ‘nationality’, ‘institutional affiliation’ and other nominal or 
conventional variables can assume multiple values without any problem. A 
person can have, at the same time, two or more nationalities, and an 
academic remain affiliated to two or more universities. With physical 
variables the issue is different. A person can be a French and Chinese citizen 
at the same time, but can she physically be, at least for a moment, in those 
two countries at the same time? An academic can remain affiliated to the 
University of Edinburgh and to the University of Copenhagen, but can she 
physically be delivering a lecture in Edinburgh and Copenhagen at the same 
time? When dealing with physical variables, PCD seems to be the rule.  
PCD assumes that any indeterminacy with respect to the configurational 
value of physical systems is due to some epistemic limitation in the observer, 
not to an alleged intrinsic indeterminacy in the observed systems. According 
to PCD, configurational indeterminacy is always epistemic indeterminacy; 
i.e., uncertainty.  
For example, let’s say that I want to know the temperature of a system at 
a given moment, and that my thermometer is such that it can give me only a 
range of probable values. The instrument says that at the time 1 the 
temperature of the system is between 33 and 36 degrees Celsius. Must I 
assume that the system has, at the same time, 33, 34, 35 and 36 degrees? 
Well, that is not our most common interpretation. What we usually do is to 
assume that the temperature of the system at the time 1 has a unique value, a 
value that may be, disjunctively, 33, or 34, or 35, or 36 degrees, but not all 
of them at the same time! We assume that the temperature of the system is a 
determinate property (i.e., single-valued), even when our knowledge of its 
punctual values remain undetermined.  
Now, if I build a mathematical model to describe the thermal trajectory of 
the system using the data provided by my thermometer, what I get is a 





values. Such a system is a non-deterministic formal system with respect to 
its configuration (not necessarily with respect to its evolution). Nonetheless, 
the real system whose temperature I am trying to follow remains a 
deterministic system. According to PCD, to assign a stochastic 
(probabilistic) ontology to the real system would be as inappropriate as to 
assign certain temperature to the mathematical model.  
If we assume PCD, as it seems reasonable to do, stochastic or 
probabilistic machines exist uniquely as formal entities; that is, as abstract 
systems that we construct to describe, model, explain or predict the behavior 
of certain concrete systems. Under this assumption, probabilities express, 
quantitatively, degrees of certainty or uncertainty in the observer, not aspects 
or features of the concrete observed systems. This is tantamount to assuming 
that every real physical system is always a single-valued system of variables, 
i.e., a configuration-determined system. As long as living systems are real 
physical systems, it seems fair to treat them as configuration-determined 
systems too.  
 
 
2.3.2 PED  
 
The Principle of Evolutionary Determinism simply means unique trajectory. 
The evolution or trajectory of a system is unique if, given exactly the same 
structural conditions (both in the system and in its surroundings, when the 
system interacts with its surroundings), the system exhibits exactly the same 
sequence of states, the same trajectory. The evolution of a system is not 
unique (i.e., indeterministic) if, given exactly the same structural conditions 
(both in the system and in its surrounding, when the system interacts with a 
surrounding), the system exhibits a different trajectory. The classical image 
to illustrate PED is that of a videotape (Bishop, 2002). Suppose that you are 
watching a film X and that you want to repeat some scenes. You rewind the 
tape, run it, and watch the same scenes again. That is unique evolution 





film Y. You rewind the tape, run it, and... Surprise! The film does not show 
the same scenes; it is a different story now. Y is an indeterministic system 
with respect to its evolution.  
Like PCD, PED assumes that any indeterminacy in the evolution of a 
system is due to some epistemic lack in the observer, not to a metaphysical 
indeterminacy in the observed system. This is actually the principle that 
Ashby applies in his analysis of ‘memory’ reviewed before (The machine 
appeared as evolutionarily indeterministic only to the incomplete observer). 
If the observer sees that a system X exhibits, under what she takes to be 
exactly the same conditions, different behaviors, and if she subscribes to 
PED, then she will assume that the behavioral difference has to do with the 
intervention of some variable that is being ignored (a ‘hidden’ variable 
whose existence, in principle, might be discovered at some moment), not 
with an alleged intrinsic randomness or capricious freedom in the system. 
This way of reasoning, as Jaynes observes, is the way in which standard 
biological science has made some of its most valuable discoveries.  
 
In biology or medicine, if we note that an effect E (for 
example, muscle contraction, phototropism, digestion of 
protein) does not occur unless a condition C (nerve impulse, 
light, pepsin) is present, it seems natural to infer that C is a 
necessary causative agent for E. [...] But suppose that 
condition C does not always lead to effect E; what further 
inference should a scientist draw? (…) 
In the biological sciences, one takes for granted that in 
addition to C there must be some other causative factor F, 
not yet identified. One searches for it, tracking down the 
assumed cause by a process of elimination of possibilities 
that is sometimes extremely tedious. But persistence pays 
off; over and over again, medically important and 
intellectually impressive success has been achieved, the 
conjectured unknown causative factor has been finally 
identified as a definite chemical compound. Most enzymes, 





owe their discovery to this reasoning process. (Jaynes, 2003, 
p. 327) 
  
In this thesis we will apply the same reasoning with respect to living 
beings, their behavior and their subsystems. If a living being shows, under 
what we take to be exactly the same circumstances, different behaviors, we 
will assume that that is because of the intervention of some ignored or not 
yet identified structural factor, not due to an alleged intrinsic freedom of 





The principle of Structural Determinism has to do with the source of 
specification of the structural states of the system. As stated by Maturana, a 
system is structurally determined if its structural state, at every moment, is 
specified by its own structure and not by external factors. External factors 
can interact with the system and trigger (or not) some change of state on it, 
but they cannot specify (define, determine) the structural result of said 
interaction (Maturana, 1975, 1981, 1987, 2003). PSD states that every time 
the system receives the action of an external factor, it is the current structural 
state of the system, and not the external factor, that (i) defines whether this 
action triggers or not a structural change on it, and, in the positive case, (ii) 
specifies the concrete structural change that takes place. In cybernetic terms 
this means that, with respect to the observed system, external factors act only 
as operative factors (operators), never as instructive factors (instructions), or, 
equivalently, that the interactions of the system are always operative 
interactions, never instructive interactions. Let us review these ideas through 
some examples.  
A person presses a button on a laptop with his finger and as a 
consequence of this the laptop turns on. After a couple of minutes the same 





previous case, the laptop now turns off. What has happened? We have the 
same elements interacting in the same way but ending in different results. 
Well, there is nothing mysterious about that. Although the finger is pressing 
the same button with the same force, the current structural state of the laptop 
is different in each case and, consequently, so too the structural change that 
takes place. The finger encounters the laptop in different structural states, 
and it is these structural states that specify the nature of the changes in each 
case. The mechanical interaction with the finger triggers the change of state 
that is possible at every moment according to the current structural state of 
the system, but it does not specify or instruct the nature of said change.  
The laptop in its turn only reacts in the way in which its structure allows. 
By pressing the button it may turn on or turn off, but not dance, cry, or cook 
a pizza. The point is not that it cannot react in these ways but that for doing 
such things it would need a different structure. The structural changes 
undergone by the laptop are never arbitrary; they are always determined by 
its structure.  
On the other hand, the fact that it is the finger of that specific person and 
not some other element that triggers certain structural change in the system 
is, from the point of view of the laptop, absolutely irrelevant. If the laptop is 
off, it will turn on whenever something interacts with the proper button in 
the proper way. That something may be a finger, a pencil, a stick, a stone, a 
screwdriver, etc. That is, a disjunctive series of objects. Nonetheless, to the 
laptop it is all the same; simply a transition from ‘off’ to ‘on’ or from ‘on’ to 
‘off’. Its structural dynamic is absolutely blind to the distinctions that we as 
external observers can make concerning the different triggering objects in its 
environment. The ‘true’ origin of its structural changes, so to speak, never 
appears as such for the laptop, and the laptop, on the other hand, does not 
need to ‘know’ that to make its transitions.  
Even more, for the effects of its structural dynamic, what counts, at every 
moment, are the structural states in themselves, not the way, whether 
exogenous or endogenous, in which those states are brought about. When the 
laptop is ‘on’, it is ‘on’ irrespective of whether this state was reached 
through an internal evolution or through a change triggered by some external 





periodically turn on and turn off). We will come back to this point later on 
when talking about perception in Chapter 5. (It will be argued that the 
nervous system, from the point of view of PDS, works like the laptop; i.e., 
its structural states have the operational efficacy that they have 
independently of the way, endogenous or exogenous, they come about).  
The important point is that a structurally determined system always exists 
in its own domain of structural states and changes, without distinguishing the 
origin of such structural states and changes.  
Now, let us suppose that after six years of use, the laptop suddenly does 
not turn on anymore. The person insistently presses the button with his 
finger, but the laptop remains off. What has happened? What has happened 
is that after six years the structure of the laptop has changed in such a way 
that now its responses are different. Its current structural state is such that the 
mechanical interactions through the button do not trigger in it the changes of 
state that were usual in the past.  
The person feels disappointed. Perplexed, he scratches his head and tries 
to understand the problem: “Wait a moment… That’s it! The finger! It must 
be my finger!” The person, convinced that it is his finger that determines the 
changes of state in the laptop, runs to the doctor and asks him to check it. 
“Please, could you check what is wrong with my finger? It is not able to turn 
on the laptop anymore. I need you to restore its normal functioning!”  
If we think that the demand of the person is nonsensical—says 
Maturana—that is because we assume, as a kind of tacit condition, PSD. We 
know that here the ‘problem’ has to do with the structure of the laptop and 
not with the nature of the external factor (the structural condition of the 
finger). We know that our fingers are able to turn on only those systems 
whose structure admits the state ‘on’ in its domain of states (working TVs, 
radios, mobiles, laptops, and electronic devices in general). None of us 
expects that our finger is able to turn on a table, a stone or a glass of water. 
After six years of use, the laptop has become a system whose structure, like 
the table, the stone and the glass of water, does not admit the state ‘on’ 
within its domain of states. ‘Turning on’ is not an intrinsic causal power in 
our fingers, and if it was such, then our finger would act as an instructive 





factor and an operative factor? 
An instructive factor is an external factor that violates PSD. An operative 
factor is an external factor that respects PSD. Can we see any example of an 
instructive factor? Yes, we can, but since the principle of structural 
determinism is valid for all real systems—says Maturana—we can find the 
example only as a fiction or myth. And the myth exists. There was once a 
king named Midas who was given the power of transforming whatever he 
touched into gold. It did not matter the structural nature of the objects that he 
touched; apples, cups, water, stones, animals, everything was converted into 
gold. Midas’s finger was not an operative factor interacting with the objects; 
it was a fully intrusive factor dictating, unilaterally, the nature of the 
structural changes in every one of them. Midas’s finger had the power of 
violating the structural auto-determination of the systems, which, after all, 
was not a very good thing. According to some versions of the story, Midas 
forgot the blind and indiscriminate character of his power in the moment 
when his daughter came to him. Caressing her, he gave her a golden death 
(Maturana, 1978b). 
The fact that we find the violation of PSD in the form of a fiction or myth 
is telling. If we pause to think about it, we will realize that one of the marks 
of those phenomena that we usually qualify as ‘magic’, ‘miraculous’ or 
‘supernatural’ is that they operate outside PSD. Witches and wizards can, if 
they want, ‘charm’ a prince and transform him into a frog. Jesus had the 
power of transforming water into wine, of healing blind people just with a 
touch. What is so extraordinary about these beings and their actions? Why 
do they seem supernatural to us? What seems supernatural to us is that these 
beings can interact with the systems specifying (instructing) the kind of 
structural change that they want to effectuate, irrespective of whether these 
changes are possible or not according to the structural determination of the 
systems.  
PSD is a central assumption for scientific practice. If I want to provide a 
scientific explanation of a system X, I need to assume X as determined in its 
own structure, not as subject to instructive interactions. This is the rule too, 
says Maturana, when the system under consideration is a living being. The 





interaction must be understood as a mutual triggering of structural changes 
wherein each part acts always as an operative factor for the other, not as an 
instructive factor.  
So far we have presented PSD as a simple metaphysical concept, trying 
to understand its core meaning through examples and illustrations. In a more 
formal exposition, PSD is a complex concept that entails, according to 
Maturana (2003, pp. 61-62), at least four domains of structural determinism: 
 
[C]omposite unities [i.e., systems] are structure-determined 
systems in the sense that everything that happens in them is 
determined by their structure. This can be systematically 
expressed by saying that the structure of composite unity 
determines it at every instant: 
a) the domain of all the structural changes that it may 
undergo with conservation of organization (class identity) 
and adaptation at that instant; I call this domain the 
instantaneous domain of the possible changes of state of the 
composite unity. 
b) the domain of all the structural changes that it may 
undergo with loss of organization and adaptation at that 
instant; I call this domain the instantaneous domain of the 
possible disintegrations of the composite unity. 
c) the domain of all the different structural configurations of 
the medium that it admits at that instant in interactions that 
trigger in it changes of state; I call this domain the 
instantaneous domain of the possible perturbations of the 
composite unity. 
d) the domain of all the different structural configurations of 
the medium that it admits at that instant in interactions that 
trigger in it its disintegration; I call this domain the 
instantaneous domain of the possible destructive interactions 
of the composite unity. 
 





system. Out of them, here we will concentrate on a) and c).  
The domain a), well viewed, corresponds to the adaptive domain of a 
system. According to Maturana, adaptation, recall, is conservation of 
organization (class identity) through, or in spite of, structural changes in 
interaction with the environment. Maturana is now introducing the idea that 
every phenomenon of adaptation, either passive or active, is subject to PSD. 
In order to underline this point, i.e., that every phenomenon of adaptation is 
subject to PSD, Maturana usually uses the expression ‘structural coupling’ 
(Maturana, 1980, 2002, 2003). ‘Structural coupling’ is a process of structural 
interaction wherein the system and its environment, or the system and other 
systems, act as mutual operative factors. Thus, to say that a system exists in 
structural coupling is to say that it exists in adaptation, but emphasizing the 
idea that said adaptation cannot be explained in terms of instructive 
interactions.  
The domain c) is interesting because it allows us to see that every 
dynamic system, passive or active, living or not, is always a selective system 
regarding its interactions. Every system, because of its structural 
determination, interacts with certain elements or aspects of the environment, 
with certain structural configurations, and not with others. A piece of 
marble, in its structural composition, determines a particular domain of 
perturbations wherein, for example, a subtle touch of my finger cannot 
trigger any change of state. My mobile phone, in its structural composition, 
specifies a domain of perturbations wherein a subtle touch of my finger (on 
its touch screen) does trigger a change of state. In this situation, there is a 
sense in which we might say that, for the marble, the subtle touch of my 
finger is something that does not form a part of its environment, to the extent 
that, as an external factor, it never appears in its domain of perturbations. We 
might also say, complementarily, that the touch of my finger is something 
that does exist in the mobile’s environment, because it appears as a part of its 
domain of perturbations.  
For the marble, the action of a hammer counts as a perturbation that 
triggers certain structural change. For the mobile, the action of a hammer is 
excluded from its domain of perturbations because it rather belongs to d), 





What for X is a perturbation, for Y may be a neutral element, whereas for 
Z a destructive interaction. Every physical system, in its structural 
determination, specifies its own domain of interactions, and therefore, its 
own domain of structural coupling and adaptation. Every physical system, in 
a certain way, selects an own environment from a broader surrounding. We 
might use ‘niche’ to refer to the particular environment that each physical 
system specifies as its own domain of perturbations, structural coupling and 
adaptation.  
Living beings, as structurally determined systems, constitute a variant of 
the same theme. They specify a domain of perturbations, and to that extent, a 
domain of structural coupling and adaptation; i.e., a niche (more about this in 
Chapter 4).  
 
 
2.4 Brief final comments 
 
A dynamic system is a machine if its trajectory is state-dependent.  A 
machine is fully deterministic if its configuration, evolution and structural 
interaction are deterministic. A machine is fully indeterministic if its 
evolution, configuration and structural interaction are indeterministic. Any 
condition in between makes the machine partially deterministic (or partially 
indeterministic).  
In this chapter we have tried to show that living beings are fully 
deterministic machines, or at least, that for the specific purposes of their 
scientific study there are not compelling reasons to think otherwise. The 
consequences of assuming determinism in living beings are substantive. 
Here we will only enumerate some of these consequences. Their impact 
upon the way in which we understand living beings’ behavior will be 
reviewed in subsequent chapters. 
First, a fully deterministic machine has no possibilities or alternatives of 
action. A fully deterministic machine is where it is and has the structural 
state that it has, at every moment, as a result of a deterministic chain of 





for such a system is just that, an intellectual construction that belongs to our 
operation as observers able to conceive of counterfactual situations.  
If living beings are assumed to be fully deterministic machines, then they 
are assumed to be systems that have no freedom of action. They react as they 
react and do what they do, at every moment, because their deterministic 
nature allows them no other possibility.  
Second, since a fully determinist machine never has alternative ways to 
act, it cannot exert any control or regulation upon its behavior, basically 
because there is no metaphysical margin for that. To the extent that, as it has 
been argued here, natural systems are assumed to be fully deterministic 
machines, their structural trajectories and behaviors cannot be the result of 
processes of control or regulation. Planets and rivers do not control or 
regulate their trajectories, they simply move according to a deterministic 
sequence of changes of state. Volcanoes cannot control or regulate their 
eruptions, they simply erupt when their structural conditions so determine it. 
If living beings are assumed to be fully deterministic machines, then their 
behavior cannot be the product of processes of control or regulation either. 
Living beings behave and act without having any control or regulation upon 
their acts.  
Third, a fully deterministic machine is a structurally determined system. 
A structurally determined system, as was illustrated in the example of the 
laptop, is a system that entirely exists in its own domain of structural states, 
without being able to, and without needing to, distinguish the origin of said 
structural states (whether exogenously triggered or endogenously generated). 
When a structural change is triggered by an external factor, all that counts 
and exists for the system is the structural change itself, nothing more. That 
is, the external factor never appears as what it is for us observers, namely the 
causative and responsible agent of said structural change. If living beings are 
assumed to be structurally determined systems, then their interactions with 
the environment are subject to this metaphysical condition.  
Living beings, like any interacting dynamic system, exist in a continuous 
process of structural coupling with the environment, i.e., in adaptation. This 
process is a natural phenomenon that, as such, takes place within the 





beings’ adaptation is a process of unique evolution (PED) wherein both they 
and the environment operate as strictly deterministic machines (AP) with 
respect to their configuration (PCD) and structure (PSD).   
The following diagram aims to summarize these ideas, showing a living 
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The main message, for now, is simply that living beings’ adaptation is a 
fully deterministic process (more about this in Chapter 5).  But notice the 
following point.  
Suppose we accept, following Ashby and Maturana, the idea that living 
being’s adaptation is a fully deterministic phenomenon. We still would need 
to explain living beings’ adaptation. For adaptation, as a concept, recall, is 
just a way of naming a certain condition or phenomenon, not an explanatory 
notion.  
In what follows we will examine certain peculiarities of living beings 
regarding their structural dynamics and functional organization. This will 
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So far we have characterized living beings as adaptive dynamic systems 
whose metaphysics, qua dynamic systems, is strictly continuous with the rest 
of dynamic systems in nature. We have said, in the name of a Strict 
Naturalism, that living beings are physical machines of closed transitions, 
and that their behavior, whatever the level of “intelligence” or sophistication 
we want to attribute to it, is generated under ordinary conditions of 
structural, evolutionary and configurational determinism. 
In this chapter we will examine another important property of living 
beings, namely their stability. Stability is a property that we can find in many 
systems, not only in living beings, yet its manifestation in biological systems 
has a special connotation for us. All stable systems—as Ashby will show 
us—generate to greater or lesser degree a characteristic behavioral pattern 
that appears to be teleological (i.e., oriented at some goal or purpose). Living 
beings, as stable systems, are not the exception to this pattern but rather the 
most representative and strongest case. The main idea of this chapter is that 
the apparent teleology of living beings is (i) precisely that, an appearance, 
and (ii) that behind said appearance what exists is a complex form of 
stability.  
Our strategy will be as follows. We are going to start by considering 
teleology as a valid appearance in our observation of living beings, i.e., as 
something that, being an appearance, has a real ground in the observed 





appearance emerges in our observation of living beings. My hope is that by 
understanding living beings as stable systems we will be able to understand, 
at least in part, the peculiarity of their behaviors without succumbing to a 
(tempting but not Strictly Naturalistic) teleological interpretation. Ashby 
puts it, as always, in a clearer way: 
 
No teleological explanation for behavior will be used. It will 
be assumed throughout that [...] an animal behaved in a 
certain way at a certain moment because its physical and 
chemical nature at that moment allowed it no other action. 
[…] Any [teleological] explanation would […] involve a 
circular argument; for our purpose is to explain the origin of 
behavior which appears to be teleologically directed. 
(Ashby, 1960, p. 9. Emphasis added) 
 
The way Ashby puts things is interesting. Ashby does not say that there 
are some behaviors that are teleologically oriented, but that there are some 
behaviors which appear to be teleologically oriented, and that the task is to 
analyze the origin of such an appearance. Accordingly, our question is not 
“How can living beings behave in a teleological way?” but “Why does the 
behavior of the living being, a particular class of deterministic physical 
machine, appear to us as if it were driven by certain goals or purposes? What 





Appearances, in many cases, are not arbitrary errors or caprices of the 
observer but phenomena that have a real ground in the observed systems. 
Because of this, some of them may be persistent and difficult to eliminate, 
even after knowing that they are mere appearances. 
Walking in the middle of the desert, suddenly you see a pond surrounded 





not know at that moment. Let us suppose that a helicopter is flying over the 
zone where you see the pond located, and that the pilot communicates with 
you by mobile phone. While you are contemplating the scene, the pilot is 
telling you that in that area there is no pond. He sends you an aerial picture 
in which all that you see are some plants. Do you, can you, stop seeing the 
pond? Well, you cannot stop seeing the pond because the mirage is not an 
arbitrary mistake of your visual apparatus. On the contrary, given the 
lighting conditions, the ambient temperature, the angle of the soil with 
respect to you, the refractive index in the local atmosphere, and the state of 
your biological machinery, the image of a pond is what you have to see (i.e., 
the mirage is actually the expected and normal response). There is nothing 
wrong about that. 
If you take the mirage as a grounded and valid phenomenon, then you can 
ask for an explanation. How does it happen that I see a pond in 
circumstances that there is no pond? What are the physical and biological 
processes that generate this experience? This question is both valid and 
fruitful because you are trying to explain the appearance while keeping the 
appearance as what it is; a phenomenon that has to do with the particular 
relation established between your condition as an observer and the state of 
affairs in the desert, not with the state of affairs in the desert in itself. 
Now, suppose you are also curious about the presence of the plants. Why 
are those plants there in the desert? How do they manage to live there? A 
good and simple answer would be “because they get water from the pond.” 
Unfortunately, you cannot appeal to the pond as an explanatory element, as 
plants do not get water from mirages! The pond, as a mirage, is a real and 
legitimate phenomenon in your experience, a natural result of a well-
determined arrangement of physical and biological conditions. Yet that does 
not mean you can use it to explain other properties or phenomena found in 
the desert.  
In a more quotidian example, we know that the geocentric appearance is 
a perfectly justified phenomenon for terrestrial inhabitants. While you are 
contemplating the sunset, the astronomer reminds you that the Sun is not 
moving around the Earth but that it is the Earth which is rotating on its own 





that, but... Do you, can you, stop seeing the Sun going down? No you cannot 
(nor can the astronomer), because the geocentric appearance is something 
perfectly determined by your particular condition as an observer (your 
location), and the relative movement of the Earth and the Sun. You can 
explain the geocentric appearance by appealing to some astronomical 
knowledge, but you cannot modify your geocentric subjective experience by 
appealing to such theoretical knowledge. Again, it is an appearance, but not 
an arbitrary whim. More importantly, you can explain the geocentric 
appearance by appealing to the heliocentric organization of the solar system 
and the rotation of the Earth. But it would be a great confusion, after 
explaining the geocentric appearance in those terms, to explain the duration 
of days by saying that the Sun takes 24 hours to orbit around the Earth.   
The idea, I think, is clear enough. Once we manage to show the 
mechanisms that generate a determinate appearance in our observation, once 
we understand its ground, we cannot take said appearance as an operating 
element in the observed system, nor use it as an explanatory principle. Once 
explained, appearances can be recognized as valid phenomena of our 
observation, but not as properties of the observed systems; not even, as some 
advocates of ‘complex systems theory’ would like to say, as alleged 
‘emergent properties’. In our previous example, the apparent geocentric 
organization of the solar system is not an ‘emergent’ property of the system; 
it is just an apparent property to the eye of the observer, which is something 
different.  
In what follows we will examine stability as a natural property of certain 
dynamic systems, including living beings. In particular, we will try to 
explain the teleological appearance of living beings in terms of their stability 





Living beings remain alive to the extent that a set of metabolic or 





maintain their values within certain specific ranges (called physiological or 
metabolic ranges). Living beings’ ability to maintain, in spite of 
disturbances, their physiological or metabolic condition within these ranges 
is what is usually known as homeostasis. Living beings’ homeostasis is a 
particular version of stability, which is a relatively common property among 
dynamic systems. What is stability? 
To talk about stability we need basically two things. First, we need a 
constant condition in the system; a set of variables with invariant 
trajectories, or a set of variables with bounded variant trajectories that 
exhibit some constant pattern (e.g., a regular cycle or oscillation). That is, we 
need the system to be in some kind of stationary or steady state. Second, we 
need some perturbation (natural or induced by us) that takes the system out 
of its steady state, i.e., we need a disturbance. (A disturbance is thus a 
particular kind of perturbation; therefore, and by definition, never a 
destructive interaction. See again the four domains of structural determinism 
distinguished in Chapter 2). The constant condition or steady state provides 
the baseline respect to which we can estimate whether or not the system 
exhibits stability. If the system, after being disturbed, spontaneously returns 
to its baseline, i.e., if it recovers its previous condition without external help 
or assistance, we say the system is stable (with respect to those variables or 
aspects under consideration). If the system does not return to its baseline, we 




The mere observation of a constant condition in a system does not tell us 
whether or not the system is stable. A system, or some of its aspects, may 
remain constant just because there is no disturbance; perhaps because the 
system is not receiving any perturbation at all, or because perturbations do 
not disturb the constant condition under consideration (in this latter case we 
say the system is neither stable nor unstable but rather ‘neutral’). Whether or 
not a system is stable, thus, depends on the way in which it responds to a 
disturbance. 
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 There are cases in which the system has more than one stable point (multiple 
attractor systems), and whose stability does not necessarily express itself. For the 





The crucial point is that every stable system, when displaced from its 
baseline and then released, exhibits a line of behavior that returns to its 
initial state (Ashby, 1947). It is as if the system, in spite of disturbances, 
“insisted” on maintaining its steady state. This property of stable systems, as 
we shall see, can be easily described, if the observer wishes, as revealing an 
internal drive in the system that leads to a certain final state; i.e., as if the 
system were trying to reach some goal (to recover its steady state). When the 
stable system is simple enough, the observer, in general, does not feel a 
strong motivation to use teleological descriptions or explanations. The case 
is different, nonetheless, when the stable system is highly complex. The 
relative simplicity or complexity of a stable system has to do, mainly, though 
not exclusively, with factors such as its dimensionality (the number of 
variables or aspects in which the system exhibits stability), its structure and 
thermodynamic regime (e.g., whether or not the system exhibits an 
endogenous dynamic, whether the system has a closed or open 
thermodynamic regime), the presence or absence of feedback mechanisms 
(both positive and negative), the order or level of stability (e.g., first-order 
stability, second-order stability), and the system’s stability composition 
(simple or polystable). Living beings, as we shall see, are highly complex 
stable systems. But before reaching the high complexity of living beings, let 
us examine more basic examples of stability. 
A system that remains in a constant condition or steady state is a system 
that, in most cases, is in some state of equilibrium (static or dynamic, 
mechanical or thermodynamic). That is, most steady states are equilibrium 
steady states. Non-equilibrium steady states are less common, but highly 
relevant for our purposes. As we shall see, living beings, considered as 
thermodynamic systems, are special cases of stable non-equilibrium steady 
states. 
Let us start, following Ashby’s classical presentation (1960), by 
reviewing simple cases of equilibrium steady states, or equilibriums, for 
short. Equilibriums may be stable, unstable, or neutral. To illustrate this 
distinction, think of three different objects resting on some horizontal surface 
and disturbed by some external force. A cube resting with one face on a table 





unstable equilibrium. A ball resting on the same table exemplifies neutral 
equilibrium. I take the illustration to be quite clear and simple, but notice 
that these are cases of mechanical static equilibriums wherein the systems 
have a fixed and limited amount of available energy (i.e., their behavior is 
restricted to this energetic invariance). Thus, although the cube is a clear 
example of stability, its behavior does not look too interesting, at least not 
for us who are trying to understand living beings’ functioning.  
More interesting, says Ashby, is the case of stable systems with 
continuous energetic supply. As examples, Ashby offers the Watt governor 
(fed with a continuous flow of steam), and the thermostat (usually fed with 
electrical power). These systems are able, in front of transient disturbances, 
to bring their critical variables (speed of steam flow and temperature, 
respectively) back to their baseline values, thus demonstrating stability. Yet 
these systems are different from the cube not only because of their energetic 
regime, but also due to the way in which they reach stability. They, but not 
the cube, are organized as functional circuits with inverted polarity (negative 
feedback), such that the very disturbance produces, through some mediating 
mechanism, the compensation that brings the system back to its equilibrium.  
Living beings, as we shall see, are also systems with continuous energy 
supply whose physiological stability or homeostasis, in most cases, is 
preserved by means of a set of servomechanisms or negative feedback loops. 
There is, of course, a long distance between Watt governors or thermostats 
and living beings, but for now let us pause on the simpler cases and try to see 
what Ashby wants to show us about them. 
 
 
3.3 The appearance of teleology in stable 
systems 
 
Ashby says that all stable systems, even the simplest ones, may be described 






Every stable system has the property that if displaced from a 
state of equilibrium and released, the subsequent movement 
is so matched to the initial displacement that the system is 
brought back to the state of equilibrium (Ashby, 1960, p. 
54). 
 
It is this pairing of the line of return to the initial displacement, says 
Ashby, what usually motivates in the observer the ascription of teleology to 
stable systems. A simple example is provided by the ordinary pendulum. 
When displaced to the right, the pendulum develops a proportional force that 
tends to move it to the left. When displaced to the left, it develops a 
proportional force that tends to move it to the right. In both cases, after a 
couple of oscillations, the pendulum recovers its static equilibrium at the 
central position, thus showing stability. 
 
Noticing that the pendulum reacted with forces which 
though varied in direction always pointed towards the 
centre, the mediaeval scientist would have said ‘the 
pendulum seeks the centre’. By this phrase he would have 
recognized that the behavior of a stable system may be 
described as ‘goal seeking’ (Ashby, 1960, p. 54. Emphasis 
added) 
 
The behavior of a stable system, says Ashby, may be described in 
teleological terms as ‘goal-seeking’. Why? I emphasized the words ‘varied’ 
and ‘always’ in the quotation because they capture, I think, the key point 
about stable systems’ behavior. All stable systems exhibit a typically 
convergent behavioral pattern; i.e., no matter which way they are displaced 
from their steady state (the variability of the disturbances), they always 
return to the same steady state. In the example, regardless of the angle of the 
displacement, the pendulum will return to the same state of equilibrium (the 
resting position). It is this combination of variability (by the side of the 
behavior) with invariance (by the side of the steady state), that gives the idea 





goal around which it is able to vary and ‘accommodate’ its behavior 
according to the different circumstances. Again, it is as if the pendulum, in 
spite of disturbances, insisted on maintaining its equilibrium. That is why 
Ashby says that every stable system may be described in teleological terms. 
But what does that mean? Does that mean that stable systems really try to 
reach some goal? Is the pendulum really seeking its resting state? Does it 
move towards the centre because that is its purpose? Perhaps the mediaeval 
scientist, with an Aristotelian mindset, might have replied “yes”. We, 
instead, who have subscribed to a Strict Naturalism, cannot. Pendulums are 
simple mechanical systems, absolutely blind to any purpose or goal. The fact 
that we can describe a stable system in teleological terms does not mean that 
the system is teleological; it just means that the teleological description 
captures an appearance that is not arbitrary but that has a real ground in the 
observed system.  
Now, when dealing with pendulums, I guess, most of us do not find a 
teleological description or explanation terribly attractive, as simple physical 
variables are enough to explain their behavior. When dealing with living 
systems, however, the situation seems to change. Why is this so? Why are 
we, post-Aristotelian observers, so prone to attribute some kind of teleology 
to living beings? One might say that we humans simply tend to project 
features of our subjective experience to entities which are close to our genus, 
and that living beings, without any doubt, are closer to us than pendulums. 
But that comment, even if true, does not explain the apparent teleology of 
living beings as a function of living beings themselves; it just expresses, at 
most, a human bias. The question is “What is peculiar about living beings, 
among stable systems, such that their behavior appears to be teleological?” 
The answer, if we follow Ashby, has to do with the complexity of living 
beings as stable systems.  
“Complexity” is a word that needs careful handling, though, as 
sometimes it is read with too much metaphysical enthusiasm. Some readers, 
perhaps followers of the so called ‘paradigm of complexity’, might say 
“Complexity brings emergent properties, so teleology might be an emergent 
property of living beings!” That is not the way we talk about complexity 





shall see, with their interconnected multidimensionality, their 
nonequilibrium thermodynamic condition, and their ultrastable functioning; 
all features that enrich or complicate the way in which living beings generate 
their behavior as stable systems, but that do not introduce any metaphysical 
novelty or exceptionality, at least not in terms of teleology. An apparent 
property, recall, is not an emergent property. 
Ashby’s idea is simple. The structural and thermodynamic properties of a 
stable system, in combination with the properties of its surrounding, 
condition the way in which the system recovers its steady state. Sometimes 
these properties are such that the system, in returning to its steady state, 
describes a simple and straight line of behavior (i.e., without deviations with 
respect to its steady state). But sometimes this is not the case, and the system 
reaches its steady state only after going through more or less large, and more 
or less long, deviations. For example, a metallic ball resting on a horizontal 
surface (state R of static mechanical equilibrium), is placed at the top of an 
inclined plane (state A) and then released. The ball, rolling down, goes back 
from A to R describing a simple and direct line of behavior. Suppose now 
that the ball is not a perfect sphere; its surface has some irregularities and its 
centre of gravity is displaced. Suppose the inclined plane is not smooth, or 
better, that has some little bars (i.e., “obstacles”). Suppose that flows of air, 
some of them lateral, some of them upward, and strong enough to move the 
ball, cross the plane from time to time. The ball, subjected to all these 
factors, will go back sooner or later to its state of equilibrium R, but this time 
describing an indirect and complicated line of behavior. We will see the 
system passing through intermediate states, say B and C, which deviate from 
its state of equilibrium. 
We can complicate the example adding more disturbances, 
servomechanisms, or endowing the ball with some kind of endogenous 
dynamism. In any case, says Ashby: 
 
The fact that the line of behavior does not run straight from 
A to R must be due to some feature in the ‘machine’ such 
that if the machine is to get from state A to state R, states B 





machine contained moving parts, their shapes might prohibit 
the direct route from A to R; or if the system where 
chemical the prohibition might be thermodynamic. [I]n 
either case, if the observer watched the machine work, and 
thought it alive, he might say; ‘How clever! [The system] 
couldn’t get from A to R directly because this bar was in the 
way; so [it] went to B, [then] from B to C; and once at C, 
[the system] could get straight back to R. I believe [the 
system] shows foresight’ (Ashby, 1960, p. 69) 
 
A stable system, says Ashby (1960, p. 69), may be regarded both as 
blindly obeying the laws of its structural dynamic, and also as showing some 
kind of “intelligent power” (e.g., foresight, anticipation) in reaching its 
“goals” in spite of “obstacles”. Both descriptions are reasonable. The second 
description is reasonable because it captures an appearance that has a real 
ground in the system. The first one is reasonable because it captures not the 
appearance but the very ground of the appearance. Nonetheless, as in the 
case of the geocentric appearance and the heliocentric organization that 
grounds it, although both descriptions are reasonable, we have to keep the 
appearance as what it is, i.e., an appearance, and not to take it as a property 
of the observed system. The behavioral pattern of a stable system, no matter 
its degree of complexity, is always a deterministic function of its structural 
properties, not the expression of an alleged teleological drive.  
 
 
3.4 Living beings’ complexity as stable systems 
 
What are the structural and functional properties that make a stable system a 
complex stable system? What is peculiar about living beings as complex 
stable systems? There are several properties that are important, but here we 
will address only a few. One of the main differences between living beings 
and other kinds of stable system is their multidimensionality. The 





aspects in which the system exhibits stability. A thermostat, for example, 
operates only in one dimension: temperature. A hyperbaric chamber operates 
mainly in two dimensions: atmospheric pressure and oxygen concentration. 
Greenhouses, depending on their technological sophistication, may operate 
in three or four dimensions: temperature, ventilation, humidity, and 
luminosity. Living beings are stable systems of high multidimensionality; 
they operate in many dimensions at the same time (e.g., temperature, blood 
pressure, hydration, ph, hormone concentration, oxygen concentration, 
glucose concentration, electrolyte balance, etc.). Whereas the thermostat’s 
behavior has to do solely with temperature stability, the living being’s 
behavior is the complex product of multiple stabilities running at the same 
time.  
More important than the number of stability variables, perhaps, is the 
degree of connection among them as components of the system. A 
greenhouse, even managing several dimensions at the same time, may be 
built so that each subsystem operates separately without affecting the 
performance of the rest. Temperature and humidity, for example, may go to 
any value without affecting the dynamics of luminosity and ventilation. The 
case is quite different when the subsystems are connected, reciprocally 
conditioning their respective performances. Living beings are stable systems 
composed of several interconnected stable subsystems; i.e., the imbalance of 
one of them may bring as a result, sooner or later, directly or indirectly, the 
imbalance of others. This kind of multidimensionality imposes a complex 
web of mutual restrictions among the variables, conditioning and 
complicating the global behavior of the system.   
Another important feature is the presence of feedback mechanisms. As 
we saw in the previous examples of stable systems, cubes and pendulums do 
not have feedback mechanisms, whereas Watt governors and thermostats do. 
Living beings’ physiology, as it is known from Cannon (1932) onward, is 
full of feedback mechanisms, yet what matters is not their number but their 
order or organization. Feedback mechanisms are closed functional circuits 
that may operate at different levels. When the circuit directly operates upon a 
determinate variable, we speak of a first-order feedback mechanism. When 





another feedback mechanism, we speak of a second-order feedback 
mechanism. A stable system composed by a second-order feedback 
mechanism is what Ashby called an ‘ultrastable system’ (1960). Ashby 
demonstrated the basic principles of ultrastable systems by means of his 
famous ‘homeostat’ (an electromagnetic artificial device that exhibited 
second-order stability). We are not going to review the details of such a 
demonstration here, but only point out the way ultrastability contributes to 
the behavioral complexity of the system that has it. Our motto in this 
chapter, recall, is that the more complex the stable system, the stronger the 
teleological appearance to the eye of the observer. Ultrastability is one of 
those features that make living beings complex stable systems.  
Very briefly, and taking the examples given by Ashby (1960), we can see 
the sensorimotor dynamics of an organism as a first-order feedback 
mechanism. As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 4, sensory and motor 
surfaces constitute, through the mediation of the environment and the 
nervous system, a closed functional circuit. Through this sensorimotor 
circuit organisms may generate, in principle, all kinds of behaviors. But do 
they exhibit, in equal proportion, all the behaviors allowed by this 
sensorimotor circuit? No, they do not. Organisms tend to stabilize certain 
kinds of behaviors and discard others. Why? The reason, explains Ashby, is 
that the variability of the sensorimotor circuit is limited by another feedback 
mechanism that, at a second level, operates upon some essential 
physiological variable (temperature, oxygen concentration, tissue integrity, 
etc.). In vertebrate animals this second-order mechanism usually runs 
through some brain structure (generally subcortical nuclei), whose activity 
connects, at different points, with the sensorimotor mechanisms. In the case 
of living beings without a nervous system, such as unicellular organisms, the 
architecture of second-order feedback mechanisms is unclear. Here, for the 
sake of the exposition, we will assume that unicellular organisms may have, 
at least in principle, some form of ultrastability.  
Taking the example of pain reaction before an external stimulus, and 
simplifying a bit, every time the second-order circuit finds a level of sensory 
stimulation that goes beyond a certain physiological threshold, it activates a 





sensorimotor circuit (the first-order feedback mechanism), thus generating a 
variation in the animal’s behavior. This process continues until one of the 
behaviors so generated brings as a result the restoration of the sensory 
stimulation to its physiological values (e.g., avoiding the source of pain). In 
other words, the sensorimotor circuit is allowed to generate considerably 
varied behaviors, under the condition that none of those behaviors displaces 
the critical variable of the second-order circuits out of its physiological 
range.  
To the extent that living beings are multidimensional systems, one has to 
assume this ultrastable dynamic at least for every essential physiological 
variable, and also, as we already saw, a certain degree of connection among 
them. Ashby called the combination of several ultrastable systems a 
‘multistable system’ (1960), which seems a fair characterization of living 
beings as stable systems.   
The coexistence of several interconnected ultrastable dynamics confers a 
considerable degree of complexity, yet there is still something missing about 
the peculiarity of living beings’ stability. Ashby demonstrated the 
phenomenon of ultrastability with his homeostat, and, in principle, one might 
obtain a multistable system by joining several homeostats. Nonetheless, the 
activity of a homeostat, which basically consists in changes of 
potentiometers and electrical current, looks still quite distant from any living 
being’s behavior (in a full working homeostat all you see is four absolutely 
immobile boxes; the “behavior” of the system reduces to needle movements, 
buttons turning on and off, and things like that).  
To understand the peculiarity of living beings as stable systems we need 
to address one last and very important aspect; the thermodynamic regime. 
From a thermodynamic point of view, living beings belong to a special 
group of physicochemical systems called dissipative structures (Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984). Examples of these structures include Benard cells, lasers, 
flames, stars, tornadoes, and whirlpools (Ji, 2012; Ulanowicz & Hannon, 
1987). The peculiarity of these systems, as opposed to the so called 
equilibrium structures (or near-equilibrium structures), is that they exist and 
conserve their organization in far-from-thermodynamic equilibrium 





are thermodynamically open, and maintain integrity through the constant 
exchange of energy and matter with the environment. In other words, they 
disintegrate if this exchange is cut off.  
Where is the difference then between homeostats and living beings, both 
of them complex stable systems? The difference, if we go back to Chapter 1, 
has to do with their respective dynamic regimes. Homeostats, like any 
electronic device, are dynamic systems of variable regime; they can 
alternate, without loss of organization, between passive and active dynamics. 
Living beings are active dynamic systems of fixed regime; they cannot 
change to a passive regime without loss of organization. Let us look at this 
point more closely.   
The homeostat is a system fed with free energy supply (electrical power).  
If you cut the supply the system ceases to operate, but does not disintegrate. 
Later on you can turn it on again by restoring the energy supply. That is 
because the homeostat exists and maintains its organization in near 
thermodynamic equilibrium conditions; i.e., its integrity does not depend on 
a continuous material and energetic exchange with the environment. Living 
beings, instead, are nonequilibrium structures, and if they go to 
thermodynamic equilibrium they not only cease to operate, they die.  
 
What is most crucial to the case of living systems is that 
they are far from equilibrium not only with respect to their 
“operation”, but with respect to their existence. The 
thermodynamics involved in the ontology of the kinds of 
system that they exemplify is an irreversible 
thermodynamics — they cannot be “restored”, because of 
that irreversibility. They die if they go to equilibrium, and 
that is final. (Bickhard, 2007, p. 582) 
 
Living beings are a particular version of dissipative structures; their 
peculiarity, as we shall see in the next chapter, lies in the kind of endogenous 
dynamic that constitutes them as physicochemical systems (i.e., the 
autopoietic dynamic). The important point here is that living beings, like any 





stability is far-from-thermodynamic equilibrium. This means that, when 
disturbed, they move not to equilibrium but to the specific far-from-
equilibrium region in which they conserve integrity, which is a remarkable 
feature. As an image, it is as if a volume of water were suspended in the 
middle of a slope, and after being displaced downward by an external force, 
it moved upward returning to its initial location. The stability exhibited by 
dissipative structures is a highly complex form of stability, in fact, a form 
that for a long time was thought of as violating natural laws, specifically the 
second law of thermodynamics. (That that is not the case has been 
demonstrated by many people, but the works of Prigogine are surely the best 
known. See Prigogine, 1980; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984).  
Every dissipative structure, at different scales, exhibits the same 
behavioral pattern of stability. Disturb a candle flame in different ways 
(without being destructive, of course), and you will see how the flame 
reconstitutes as such. Disturb a maelstrom in the sea, and you will see how 
the maelstrom returns and conserves its integrity. Once a nonequilibrium 
steady state stabilizes as such, it is able to exhibit a considerable degree of 
stability in spite of disturbances. Sure, the stability that a system X can reach 
in far-from-equilibrium conditions is more precarious than the stability that 
it might reach in equilibrium conditions (sooner or later, stars disintegrate 
and living beings die), yet it is still a quite strong stability.  
As in any case of stability, dissipative structures seem to “insist”, despite 
disturbances, in retaining their organization, and so are susceptible to 
teleological descriptions. In the case of the living being, the typical image is 
that of a system “struggling” to survive and maintain its integrity; e.g., the 
classical Spinozan “conatus”, or what enactivists would call ‘motor 
intentionality’ (Gallagher and Miyahara, 2012). Being dissipative structures, 
and therefore thermodynamically open systems, living beings are stabilized 
as energy and matter flow systems. Like the pendulum that always returns to 
its equilibrium steady state, so the living being always returns to its non-
equilibrium steady state; i.e., it constantly restores the exchange of energy 
and matter with the environment.  





diminished to some degree (e.g., it has not eaten or drunk anything for a 
relatively long period), and the system, because of this, is displaced from its 
steady state as a thermodynamic system (i.e., essential variables such as 
hydration or glucose concentration deviate from their optimal values), at 
some moment the system will automatically operate, through one or more 
ultrastable mechanisms, the reactivation of its sensorimotor circuit.  From 
that moment, the ultrastable dynamics held between the second-order 
feedback mechanism (which operates upon essential variables) and the first-
order feedback mechanism (which operates upon the correlations of 
sensorimotor activity), will iterate until the behavior of the system brings as 
a result an intake of matter and energy such that the essential variables return 
to their optimal values. In this complex process, what the observer will see 
from the outside is that the cat gets up, walks to the kitchen and drinks some 
milk, the frog targets the fly, shoots its tongue and eats it, the lab rat, trapped 
in a maze, searches a way out, finds it and eats the food; all this with the 
alleged “purpose” of recovering their respective physiological levels of 
energy.   
 Living beings face a continuous flow of disturbances, both internal and 
external, and their behavior as dissipative structures is a constant return to 
the far-from-equilibrium condition where they exist. That is why we see 
them constantly renewing the exchange of energy and matter with the 
environment. Are there here purposes, goals, telos? Not really, though, as 
with any stable system, their behavior may be reasonably described, if the 
observer wants to, in teleological terms. The temptation is especially strong 
here, since living beings, among dissipative structures, are the only ones 
endowed with ultrastable mechanisms. The teleological description of living 
beings captures an appearance that is valid and justified, in the sense that it is 
grounded in stability mechanisms that are real and operative in living beings. 
Nonetheless, being an appearance, we cannot use it as an explanatory 
element in our cognitive theories; not, at least, if what we want is a Strictly 
















So far we have characterized living beings as adaptive dynamic systems 
(Chapter 1), deterministic machines of closed transitions (Chapter 2), and 
multistable dissipative systems (Chapter 3). In this chapter we will analyze 
one last and very interesting property of living beings; their organizational 
closure. More specifically, we will examine living beings’ organizational 
closure with respect to their autopoietic constitution and sensorimotor 
dynamic.  
As we shall see, organizational closure is a relatively common property in 
certain natural and artificial systems, not an exclusive mark of living beings. 
Nonetheless, there is one specific domain in which, apparently, only living 
beings exhibit organizational closure; that of processes of molecular 
synthesis. This is the central claim of Maturana’s autopoietic theory of living 
beings.  
Maturana’s autopoietic theory comprises two related but logically 
independent ideas: 1) all living beings discovered in Nature hitherto are, or 
are composed by, physical autopoietic systems, and 2) any physical 
autopoietic system, irrespective of its concrete molecular realization (carbon 
based or not) and origin (natural or artificial), can be considered a living 
system. I will argue that, out of these claims, number 1 is almost trivially 
correct, whereas number 2 might or should be left open to discussion. Claim 
number 1 is simply a descriptive abstraction, and, in my view, a correct one. 





expression of the well-known cyclic character of cell metabolism, and does 
not offer by itself much space for the debate. Claim number 2, instead, is 
stipulative. It says that the presence of autopoiesis in any physical system, 
discovered in Nature or artificially created, and whatever its molecular base, 
should be enough for us to qualify it as a living being.  
Although I think that this stipulation is basically correct, I would like, at 
least for the purposes of this thesis, to leave it open to discussion. Some 
people think that the mere presence of autopoiesis in a physical system does 
not make that system, immediately and without ambiguity, a living being. 
Some think that the presence of autopoiesis is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a given physical unity to be considered as a living being; that 
something more is needed (Bitbol and Luisi, 2004; Bourgine and Stewart, 
2004). The objection, roughly speaking, is that as a demarcating criterion, 
autopoiesis is too abstract and general; that we can conceive of, or artificially 
create, systems whose dynamic is basically autopoietic but whose structural 
complexity, behavior or mode of interaction with their environment is too 
poor, fragile or simple to be considered genuinely ‘alive’.  
I take it that this discussion is, to a large extent, a matter of convention. 
Some people, like Maturana and myself, would not have any problem in 
calling an autopoietic physical system made of entirely ‘atypical’ kinds of 
molecules, without any resemblance to DNA or protein molecules a ‘living 
being’. Others, instead, think that a chemical system without DNA and its 
associated ribosomal system, even if autopoietic, could not be considered a 
genuine living being (Barbieri, 2012, 2008).  Some people, like Maturana 
and myself, would not have any problem in calling an extremely fragile and 
simple autopoietic physical system, one that cannot survive minimal 
perturbations or easily disintegrates, a ‘living being’. Others, instead, may 
think that a system that cannot survive minimal perturbations cannot be a 
living being (Damiano and Luisi, 2010). This discussion I want to leave 
open because, ultimately, it is not relevant for the essential purposes of this 
thesis.  
Strictly speaking, the general theory of cognition that I am defending here 
does not depend on the particular fortune of autopoietic theory. Maturana, 





exclusive mark of living beings, or that its presence in a given system is 
sufficient for that system to be considered alive. Yet that would not change 
anything regarding our Strict Naturalistic conception of living beings, which 
is the point that really matters to us. The crux, for the specific purposes of a 
Strict Naturalistic cognitive science, is not whether autopoiesis is or is not a 
distinctive mark of living beings but rather whether living beings, whatever 
their organization, are or are not metaphysically ordinary dynamic systems 
subjected to the same constraints that rule any physical system in general, 
and whether or not they must be conceived of in Strictly Naturalistic terms. 
In this sense, the main message of autopoietic theory, as we shall see, is that 
the only peculiarity of living beings within the physical universe is their 
autopoietic constitution, and that there is nothing metaphysically 
extraordinary about that! 
Now, although the theory of cognition presented in this thesis is 
independent of the autopoietic theory, the notion of autopoiesis is important 
in its own right because it helps us to understand, in part, the origin of the 
behavioral distinctiveness of living beings as dynamic systems. We have 
said in previous chapters that living beings’ adaptation is simply one more 
version of a universal phenomenon among interacting dynamic systems, 
namely structural coupling;  that all physical systems, as long as they exist in 
a given environment, exhibit some form of adaptation. Adaptation, recall, is 
conservation of organization (class identity) through, or in spite of, structural 
changes in interaction with a medium. What defines, to a large extent, the 
different forms of adaptation found in different systems is precisely the kind 
of organization (class identity) conserved in each case. We have seen in the 
previous chapter that living beings belong to the natural kind of dissipative 
structures, and that within that group they are the only ones endowed with 
ultrastability mechanisms. This has helped us to understand a good part of 
living beings’ behavioral distinctiveness, but we still have not specified the 
particular organization around which living beings maintain adaptation. The 
notion of autopoiesis will help us to fill this gap. Autopoietic theory will 
help us to understand a bit more why, despite their ordinary metaphysical 
constitution, living beings behave in ways that are peculiar within physical 





autopoietic theory of living beings.  
In the context of our cognitive theory, the most important aspect of living 
beings’ organizational closure is not their autopoietic constitution but their 
senso-effector dynamic. All living beings, in normal conditions, have one or 
more senso-effector systems incorporated in their structure, some of them 
internal (e.g., the endocrine system), others in functional contact with the 
external environment (e.g., the sensorimotor division of the nervous system). 
The structural implementation of these systems varies according to the 
complexity of the organisms. In unicellular organisms, for example, senso-
effector systems are usually composed by a set of macromolecular structures 
(e.g., membrane chemoreceptors, microtubules, etc.) and organelles (e.g., 
flagella, cilia, etc.). In multicellular organisms, with the only exception of 
sponges and a few other similar species, the senso-effector systems are 
invariably composed of sets of specialized cells (e.g., neurons in the nervous 
system, secretory cells in endocrine system). The most common senso-
effector systems in multicellular organisms are the nervous system, the 
endocrine and exocrine system, and the immune system. Out of these 
systems, here we will concentrate on the nervous system (most of the times 
only on its sensorimotor division).  
The nervous system interests us for obvious reasons, yet what interests us 
are not its anatomical details but its functional organization, the ‘logic’ of its 
operational dynamic as a network of senso-effector correlations. In this 
chapter Maturana will tell us that the nervous system, from the point of view 
of its functional organization, is a closed system, and that as such it does not 
have inputs and outputs, inside and outside. We will try to understand this 
idea, evaluate its philosophical cogency, and explore some (only some) of its 
consequences. Our guiding questions will be; what does it mean to say that 
the nervous system is an organizationally closed system? Is this a proper 
characterization of its senso-effector dynamic? If so, what implications does 
this have for our understanding of living beings’ behavior? What can 
‘perception’ be for a closed system (like the nervous system)? What can 







4.1 Organizational closure 
 
In Chapter 1 we said that in some active dynamic systems we may 
distinguish not only changes of state but processes, operations or 
mechanisms that exhibit a certain organization. We called these systems, 
generically (and lacking a better name), ‘systems of processes’. 
Systems of processes can be characterized in terms of the kind of events, 
operations, processes or mechanisms that constitute them, and/or in terms of 
the way in which these events, operations, processes or mechanisms are 
organized. For example, to say that X is a system of power generation is to 
say that the kind of processes that compose X are processes of energy 
generation, or that, taken as a whole, these processes bring as a result the 
generation of energy. In saying that, let us notice, we are not saying anything 
about the organization of these processes. Perhaps X’s processes run in 
parallel, perhaps serially. Perhaps they are arranged as a distributed network, 
perhaps as a centralized flow.  
The events, operations, processes or mechanisms that constitute a 
determinate system (concrete or abstract, natural or artificial) can be 
organized in different ways. There is, nonetheless, one kind of organization 
that is especially relevant to us, namely the circular (cyclic) or closed 
organization. An organization of processes is circular or closed if the result 
of its processes (re)enters and participates as a constituent element of the 
organization of processes itself. This organization contrasts with the open or 
linear organization, in which the result of the processes does not enter and 
participate as a constituent of the organization itself.  
Systems that exhibit closed or circular organizations are, for example, 
natural cyclic systems such as the hydrologic system (the so called ‘water 
cycle’) or the geological system of rock formation (known as the ‘rock 
cycle’). Closer to our topic, all feedback systems constitute examples of 
organizationally closed systems too. In the previous chapter we saw several 
of them, but at that moment, focused on the topic of stability, we did not 
emphasize their circular organization. Thermostats, Watt governors, 





instances of closed functional circuits.  
In this chapter we will concentrate on two aspects in which living beings 
exhibit organizational closure: metabolism and sensorimotor activity.  
 
 
4.2 Autopoiesis and living beings 
 
The word ‘autopoiesis’—literally ‘self-production’—denotes a system of 
productive processes organized in a circular way.  
Maturana’s autopoietic theory is focused on the basic (or minimal) living 
unity, the cell. The individual cell, either as a unicellular organism (bacteria, 
amoebas, paramecia, etc.) or as a composing cell of a multicellular organism, 
is, according to Maturana, an autopoietic molecular machine. An autopoietic 
machine is a subclass of poietic machines. A poietic machine is a machine 
that produces or fabricates something. Two basic subtypes of productive 
machines can be distinguished: allopoietic and autopoietic machines. 
Allopoietic machines are systems that produce something distinct from 
themselves (e.g., a car factory), while autopoietic machines are machines 
that produce themselves (Maturana, 1975).  
Living cells are also allopoietic machines; they constantly produce 
elements that do not form part of their own productive system (e.g., 
hormones, neurotransmitters, etc.). Maturana contends that living cells are 
distinctively autopoietic and trivially allopoietic machines. That is, that 
among allopoietic physical systems, only living cells are at the same time 
autopoietic.  
The word ‘autopoiesis’, without further specifications, denotes a 
particular kind of processes (production processes) and a particular kind of 
organization (circular organization), not a particular kind of physical entity. 
It is worth reminding the reader here that ‘organization’ is a formal notion, 
an abstraction. It refers to the set of relations that define the class identity of 
a system, not to the concrete conditions under which such relations are 
satisfied or conserved in a particular domain of existence. Thus, the “notion 





realize the system as a network of productions” (Maturana, 1981, p. 22). 
When we say that “Y” is an autopoietic system what we mean is that “Y” is 
organized as a self-producing network. A self-producing network of what? 
Well, that is not relevant for the identification of “Y” as an autopoietic 
system. “Y” may be a formal (ideal) system of purely abstract elements, a 
bidimensional model in a virtual space, or a system made of physical 
components in a concrete tridimensional space. This latter case is the case of 
living systems: “a living system is an autopoietic system in physical space” 
(Maturana, 1981, p. 22. Emphasis added). In other words, while all living 
cells are autopoietic systems, not all autopoietic systems are necessarily 
living cells.  
The formal status of the notion of autopoiesis is usually overlooked 
among commentators, as most of them tend to include in the notion of 
autopoiesis the material constitution of living beings, as if ‘autopoietic 
systems’ and ‘living systems’ were coextensive categories. For example, 
Evan Thompson claims that an autopoietic system is a “self-producing 
bounded molecular system” (2007, p. 44), while Michael Wheeler thinks that 
“autopoiesis is autonomy plus materiality [, and that] materiality is 
definitional of autopoiesis” (2011, p. 151). This is not entirely correct. 
Maturana explicitly points out that “[t]here is no restriction on the space in 
which an autopoietic system may exist [, and that the] physical space in 
which living systems exist is only one of many” (Maturana, 1981, pp. 22-
23). The materiality alluded to by Thompson and Wheeler may well be an 
essential element of living beings as particular instantiations of autopoietic 
systems (as the quotation below clearly shows), but not of autopoietic 
systems as a general class. 
 
A living system is a discrete self-contained molecular 
dynamic system that produces itself as a closed network of 
productions of molecules that in their interactions produce 
the same network of molecular productions that produce 
them as a stationary dynamics sustained in a continuous flow 






I have highlighted the final words of this paragraph simply to emphasize 
something that should be obvious, but that sometimes seems to be 
overlooked. In the physical space of molecular dynamics, any productive 
process entails the consumption of energy and the utilization of some ‘raw’ 
material.  
It is also worth noting that in the concept of autopoiesis the suffix 
‘poiesis’ captures a particular sense of the original Greek poiēsis. Poiēsis is 
a broad Greek concept that means, in its most embracing sense, ‘to bring 
forth’, ‘to bring into presence’ or ‘to bring into appearance’, and that may be 
equally applied to artistic creation, handicraft manufacture, or the 
spontaneous (non-manmade) arising of natural formations. Many senses are 
involved in this primitive concept of poiēsis: ‘to create’, ‘to conceive’, ‘to 
generate or beget’, ‘to produce’, ‘to make up’, ‘to fabricate’, ‘to bloom’, ‘to 
sprout or burst forth’, etc. Out of these multiple meanings, Maturana alludes 
only to a process of production or fabrication; more specifically, to a process 
of ‘synthesis’ or ‘composition’ whereby a set of elements are assembled 
(combined under certain organization) to form a complex whole. Maturana 
wants to capture, in formal terms, the permanent dynamic of molecular 
synthesis (formation of molecular compounds, generally organic polymers, 
by means of one or more chemical reactions) that takes place in the cell 
metabolism. In this sense, if a car factory is an allopoietic machine, a cell is 
an autopoietic machine as long as it is a molecular factory that synthesizes 
the molecules that constitute it as such.  
This notion of ‘production’ as ‘synthesis’ must be differentiated from the 
notion of production used in certain philosophical theories of causation, 
where it is said that an event E has as a cause the event C if E is the effect 
produced by C (Hall, 2004). In this case ‘to produce’ means simply to bring 
about or generate a certain state of affairs. For instance, we may say that the 
increase in temperature produces (causes) the melting of snow, that the 
friction of bodies produces heat, or that earthquakes produce structural 
damage in bridges. None of these causal relations, however, involves the 
assembling of parts or elements to build a complex whole, which is the sense 
in which ‘poiesis’ means ‘production’ (synthesis, composition) in 





To be a poietic machine in general (allo or autopoietic) a system X has to 
produce or fabricate something. If X merely repairs, restores or renovates 
components without synthesizing anything, then X is not a poietic machine. 
There are several physical systems that keep constant their organization 
through a permanent renovation of their material components. We saw some 
of them in the previous chapter when talking about dissipative structures. 
For example, a turbulence in the current of a river or a tornado are natural 
systems that remain constant in their configuration through (or in spite of) 
the renovation of their material components. A cellular system is a system 
that renovates its material components too, of course, (it needs nutrients and 
it evacuates chemical waste), and that consumes and dissipates energy (it is a 
dissipative system), but that is not what defines its class identity as a living 
system. The difference is that the cell is organized as a productive network, 
not just as a system through which some components come and go. A 
tornado or a turbulence, to be an autopoietic system, should be constituted as 
a network of productive processes, as a factory; they should assemble 
elements and build the very compounds that constitute them as systems.  
There are also self-sustaining dissipative structures, where what one sees 
is a chain of physicochemical events that maintains itself. The burning 
candle is a typical example: the heat of the flame melts and liquefies the wax 
(combustible solid), this liquefied combustible ascends through the wick (by 
capillarity) where it is vaporized to finally burn in the flame, whose heat 
melts and liquefies the wax..., and so on and so forth. At this point the 
reader, noting the evident circularity of the process, could describe the 
sequence in causal terms by saying “the heat of the flame causes or produces 
the melting of the wax, the capillary action produces the ascent of the 
combustible liquid [...] the combustion produces the flame, whose heat 
causes or produces the melting...”, and then ask “Is this not a productive 
circular network, and therefore a self-producing or autopoietic system?”  
The confusion vanishes if we keep in mind the distinction between the 
‘poietic’ notion of production and the ‘causal’ notion of production 
mentioned before. While it is true that the burning candle constitutes a causal 
circle, it is not the case that this circle is an assembling network that 





such. The combustion process consists in a series of exothermic chemical 
reactions that release some products, but these products (combustion gases) 
do not participate in the synthesis of the constituent elements of the chain of 
reactions. For example, the released CO2 does not enter in any chemical 
reaction to produce wax (combustible).    
Living beings are self-sustaining dissipative structures too, but, again, 
that is not what confers their class identity. What is peculiar to living beings 
among dissipative structures is their internal dynamic of molecular self-
production.  
In the same way, we must distinguish the specific notion of ‘production’ 
as ‘synthesis’ from the more general idea of poiēsis as ‘bringing into 
presence’. Heidegger, for example, in the context of his theory of truth as 
alethēia (truth as ‘unhiddenness’), speaks of poiēsis in the broad sense of 
‘passing from a state of concealment to a state of unconcealment’. Quoting 
the Plato of Symposium, Heidegger says that “[e]very occasion for whatever 
passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not 
presencing is poiēsis, is bringing-forth” (1977, p. 10. Original emphasis), 
and refers to the organic Nature (physis) as the primary source of poiēsis. 
Why? The reason is that, unlike manmade artifacts, natural phenomena 
would have their poietic principle in themselves:   
 
Physis is indeed poiēsis in the highest sense. For what 
presences by means of physis has the bursting open 
belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom 
into bloom, in itself (en heautōi). In contrast, what is 
brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver 
chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth 
not in itself, but in another (en allōi), in the craftsman or 
artist. (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 10-11. Original emphasis) 
 
Some commentators have believed that they have found here a direct 
antecedent of Maturana’s autopoietic theory (Dicks, 2011; Di Paolo, 2009; 
Ilharco, 2003; Mingers, 1995). Heidegger characterizes ‘organic nature’ (i.e., 





(poiēsis en heautōi), and the artificial world of human creations as ‘poiesis in 
something else’ (poiēsis en allōi), which seems to resemble the Maturanian 
distinction between ‘auto-poiesis’ (in biological systems) and ‘allo-poiesis’ 
(in manmade systems). The similarity, nonetheless, is only superficial. 
Heidegger’s main concern is to recover, through the notion of poiēsis as 
‘bringing-forth’, the primitive (Pre-Socratic) ontological sense of ‘truth’ as 
alethēia or ‘unhiddeness’, i.e., ‘truth’ as a property of Being rather than as a 
property of our beliefs or linguistic expressions. His philosophical project 
has not to do with defining the class identity of living beings but with 
reviving a forgotten and, to his eyes, more fundamental sense of ‘truth’: 
 
Through bringing-forth, the growing things of nature as well 
as whatever is completed through the crafts and the arts 
come at any given time to their appearance […] Bringing-
forth brings hither out of concealment forth into 
unconcealment. Bringing-forth comes to pass only insofar as 
something concealed comes into unconcealment. This 
coming rests and moves freely within what we call revealing 
[…] The Greeks have the word alethēia for revealing. The 
Romans translate this with veritas [, and w]e say "truth" 
[…]” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 11. Original emphasis) 
 
This splendid and deep Heideggerian reflection about the notion of ‘truth’ 
as an ontological category does not correspond to the modest and 
metabolically inspired sense in which Maturana talks about ‘autopoiesis’, 
and therefore it does not seem particularly useful to explain or clarify its 
meaning.8  
Another apparent connection, sometimes mentioned in the secondary 
literature, is Canguilhem’s philosophy of biology. For example, Di Paolo 
points out that Canguilhem, before Maturana, had “already in 1951 used the 
                                                          
8
 This is not to say that both notions are incompatible. One can build, actually, a 
Heideggerian interpretation of Maturana’s theory (or vice versa) in a relatively easy 
way (see Mingers, 1995). A more harmonic connection would be between 
Heidegger and the enactive approach, which explicitly refers to the notion of 





term autopoetique to define the character of living organisms” (2009, pp. 43-
44. Original emphasis). This association, tempting at first glance, is risky in 
more than one sense. First, it suggests that Canguilhem and Maturana, in 
using similar terms, are using similar concepts, which as we shall see is not 
the case, and second, it overlooks the notable disparity (and perhaps 
incompatibility) that exists between the normative approach of Canguilhem 
and the strictly non-normative stance of Maturana. In Canguilhem the 
concept autopoétique does not refer to the self-productive dynamics of living 
beings but, to (what he takes to be) the biological normativity of their 
internal physiology (their inner milieu). Canguilhem opposes the internal 
autonomy of living beings to the hétéropoétique character of manmade 
instruments and artifacts. The idea, roughly speaking, is that while human 
artifacts respond to the external demands of their users, living beings impose 
their own physiological demands in an autonomous way; that while human 
artifacts adjust to an external functional environment, living beings adapt, 
also and primarily, to their own internal functional environment. 
Canguilhem’s distinction between autopoétique and hétéropoétique does not 
take place in the context of the question about the defining organization of 
living beings but in the context of a methodological reflection about the 
particularities of the ‘experimental method’ in biology (see Canguilhem, 
1965, Part 1 “La méthode biologique”). The notion of ‘poiesis’ as 
production—that in French corresponds to poïèse or poïètique (rather than to 
poétique)—is completely absent in Canguilhem’s analysis, whose main 
concern is to highlight the alleged self-normative (auto-nomic) character of 
living beings. And nothing could be more distant from Maturana’s 
autopoietic machines than the idea of an alleged ‘intrinsic normativity’ in 
living beings. Maturana is emphatic in saying that “what [we] call normative 
activities are not aspects of [...] autopoiesis [but only] commentaries or 
explanatory propositions that [we] make about what [we] may think that 
should occur in the […] organism” (2011, pp. 149-150. Emphasis added).  
In this section we have tried to clarify the notion of autopoiesis and 
identify the precise sense in which it applies to living beings. We have also 
tried to warn of some conceptual associations or similarities that may be 





Maturana wants to transmit with his theory, is that once revealed as 
autopoietic systems, i.e., as cyclic or circular metabolic systems of molecular 
synthesis, living beings are revealed as metaphysically trivial physical 
machines whose only peculiarity, as dissipative thermodynamic structures, 
lies in their self-productive dynamic. What the autopoietic theory tells us, 
ultimately, is that among natural systems, living beings simply constitute a 
version, not an exception.   
Autopoietic theory is, indeed, a way of justifying the Strict Naturalistic 
view of living beings. If the cell, the basic unity of living beings, is 
ultimately a set of chemical reactions organized in a certain way and 
sustained under certain thermodynamic conditions, then there seems to be no 
reason to treat living beings as metaphysically exceptional entities. If in 
standard natural sciences rivers, volcanoes, stars, comets, or any other kind 
of natural systems, are not conceived of or treated as semantic, intentional, 
teleological, agential, epistemic or normative systems, then living beings 
should not be so conceived of or treated either. 
Let us examine now the organizational closure of living beings with 
respect to their sensorimotor dynamic.  
 
 
4.3 Organizational closure in senso-effector 
systems  
 
All structural interactions in the physical world involve some transfer or 
exchange of energy. In some cases, this transfer is purely quantitative, i.e., 
without energy conversion (e.g., thermal conduction between two or more 
systems, elastic collisions). In other cases, the transferred energy is not only 
received but also transformed into another type of energy. The structures that 
receive an amount of energy and convert it into another type of energy are 
usually called ‘transducers’.  
A transducer, in a broad sense, is any structure that reacts to certain 
structural configurations of its environment, converting the type of energy 





with its own structural configuration. Transduction phenomena are, thus, a 
subtype of structural interaction, subject, therefore, to the same 
metaphysical principles valid for any structural interaction. Their only 
difference with the rest of structural interactions is that in them the 
transferred energy is converted into another kind of energy; conversion that 
is realized, invariably, according to the structural determination of the 
recipient system (this metaphysical point will be relevant for our discussion 
on perception later on).  
Senso-effector systems are, essentially, functional systems composed by 
two or more transducers whose dynamics are connected or are functionally 
dependent in one way or another. Being functional systems, senso-effector 
systems can be found in a great variety of structural realizations, biological 
or not. A living being’s sensorimotor system is an instance of a senso-
effector system. For example, pressure sensors in the skin receive 
mechanical energy and convert it into electrical impulses, thus acting as 
transducers. Photoreceptor cells in the retina (cones and rods) receive 
electromagnetic radiation and convert the energy associated with photons 
into electrical impulses, thus acting as transducers. On the other side, muscle 
fibers receive electrical neural impulses and convert them, with the aid of 
their own energetic resources, into mechanical energy (movement), thus 
acting as transducers too. Artificial examples of senso-effector systems can 
be found in infrared sensors, photovoltaic cells in power generation plants, 
or bimetallic strips in thermostats. 
From a structural point of view, senso-effector systems are almost always 
incorporated as subsystems in some larger system that contains them (an 
organism, an airplane, a power generation plant, a thermostat, etc.), and with 
respect to which, generally, the observer distinguishes or assigns the roles of 
sensor and effector between otherwise functionally equivalent transducer 
elements. For example, previously we saw that both photoreceptor cells and 
muscle fibers operate as transducers. If they are linked through the nervous 
system, thus forming a system, which one of them is the sensor and which 
one the effector? Well, none, or both; it depends on the chosen point of 
reference. Let us see. 





view of transduction, their environment or domain of perturbations has to do 
essentially with photons. In the case of muscle fibers, their environment or 
domain of perturbations has to do essentially with electrical impulses. 
Taking as a point of reference the organism in which these transducer 
structures are incorporated, what one sees is that photons come from the 
outside (ambient light) and the electrical impulses received by muscle fibers 
from the inside (nervous system). According to this perspective, one says 
that the organism senses the environment through its photoreceptor cells 
(sensor element), and that acts or responds through its muscle movements 
(effector element). However, since both photoreceptor cells and muscle 
fibers are transducers that have their own environment or domain of 
perturbations, we might validly change our perspective and see the muscle 
fibers as sensing the nervous system (sensor element) and the photoreceptor 
cells as acting upon the nervous system (effector element). We do not do this 
because our descriptive and explanatory purposes with respect to living 
beings usually have a specific orientation, i.e., we want to understand living 
beings’ adaptation with respect to what we see as their external environment. 
But it is worth noting, when we talk about senso-effector systems, the 
conventional status of the categories ‘sensor’ and ‘effector’. (The point is not 
as trivial as it seems, especially when we take into account, as we shall see 
soon, the closed nature of the sensorimotor system in living beings).  
A senso-effector system may be organized in different ways. A 
thermostat, for example, may be assembled so that the sensor component 
(e.g., the bimetallic strip), through intermediate mechanisms, affects the 
effector component (the heater), but the effector, located in a distant and 
separate room (e.g., in a different house), does not affect the sensor 
component. That would be a case of an open or linear senso-effector system. 
In normal conditions, thermostats are always assembled as closed circuits, 
allowing the heater to affect, through the environment, the sensor 
component. That is because in designing and using thermostats what we 
want is precisely the correlated and coordinated activity of their sensor and 
effector components (in this case, the negative feedback loop).   
The sensorimotor system of living beings is a senso-effector system that, 





mechanism. What happens at the level of the sensory surface affects, through 
some mediating biological mechanism (that may or may not include a 
nervous system), the activity of the effector surface, and the activity of the 
effector surface affects, through the mediation of environmental factors, 
what happens at the level of the sensory surface. Ashby illustrates the idea 
with the example of a kitten approaching fire: 
 
The various stimuli from the fire, working through the 
nervous system, evoke some reaction from the kitten's 
muscles; equally the kitten's movements, by altering the 
position of its body in relation to the fire, will cause changes 
to occur in the pattern of stimuli which falls on the kitten's 
sense-organs. The receptors therefore affect the muscles (by 
effects transmitted through the nervous system), and the 
muscles affect the receptors (by effects transmitted through 
the environment). The action is two-way and the system 
possesses feedback. (Ashby, 1960, p. 38) 
 
Maturana, with amoebas and protozoa, provides a more basic example (a 
sensorimotor dynamic without a nervous system): 
 
The presence of the protozoan generates a concentration of 
substances in the environment. These substances are capable 
of interacting with the amoeba membrane, triggering 
changes in the consistency of the protoplasm which results 
in the formation of a pseudopod. The pseudopod, in turn, 
causes changes in the position of the moving animal, thus 
modifying the number of molecules in the environment 
which interact with its membrane. This cycle is repeated and 
the sequence of movements of the amoeba is therefore 
produced through the maintenance of an internal correlation 
between the degree of change of its membrane and those 
protoplasmic changes we see as pseudopods. (Maturana and 






In both cases, what we have is a closed functional circuit wherein the 
sensor and effector components maintain a set of dynamics correlations 
between them. Following these observations, Maturana draws the idea that 
from the point of view of its sensorimotor dynamic, the “living being is [a] 
system closed on itself” (Maturana, 1970, reprinted in Maturana and Varela, 
1980, p. 50. Emphasis added). What does this mean?  
 
 
4.3.1 Organizational closure and sensorimotor system 
 
Recall in Chapter 1 we said that, when observing living beings, we tend to 
see them as having an external world before them, a world toward which 
their existence is open and oriented. Living beings appear to us as endowed 
with sensory ‘windows’ that pick up stimuli from the external world (i.e., as 
capable of perception), and effector organs that act upon said external world 
(i.e., as capable of action). Could we be mistaken about that? According to 
Maturana’s theory, we not only could be but actually are mistaken about that 
(Maturana, 1970/1980, 1975, 2003). As in the case of the geocentric 
appearance, which is grounded in the heliocentric organization of the solar 
system and our relative position as observers, the sensorimotor openness and 
directedness of living beings would be a normal and expectable appearance 
that has to do, on the one hand, with the circular organization of the 
observed system, and on the other, with our particular position as observers 
in relationship to the said system. 
To properly interpret Maturana’s idea, it is important to understand the 
functional notion of closure at play here. When we say that living beings’ 
sensorimotor dynamic is a closed system, someone might ask: “Closed to 
what?” This question presupposes a physical-spatial interpretation of 
closure, as when we close a door and leave someone outside. In this case, it 
sounds as if the sensorimotor system, in its closure, were blocking the 
entrance to something external (e.g., the environment, the external world). 






The sensory and the effector surfaces that an observer can 
describe in an actual organism, do not make the […] system 
an open […] network because the environment (in which the 
observer stands) acts only as an intervening element through 
which the effector and sensory [surfaces] interact 
completing the closure of the system (Maturana, 1975, p. 
318. Emphasis added) 
 
The functional organization of the sensorimotor system is closed, but this 
is not because the environment is left outside the system, but rather because 
the environment is always incorporated as a functional step within the 
system. The sensorimotor system is not closed to the environment; it closes 
on itself through the environment. What Maturana means is that the section 
(functional gap) that we, from our position as external observers identify as 
the environment or the outside of the system is, for the system, one more of 
its functional links. 
If this is the case, Maturana goes on, if the environment is always 
included as a functional component of its sensorimotor dynamic, then the 
living being cannot have the environment as something external to it. That 
is, if in the closed dynamic of the sensorimotor system the environment 
works as one more functional link, then what we see as ‘the environment’ or 
‘the external world’ of the system must be, for the system, and from the 
functional point of view, rather a ‘transparent’ element; something too 
intimate and inner, so to speak, to be distinguished as a separate object.   
The idea is that, considered as senso-effector systems, living beings form 
with the environment a functional unity, a continuum in which inputs and 
outputs, understood as intrinsic properties of the system, do not exist. It is 
the observer who, for her own descriptive or explanatory purposes, may 
‘open’ the system and consider the environmental stimuli as ‘inputs’, or the 
motor activities as ‘outputs’. Nonetheless, argues Maturana, this distinction, 
as far as the dynamic/functional organization of the system is concerned, is 
arbitrary, and does not reveal any intrinsic property of the system.  





topological point of view, living beings have physical boundaries that 
separate them from the environment. Living beings are physically discrete 
unities with more or less clear boundaries (membrane, skin, exoskeleton, 
etc.). Maturana recognizes this point when he affirms that every living being 
is a “discrete [...] molecular dynamic system” (2011, p. 145. Emphasis 
added). The idea is rather that said physical boundary, though structurally 
real, does not have operational presence (i.e., it is functionally irrelevant) in 
the domain of the sensorimotor system as a closed circuit.  
Let me insist, to prevent misunderstandings, and before going deeper 
with the analysis, on the strictly functional and sensorimotor dimension of 
this notion of closure. We have seen that living beings, from the material and 
thermodynamic point of view, are open systems that conserve integrity 
through a constant exchange of matter and energy with the environment. 
Maturana, as any standard biologist, acknowledges this point when he says 
that a living being is a “system […] sustained in a continuous flow of matter 
and energy through it” (Maturana, 2011, p. 145). Once again, the closed 
character of living beings pointed out by Maturana refers to their functional 
organization as sensorimotor systems, not to their material existence as 
dissipative structures.  
Having said that, if we acknowledge, as Maturana and I want to, the 
circularity and closure of the functional organization of the sensorimotor 
system (in the relevant sense), then any directedness or openness will appear 
as an observer-relative ascription, not as an intrinsic property of the system. 
This is because the sensorimotor system, as a closed network, is always 
interacting with itself, no matter, from the functional point of view, whether 
this interaction takes place through a functional node that is inside or outside 
the organism as a discrete physical unity. An observer may, out of the many 
functional nodes of the system, pick out one in particular as a point of 
reference and describe the system as oriented or open to it. Any node might, 
in principle, be chosen. However, since we as observers are always located 
in one of the functional nodes of the network, namely the gap between the 
sensory and motor surfaces of the organism, we, tacitly (as a sort of ‘natural 
attitude’), always take that node as a point of reference. We see the 





as observers; i.e., to the environment. This directedness, however, is entirely 
observer-relative. Were we placed in a different functional node, we might 
validly treat that node as the ‘environment’ toward which the system is open 
and directed. 
Let us take, to visualize the point, the example of the nervous system as a 
subcomponent of the sensorimotor system. The nervous system connects the 
sensor and effector surfaces through a complex network of neurons that 
interact in electrochemical terms. In each one of these interactions, called 
synapses, what we see, basically, is a presynaptic surface that affects, 
through chemical mediators, a postsynaptic surface. This interaction, from 
the strictly functional point of view, has no difference with the interaction 
that we see between the effector and the sensor surfaces of the organism. 
Presynaptic and postsynaptic surfaces act as minitransducers that convert 
electrical impulses into chemical energy (release of neurotransmitters at the 
presynaptic surface), and complementarily, chemical energy into electrical 
impulses (membrane depolarization at the postsynaptic surface). The only 
difference, one that is not relevant for the closed dynamic of the system, is 
that in one case the mediators are intra organismic chemical compounds, 
while in the other they are environmental factors.  
As a metaphor, and only as a metaphor, it is as if the sensorimotor 
system was always ‘talking’ to itself, without noticing whether the 
transmitter vehicles are bodily chemicals or environmental factors. All there 
is for the sensorimotor system, including the nervous system, is a circular 
dynamic of correlations; i.e., a constant ‘monologue’ (more about this soon).  
Maturana’s relativistic point is the claim that if we as observers were 
placed within the nervous system, we might validly treat one or more of its 
synaptic gaps as the ‘environment’ toward which the system is open, 
directed or adapted.  
The situation, if you will, is similar to the description of a moving object 
as approaching or moving away. What is the “right” description? What is the 
description that reveals the intrinsic dynamic of the object? Well, neither of 
them—neither reveals an intrinsic (non-relative) property in the moving 
object. The description of the object as approaching, or as moving away, is 





approaching of the object (or its moving away) is a property that we fix by 
adopting a descriptive convention, not something that we “find” in the 
object.   
It is important to remark that, as in the case of the geocentric appearance, 
the openness and directedness that we see in the sensorimotor system is not a 
capricious error or an arbitrary misconception. It is, given the circular 
organization of the system and our particular location as observers, rather 
the normal and to-be-expected interpretation. Thus, as in the case of the 
teleological appearance reviewed in the previous chapter, our tendency to 
ascribe openness and directedness to the sensorimotor system is, to a large 
extent, justified. The problem only arises when we assume that such an 
appearance reveals an intrinsic directedness or openness in the system.  
Ancient sailors did not find big problems in orientating their sailings 
using their own nautical charts, charts that were constructed under the 
assumption that the Sun orbited around the Earth. The assumption, based on 
an appearance, was wrong, but that did not render the ancient nautical charts 
entirely useless instruments. Similarly, I think, cognitive science can treat 
living beings as sensorimotor systems open to the environment, with inputs 
and outputs (e.g., information processing theories), or as systems 
intentionally directed at the external world (e.g., enactivist approaches). 
Cognitive science can, with relative success, initiate some, perhaps many, 
explorations using the theoretical maps so constructed. We, who have 
subscribed to a Strict Naturalism, are not interested in questioning the 
relative usefulness of such a strategy. Our interest is rather to remain loyal to 
the primary ontology of living beings as natural systems, avoiding, whenever 
we can, any observational projection into them.  
Suppose we accept the idea that the sensorimotor system of a living being 
is a closed system (in the specific sense examined above). What might the 
consequences be for our understanding of perception and action in living 








4.4 Action and perception 
 
In the previous section we have seen that, in a sort of Copernican turn, 
Maturana calls for a radical change of perspective with respect to living 
beings’ sensorimotor dynamic. We are invited to pass from a descriptive 
framework centered on our own observational angle to a broader descriptive 
framework in which our observational angle appears just as a particular 
viewpoint, and which does not necessarily reveal the way in which the 
observed system operates itself.  
The way in which the sensorimotor system operates, according to 
Maturana, is one in which there is no direction or openness, and where what 
we take to be the system’s environment proves to be, for the system, a 
functionally transparent element, or even more, an entirely inexistent object:  
 
An observer that sees an effector/sensor correlation as an 
adequate behavior does so because he or she beholds the 
organism in the domain of structural coupling in which the 
distinguished behavior takes place in the flow of its 
conservation of adaptation. The organism in its operation [, 
nonetheless,] does not act upon an environment; the 
environment exists only for an observer (Maturana, 2003, 
pp. 102-103. Emphasis added) 
 
How might this move, if accepted, impact our conception of perception 
and action in living beings? If the sensorimotor system, as Maturana argues, 
is a closed system, and if, because of this, the environment exists only for an 
observer, what does the organism perceive when it perceives? Perception, 
traditionally, is understood as a kind of ‘openness to the world’. The world, 
with all its entities and properties, is out there, and living beings access that 
world, directly or indirectly, through their perceptual mechanisms. If, as 
Maturana thinks, something like the environment or the external world never 
appears as such for living beings, how can we make sense of the idea of 






What about action? Action, traditionally, is understood as a specific kind 
of behavior. Action is the kind of behavior which is directed (or intended) in 
at least two senses: 1) Teleological (directed at some end or goal), and 2) 
Intentional (directed at the world). In Chapter 2 we said that a living being’s 
behavior is the product of strictly deterministic mechanisms, and in Chapter 
3 Ashby tried to show us that the teleological character of said behavior is 
nothing more than an appearance grounded in complex stability processes. In 
doing so, we have partially deconstructed the notion of action. Maturana 
now seems to want to finish the deconstructive task, questioning the 
intentional directedness of living beings’ behavior. According to him, such 
an intentional behavior, understood as an action executed upon the world, 
would be also an observer-relative appearance. We have been told that “[t]he 
organism […] does not act upon an environment; [because] the environment 
exists only for an observer” (Maturana, 2003, pp. 102-103).  
This interpretation strikes us (including myself) as deeply 
counterintuitive. If we, from our position as observers, see an organism 
climbing a tree, drinking water, escaping fire, etc., what is wrong in 
describing what we see precisely in terms of actions; i.e., ‘climbing a tree’, 
‘drinking water’, ‘escaping fire’?  If the organism—as Maturana thinks—is 
not doing any of these things, what on earth is it really doing?  
To better understand the reach of Maturana’s ideas about perception and 
action, let us help ourselves, once more, with the geocentric analogy. 
If watching a sunset you see the Sun going down, it would not make 
sense to ask you, in the name of Copernicus, not to see the Sun going down. 
The fact that you see the Sun going down does not contradict Copernicus’ 
theory. On the contrary, it supports it. Copernicus’ theory wants to expose 
the primary ontology of the solar system, its intrinsic organization, not to 
eliminate the geocentric picture that appears before your eyes. The picture 
that appears before your eyes is, in fact, one of the things that the theory 
aims to explain. “What is going on in the solar system while I see the Sun 
going down?” That is the kind of question that the theory aims to address. 
“While you see the Sun going down, what is happening is that the Earth is 





the kind of answer the theory provides.   
Similarly, if observing a living being in its environment, you see it 
perceiving and avoiding obstacles, finding and eating food, detecting and 
escaping predators, it would not make sense to ask you, in the name of 
Maturana, not to see the organism perceiving and avoiding obstacles, finding 
and eating food, detecting and escaping predators. The fact that you see the 
organism perceiving the environment and doing different things does not 
contradict Maturana’s theory; in a certain sense, as we shall see, it rather 
supports it. Maturana simply wants to expose the intrinsic (non observer-
relative) functional organization of the sensorimotor system, and explain, not 
eradicate, the fact that you see the living being as perceiving things in the 
environment and acting according to such perceptions.  
The questions to be formulated would be the following: “What is going 
on in the living being while I see it perceiving such and such thing and doing 
such and such thing?” Or “What kind of mechanisms and processes generate 
what I, placed here in a particular functional node of the system, see as the 
organism’s perception and action?”  
The basic elements to answer these questions were already provided in 
the previous chapters. It just happens that at that moment, when talking 
about structural determinism or stability, we did not focus our attention on 






In Chapter 3 we saw, with Ashby, that the sensorimotor system is basically a 
first-order feedback mechanism, a closed functional circuit.  We also saw 
that, in some cases (e.g., vertebrate animals), this system works coupled to 
second-order feedback mechanisms which maintain certain invariance upon 
physiologically essential variables. In these conditions, what the 





maintaining a certain correspondence or coordination between its sensor and 
effector components, i.e., an internal correlation of activity.  
What is going on in the living being while we see it, say, detecting and 
eating food? Let us consider, once more, Maturana’s example of the amoeba 
engulfing a protozoon, but now let us pay attention to the way in which the 
‘eating’ action (i.e., the formation of pseudopods) appears as a sort of 
‘unintended’ result of the amoeba’s feedback mechanisms, and only in the 
descriptive domain of the external observer: 
 
The presence of the protozoan generates a concentration of 
substances in the environment. These substances are capable 
of interacting with the amoeba membrane, triggering 
changes in the consistency of the protoplasm which results 
in the formation of a pseudopod. The pseudopod, in turn, 
causes changes in the position of the moving animal, thus 
modifying the number of molecules in the environment 
which interact with its membrane. This cycle is repeated and 
the sequence of movements of the amoeba is therefore 
produced through the maintenance of an internal correlation 
between the degree of change of its membrane and those 
protoplasmic changes we see as pseudopods. That is, a 
recurrent or invariable correlation is established between a 
perturbed or sensory surface and an area capable of 
producing movement (motor surface) which maintains 
unchanged a set of internal relations in the amoeba. 
(Maturana and Varela, 1987, pp. 147-148. Second emphasis 
mine). 
 
If we take the point of view of the amoeba and its sensorimotor system, 
all that we see is the dynamic maintenance of a strict correlation or 
correspondence between the activity of the sensor and motor surfaces; a 
dynamic that, as it unfolds, brings as a result a series of structural changes in 
its protoplasm. That is, its protoplasmic changes appear as a function of the 





components. The correlation, in this case, is positive (a positive feedback 
mechanism). The virtuous circle is that the higher the number of molecules 
interacting with the membrane, the more pronounced the structural changes 
in the protoplasm; changes that, in turn, bring as a result an even higher 
number of molecules interacting with the membrane, and so on. That is the 
whole picture in terms of the amoeba. 
Now, let us change point of view. How would this sequence of structural 
changes look to an observer placed outside the amoeba? Since the 
established correlation is positive, i.e., the higher the activity at the sensor 
surface, the more pronounced the protoplasmic deformations (and vice 
versa), we might predict that to an external observer these structural changes 
would look, more or less, like progressive protoplasmic prolongations 
(perhaps pseudopods) going toward the source of the chemical stimulation in 
the environment (which might be a high concentration of certain substances, 
or perhaps some microorganism). That is, such an observer would see 
something like pseudopods extending toward some element or unity in the 
amoeba’s surroundings.  
Let us have a look now. What do we see?  Well, what we see is basically 
an amoeba extending its pseudopods toward a protozoon. We see a living 
being executing an action upon the environment.  
The case of the amoeba, according to Maturana, is the general case for all 
sensorimotor systems, with or without a nervous system. What we see as the 
living beings’ action would be a phenomenon that appears only in our 
descriptive domain as external observers, not something that living beings 
intrinsically realize. 
 
In the organization of the living systems the role of the 
effector surfaces is only to maintain constant the set states of 
the receptor surfaces, not to act upon an environment, no 
matter how adequate such a description may seem to be for 
the analysis of adaptation (Maturana, 1970/1980, p. 51).  
 
We will come back to this point in the next section when analyzing the 







What might perception be for a closed and directionless functional system 
like the sensorimotor system? If, as Maturana thinks, the environment exists 
only for an external observer, what is perceived, if anything, during an act of 
perception? Can we say, from the biological point of view, that there is 
something like an ’object’ of perception?  
The answers to these questions are not easy to elaborate, in part because 
what seems to be at play, if we follow Maturana’s analysis, is the very 
meaning of the concept of perception. Here I will provide only some 
elements to address these questions, without aiming to answer them. A 
sketch of a response will be presented in the next chapter.  
There are two aspects that are important for addressing the problem of 
perception: 1) The functional closure of the sensorimotor system, and 2) The 
structurally determined character of the sensory surfaces and of the nervous 
system in general. Let us start by reviewing 1).  
We have seen that the sensorimotor system is a feedback circuit whose 
circular dynamic basically consists in the maintenance of certain internal 
correlations of activity. In this context, what we have said with respect to 
action above is equally valid for the case of perception. Perception, 
understood as ‘openness’ or ‘access’ to an external world, is something that 
only appears in the descriptive domain of an external observer, but that does 
not reflect the intrinsic dynamic of the sensorimotor system. What we see as 
‘objects’ of perception for the organism do not appear as such for it, 
basically because, in terms of its sensorimotor organization, such ‘objects’ 
are always included as internal variables of the system, not as separate 
entities.  
This point needs careful handling. When Maturana says that living beings 
are closed sensory systems, he does not mean that they are blind, deaf or 
insensitive to the environmental factors. Ashby’s cat certainly reacts to the 
stimuli from fire; i.e., the heat, the light and the smoke perturb its different 
sensory surfaces and trigger in them specific structural changes. The point is 





something external to its activity. Fire, as a source of stimuli, works as one 
more link within the sensorimotor system, indistinguishable, from the 
functional point of view, from any synapse occurring within the nervous 
system.   
From the material point of view, of course, fire is very different from the 
neurotransmitters that act at the level of the synaptic gaps, and we, as 
external observers, clearly see that fire is located outside the cat’s physical 
boundaries, whereas neurotransmitters are inside. However, these 
distinctions are functionally transparent for the sensorimotor system as a 
closed circuit. Fire, as an object that is external to the cat’s sensorimotor 
system, is something that only appears for us as observers.   
All this may sound counterintuitive, but let us try to go on with the 
analysis. Suppose we accept, just to do the philosophical exercise, the idea 
that perception, from the point of view of the sensorimotor system, does not 
correspond to an ‘openness’ to the external world, that what we take to be 
the ‘objects’ of perception do not have operational presence in the sensory 
dynamic of the organisms. There still remains the fact that the sensory 
surfaces, as we saw at the beginning of this section, react as transducers 
before specific configurations of the environment. Perhaps the overemphasis 
put on the functional point of view, somehow, masks the real fact that the 
sensory surfaces, after all, do make contact, directly or indirectly, with 
something that is structurally external to them,  that is, with the 
environment.  
It may be that the cat’s sensorimotor system, in its constant ‘monologue’, 
so to speak, never ‘realizes’ that certain stimuli come from a world of 
objects that is outside the cat as a physical system, and that is entirely 
different from the synaptic ‘world’ of the nervous system. Yet that does not 
eliminate the fact that the energy from the fire, which we know is out there 
in front of the cat, is received or detected, in terms of transduction, by the 
different sensory surfaces of the cat.  So it appears there is still a sense, a real 
one, in which what we call perception, even if it does not have the kind of 
directionality or openness we think it has, is not entirely in the eye of the 






Perception and structural determinism  
 
Effectively, we have said that the idea of functional closure does not aim to 
deny that living beings, through their sensory surfaces, react before, and to 
that extent ‘sense’, the different stimuli coming from the environment. But 
there is an important point that has not been considered yet in the analysis. 
Sensory surfaces and the nervous system in general, like any physical 
system, are structurally determined systems.  
In a structurally determined system, as we saw in Chapter 2, all that 
counts are the structural states of the system, irrespective of the way in 
which these states are brought about. This is because the states of the system, 
whatever their nature, are always determined by the system itself. Recall the 
example of the laptop presented in Chapter 2. Laptops are full of 
transducers, generally artificial tactile sensors. All the buttons, or, in some 
cases, the icons of the touchscreen, operate as transducers that convert 
mechanical energy (mechanical pressure) into electrical charges. By pressing 
a button we turn on the laptop. When the laptop is on, the structural state 
‘on’ exists and has the operational presence that it has, irrespective of 
whether it is reached thanks to the triggering action of my finger, another 
person’s finger, a screwdriver, the impact of a stone, etc. That is, there is a 
disjunctive series of external factors that can trigger the same structural state 
in the system, and the system, in responding the way it does, does not seem 
to be able to distinguish among the different external factors.  
Even more, the structural state ‘on’ exists and has the operational 
presence that it has, irrespective of whether it is reached thanks to the 
triggering action of some external factor operating upon the transducer 
button or thanks to some internal dynamic of the laptop (e.g., a self-
programmed function). Once the state ‘on’ is present in the system, it is 
simply there, regardless its origin. From the point of view of the laptop, a 
structural state X reached through the action of external factors is 
indistinguishable from a structural state X reached through an endogenous 
dynamic.  
Who distinguishes the origin of the structural states of the laptop in each 





laptop and its structural dynamic there is nothing external; all that exists is 
the presence of its own structural dynamic. We observers see the laptop and 
see it surrounded by a whole world. However, the laptop, from the point of 
view of its structural determinism, operates in a sort of self-contained 
metaphysical space where ‘the external’ has no place.  
Living beings and their sensorimotor system, including the nervous 
system (when they have one), are structurally determined systems. Sensory 
organs, as transducers, exactly behave like the laptop’s buttons. Every time 
some external factor triggers a structural change in a sensory organ, all that 
appears and exists for the system is its own structural change associated with 
its own energetic modality. Once this structural state is reached, all that 
counts, for the structural dynamic of the nervous system, is that the sensory 
organ is effectively in that state and not in another. The way in which this 
state has arisen in the sensory organ does not have any operational relevance 
for the system, which operates, moment after moment, only according to its 
structural present. As in the case of the laptop, once a determinate structural 
state is present in the system, it is simply there, and its origin is not relevant.  
The situation does not change even if the sensory organ reaches a 
determinate structural state, systematically, only in presence of a specific 
kind of perturbation, and never as a result of a spontaneous internal dynamic. 
Even so, it remains the case that the nervous system operates with the 
structural states found at each moment, just as they are found, without 
making distinctions regarding their origin. The external factors, for the 
sensory organ and for the nervous system in general, never appear as what 
they are for us observers, namely the causative and responsible agents of the 
system’s structural change.  
It is the observer, not the nervous system, who can distinguish the 
different origins of the structural states of the sensory system. The sensory 
system, as any structurally determined system, exists and operates in its 
structural present; whether its present structural state is endogenously 
generated or externally triggered is a distinction that has no operational 
presence in its dynamic of states. In such circumstances, there is no way, so 
to speak, in which the sensory structure can ‘communicate’ to the rest of the 





states disappears in the structural determination of the system.  
This metaphysical condition, which is no more or less than PSD (see the 
metaphysical principles examined in Chapter 2), easily explains, as we shall 
see, phenomena such as illusion and hallucination. But these phenomena, in 
turn, open the door to a complex and old philosophical problem with respect 
to perception.  
 
 
4.4.3 The problem of perception: on frogs and drifting 
ships 
 
The problem alluded to above can be set in a very simple way. Let us present 
a fly in the visual field of a frog. Then, let us conserve the structural state of 
its retina and of all its nervous system (disregard the technological 
plausibility of the procedure). While we do this, let us remove the fly from 
the frog’s visual field. Is the frog still seeing the fly?  
If we take as a point of reference our position as external observers, 
probably we would answer “No, the frog is not seeing the fly; the frog is 
having a hallucination whose hallucinatory content is a fly”. But if we take 
the point of view of the frog’s nervous system, what would we say? 
Someone might think that the answer in this case should be “Yes, the frog is 
seeing the fly, because the structural state of its nervous system is exactly the 
same structural state that takes place when the fly is actually there in its 
visual field”. But, if we take seriously the position of the frog’s nervous 
system as a structurally determined system, could we really even answer the 
question?  
If the frog’s nervous system is a structurally determined system and if, 
because of this, all that counts for its operational dynamic are its own 
structural states, irrespective of whether or not they are brought about thanks 
to the triggering action of some external factor, can there be for such a 
system any possible distinction between seeing (perceiving) and having a 





possible for the frog’s nervous system. What is more, we argue that such a 
distinction is not necessary for its functioning as a biological system (this 
last point will be discussed in the next chapter).  
The distinction between perception and hallucination, or between 
perception and illusion, is a distinction about the origin of the structural 
states of the sensory system, not about the structural states themselves. We 
as observers can identify such and such a structural configuration in the 
frog’s environment (e.g., the presence or absence of a fly) and contrast it 
with such and such a structural condition in the frog’s nervous system. But 
this is precisely the kind of distinction that the frog’s nervous system, 
operating entirely in its own space of structural states, cannot make. The 
frog’s nervous system cannot make such a distinction because, like the 
laptop in the previous example, its structural dynamic unfolds in an entirely 
self-contained metaphysical space, without reference to the outside. For the 
frog’s nervous system, and this time from the point of view of structural 
determinism, there is nothing ‘external’ to its operations. 
But how can this be? Are we implying that the frog’s nervous system, 
somehow, operates in a sort of vacuum, in the absolute darkness of its self-
contained metaphysical space? Well, yes, that is more or less what we are 
saying. But, is the frog’s nervous system really operating in a vacuum? Well, 
in a sense, no, of course not. There is a whole world around the frog, with 
plants, flies, etc. So what is the point? The point is that those who can 
distinguish the existence of such a world are we external observers with 
respect to the frog, not the frog’s nervous system. The frog’s nervous system 
does not ‘have in view’ the external world that we behold (strictly speaking, 
no world in particular). The frog’s nervous system operates upon its own 
states and according to its own rules, only maintaining certain internal 
correlations of electrochemical activity.  
As an illustration, slightly modifying Maturana’s classic example 
(1970/1980), let us think of a man who has lived all his life below the decks 
of a ship, without knowing anything about the world outside the cabin. He 
has been conditioned, through hypnosis sessions after which he only 
remembers the conditioning rules, to maintain, by moving a series of buttons 





screen. He is ignorant about the meaning of these values, and about the fact 
that they are causally related to some external factors. (The ship is full of 
very sophisticated sensor devices, but he does not know that). He is also 
ignorant about the overall result of his maneuvers and performs his task in a 
ritualistic way, mechanically, as after so many hypnosis sessions he really 
does not know why he is maintaining a certain correlation of values on the 
screen.  
The man’s actions are such that, despite his absolute ignorance, the ship 
gracefully navigates through the seas, avoiding reefs, getting away from 
storms, and doing all the things that a ship driven by a helmsman would do.   
Is the ship being driven by a helmsman, a pilot that controls its course in 
light of having in view reefs, waves, winds, storms? Or perhaps, if not 
having in view these external objects as such, at least trying to infer, guess or 
predict, from his position, the causal structure of the world around the ship? 
Well, not really. When we open the physiology of the ship, so to speak, all 
we find is someone obsessed with an internal game of meaningless values, 
playing the game without knowing why. That man is not driving any ship, 
nor trying to know, infer or predict anything about the external world. 
The amazing fact is that, in spite of operating in the dark, i.e., without 
any reference or concern toward the external world, his actions result in the 
graceful displacement of the ship through the seas. The amazing fact is that 
the ship, although from the outside appearing to be driven by a helmsman, is 
indeed drifting. It is gracefully drifting through the seas.  
The frog’s nervous system, says Maturana, operates more or less like that 
man, i.e., with no access to what we external observers distinguish as ‘the 
external world’, with ‘reefs’, ‘storms’, ‘plants’ and ‘flies’, and without 
performing any role that might be compared to the role of a helmsman or 
pilot who controls the frog’s navigation through the world. The frog’s 
nervous system, strictly speaking, is not ‘trying’ to do anything. It does not 
have any ‘task’ upon its shoulders, any ‘duty’ to fulfill. It is not trying to 
solve any epistemological problem with respect to the external world either, 
deciphering or inferring its causal structure, predicting or guessing future 
events.  





targets it, and shoots its tongue to trap it. But if the frog, its sensorimotor 
system, and its nervous system as a whole are a structurally determined 
system, such a description can hardly reveal what is going on in the frog, “no 
matter how adequate such a description may seem to be for the analysis of 
[the frog’s] adaptation” (Maturana, 1970/1980, p. 51). What is going on in 
the frog is an internal game of sensorimotor correlations focused on 
themselves, whose ‘blind’ and unintended result corresponds to what we see 
as the action of ‘catching a fly’.  
But, the reader might insist, if the frog’s nervous system is operationally 
equivalent to the man in the ship, if it operates in the absolute darkness, how 
does the frog manage to target the fly and catch it? Well, that is the whole 
point, we reply. The frog never targets the fly. Right, the reader might 
concede, the frog does not target a ‘fly’ but something more unspecific or 
abstract than that, perhaps something like ‘flying black spot’, or simply 
‘food’. No, we reply, the frog does not target anything at all. It is the very 
action of targeting that is absent in the dynamic of the frog’s nervous system.  
 
Wait a minute. What are we talking about? 
 
Perhaps it is important, at this point of the discussion, to remind ourselves of 
the Strict Naturalistic frame we have assumed with respect to living beings 
in this thesis. The so called ‘problem of perception’, at least in philosophy, is 
mainly, though not exclusively, an epistemological problem. We want to 
account for the fact that the animal, in this case the frog, successfully adapts 
to the environment, and to that extent, somehow, ‘knows’ the world in which 
it lives. In general, we see that animals adapt to their environment, and this 
ability reveals to us some form, perhaps very basic, of knowledge or 
cognition. But in assuming a Strict Naturalistic stance with respect to living 
beings, what we have done is precisely to remove this kind of question. Or, 
more or less equivalently, to expose the conventional and arbitrary character 
of its exclusive association to living beings, showing that, after all, every 
physical system exists in structural coupling and adaptation.  
So perhaps, before going on with the discussion, it is worth clarifying our 





somehow, do the trick of baking an ‘epistemological pie’ of perception by 
using only ‘structural ingredients’, then we are expecting different things. 
This thesis, recall, is about the biological “roots” of cognition. Our purpose 
is to examine the primary ontology of biological systems, and show that their 
behavior and adaptation, to which we tend to attribute an epistemic or 
cognitive dimension, appear as natural results of said ontology. We have 
assumed that living beings, like all other natural systems, relate to the world 
in strictly structural terms, not in epistemic, informational, intentional or 
semantic terms. That is why we remarked, at the beginning of this section, 
that every sensory process, i.e., every transduction phenomenon, is a subtype 
of structural interaction and nothing more than that. (See again in chapter 1 
section 1.2.1 ‘The cognitive construction of living beings’).  
That is what we are talking about. 
Now let us go back to the frog. The frog never targets something in the 
world, we were saying. The amazing thing, as in the case of the ship, is that 
when the frog shoots its tongue, there is a fly right there available to be 
trapped. How does that happen?  
Notice that once we take a Strict Naturalistic stance, the nature of the 
question about action and perception starts to change. We do not ask “How 
does the frog’s nervous system target the fly and drive the tongue to trap it?” 
Our problem now is different. The question that we have to face is: “How 
does it happen that when the frog’s nervous system, in the vacuum, without 
targeting anything in the world, and without any purpose in particular, shoots 
the frog’s tongue, there is a fly right there in the world available to be 
caught?”  
Our question is about the coherences of the structural coupling between 
the frog and its environment, or better put, between the frog and its niche. 
We need to explain the congruence that we observe between what the frog 
does and the particular structural configurations of its niche, the apparent 
synchronicity, so to speak, between the fly and the frog’s tongue. And we 
have to do it acknowledging or assuming that the frog’s niche cannot specify 
or instruct the structural dynamic of the frog, and that the frog’s nervous 
system, both in its functional organization and structural determinism, 





the effective navigation of the frog through the world, the conservation of its 
adaptation, assuming that there is no ‘pilot’ in charge of the navigation.  
We are, it seems, placed in front of a new kind of problem. It is a big one, 
mainly because our resources to face it are quite limited. For many, perhaps, 
explaining the behavior of a simple frog may seem an easy and basic task, 
not a problem. But recall that within our framework there are several 
restrictions. We cannot appeal to epistemic notions, neither open nor dressed 
up (e.g., information), we cannot use representations or semantic relations of 
any kind, intentionality (with or without content), control mechanisms, 
agency, normative aspects, or teleology. All we have is a bunch of 
metaphysical principles, the notion of stability, some thermodynamic 
considerations, and the closed character of living beings.  
Perhaps—we have to admit the possibility—with this class of resources, 
the problem we have to face, even if modest, turns out to be an unsolvable 
problem, at least for now.  
The challenge is there, anyway, and I think we should go for it. Even if 
after trying our best the reader remains unconvinced, I am sure the 
intellectual effort, or the mere exploration in itself, will have been worth it. 
Next is a brief chapter where we will try to articulate and consolidate all we 
have said so far about living beings. We will try to test, partially, the 
explanatory force of the ontological characterization of living beings offered 
















Structural drift: adaptation, intelligent 
behavior and cognition 
 
 
In this thesis, following the requirements of a Strict Naturalistic approach, 
we have characterized living beings as (i) adaptive dynamic systems, (ii) 
deterministic machines of closed transitions, (iii) multistable dissipative 
systems, and (iv) organizationally closed systems with respect to their 
autopoietic and sensorimotor dynamics. Now it is time to apply these 
concepts and see whether we can explain and understand the behavior of 
living beings on the basis of said ontological characterization.  
In the previous chapter we argued that action and perception, as 
understood in their traditional sense, correspond to distinctions made by the 
observer in the interactional domain of living beings, not to intrinsic 
processes of living beings. We took the representative case of a frog catching 
a fly, and characterized the frog through an analogy to a drifting ship that, in 
spite of lacking a helmsman, gracefully navigates through the world 
conserving its adaptation. Now we have to explain the operational 
coherences that we observe between the living being and its environment, or 
in our example, between the frog and its specific niche.  
Our question was: “How does it happen that when the frog’s nervous 
system, operating in the dark, without targeting anything in the world, and 
without any purpose in particular, shoots the frog’s tongue, there is a fly 





5.1 The frog and its circumstance 
 
The previous question can be split into at least two sub-questions. First, if 
the frog’s nervous system is unable to distinguish the origin of its 
stimulation, how does it “know” that the triggering factor is a fly and not 
another thing? How does it “know” that this is not an illusion, or even a 
hallucination? Second, even assuming that the frog’s nervous system is able 
to identify the presence of the fly, how does it manage to shoot the frog’s 
tongue at the right moment in the right direction? If the frog’s nervous 
system operates in the dark and lacks internal maps or models of the external 
world, how can we explain the accuracy of the frog’s action?   
The first answer is that the frog’s nervous system actually does not 
“know” that there is a fly out there in the world. The frog’s nervous system 
does not react to the presence of a fly but to a certain stimulation pattern on 
the frog’s retina. That is why, as is well known, it is relatively easy to “fool” 
a frog by moving a little piece of black paper in the air. Any object able to 
produce the “right” stimulation pattern on the frog’s retina is able to trigger 
the same reaction. So the question should be another one. How does it 
happen that, in natural conditions, the frog’s tongue finds a fly and not 
something else that would produce a structurally similar retinal stimulation 
pattern (e.g., a piece of black paper), out there in the world? This, notice, is 
not an epistemological question. We are not asking about an epistemological 
correspondence but about an ecological congruence. We are asking about the 
existence and availability of flies in the frog’s natural niche. The answer to 
this question, without going into details, is relatively simple, and has to do 
with the fact that frogs and flies share a common evolutionary history in the 
biosphere; a history in which they have each become part of their respective 
ecological niches. Frogs find flies in their environment with the same 
naturalness they find ponds and muddy lands, and flies find frogs in their 
environment with the same naturalness they find feces, decaying meat and 
rotting fruits. This is not a matter of providential harmony or an ‘invisible 
hand’ that arranges the things for the convenience of everyone. It is matter of 





have jointly evolved, resulting in a certain ecological coherence in which 
they conserve their adaptation.  
The answer to the second question has to do with the structure and 
functional organization of the frog’s sensorimotor system. The sensorimotor 
system is essentially a feedback mechanism, a closed functional circuit. In 
such a system, as we saw in the previous chapter, the environment and its 
triggering factors work as functional nodes of the circuit, not as external 
elements. The environment and its triggering factors constitute elements 
through which the sensorimotor network coordinates its own activity. In 
other words, when we ask about the congruence between the frog’s action 
and its circumstance, we are asking, ultimately, about the congruence of a 
feedback system with itself. Let us see the point through a simple example of 
closed senso-effector system.  
In a room X, the decrease of the temperature to 18 degrees triggers a 
structural change in the sensor component of a thermostat. This structural 
change triggers in turn a cascade of structural changes in the thermostat such 
that the result is the activation of a heater (the effector component). The 
heater raises the ambient temperature to 20 degrees, at which point the 
sensor component suffers a new structural change that triggers a subsequent 
cascade of structural changes in the thermostat. The result now is the 
deactivation of the heater. The overall situation is that the ambient 
temperature in the room X constantly oscillates between 18 and 20 degrees, 
without going out of this range. Taking into account that the thermostat is a 
structurally determined system, and that, consequently, it absolutely works 
within the limits of its own structural states, without having in view anything 
like rooms or ambient temperatures, we can formulate the following 
question. How does it happen that when the heater initiates its activity there 
is a room X out there in the world with an ambient temperature of 18 
degrees?  The answer is that this happens, first, simply because the system is 
assembled as a closed circuit. If the heater was located in a different house, it 
would not act upon the room X but upon another one. Second, the fact that 
when the heater initiates its activity the room X is at a temperature of 18 
degrees, and not of 15 or 23 degrees, is because the thermostat has been set 





one. Why does not the heater, once activated, go on working and raising the 
ambient temperature more and more? Why does it cease to work at 20 
degrees? This happens because of the negative polarity of the thermostat’s 
wiring. If the thermostat’s wiring was inverted to a positive feedback circuit, 
the heater would go on working and raising the temperature until breaking 
down.  
The thermostat always works within the metaphysical boundaries of its 
structural determinism establishing internal correlations of activity. What 
explains its ‘successful’ behavior with respect to the room X is its particular 
organization and structure (its wiring, its polarity), and the way in which it is 
coupled to the ambient temperature of the room X.  
In the case of the frog the explanation is essentially the same. First, the 
frog shoots the tongue at the right moment, i.e., only when the fly is present 
in its visual field (neither before nor after that), because it is the very fly, 
with its appearance in the frog’s visual field, that triggers and initiates the 
response in the frog’s sensorimotor system. The frog’s sensorimotor system 
has been set, by evolution, to react in that way only before the stimulation 
pattern caused by that kind of flying object (which, in its specific ecological 
niche, is usually a bug). 
Second, the frog shoots the tongue in the right direction thanks to the 
particular anatomical and functional organization of its sensorimotor system 
as a closed circuit. As with the thermostat, if we change the wiring of the 
system, the spatial accuracy of the response will change too. That this is the 
case is dramatically revealed by the classical experiments of Roger Sperry 
(1943, 1945). Sperry changed the anatomical configuration of the frog’s 
sensorimotor system by rotating the retina of one of the frog’s eyes 180 
degrees. Once recovered from the surgery, the frog was able to catch its prey 
without any problem if the rotated eye was covered. When the rotated eye 
was uncovered (and the normal one covered), however, the frog reacted by 
shooting its tongue with an exact deviation of 180 degrees with respect to the 
position of the prey. Sperry reported that the frog never could change its 
response, persisting in its ‘error’ until the end. That is, the frog’s 
sensorimotor system, under this new anatomical organization, continued 





operation, irrespective of the dramatic changes produced at the level of the 
frog’s external behavior.  
When Maturana saw this experiment, he asked “Is this an error in 
targeting or an expression of a new internal [sensorimotor] correlation?” 
(Maturana and Varela, 1987, p. 126).  
The frog’s sensorimotor system always operates within the metaphysical 
boundaries of its structural determinism, without having access to the spatial 
coordinates of the external world. The spatial accuracy of the frog’s behavior 
has to do simply with the specific way in which its sensorimotor system is 
anatomically and functionally organized, not with the possession of alleged 
‘internal maps’ of the world. Change the wiring of the system and you will 
change the response. Spatial categories such as ‘up’ and ‘down’, ‘front’ or 
‘back’ only exist for the observer, not for the frog’s sensorimotor system 
(Maturana and Varela, 1987).  
Properly viewed, says Maturana, the frog’s sensorimotor system, after the 
surgery, continues running its internal correlations with strict accuracy (that 
is why the observed deviation is of exactly 180 degrees!). It is only from the 
viewpoint of the external observer that the behavioral result of its new 
correlation counts as an ‘error’. The sensorimotor system, strictly speaking, 
like any natural system, never makes mistakes.  
Now, what is important in the example is not that the frog cannot 
‘correct’ the behavior, but that the sensorimotor system, whatever its 
organization, always operates under its own structural determination. What 
validates the idea of structural determination is not the rigidity of the frog’s 
behavior, i.e., the fact that it never ‘learns’ to trap a fly under the new 
wiring, but that the change from one kind of behavior to the other depends 
on the structural changes suffered by the frog’s sensorimotor system. 
Otherwise, any instance of behavioral flexibility—what we usually call 
‘learning’ or ‘intelligence’—would speak against the structural 








5.2 Learning and intelligent behavior 
 
In a cognitive observational context, i.e., when living beings are constructed 
as cognitive systems, it is usually said that an organism is intelligent if it is 
able to learn, if it is able to modify its behavior in order to achieve some 
goal. In such an interpretative context, as a general rule, and broadly 
speaking, behavioral rigidity is an indicator of lack of intelligence and 
behavioral flexibility of intelligence. What matters, to talk about 
intelligence, is not the achievement of the goal itself, the success in the task, 
but whether the organism, put in a different scenario, is able to modify its 
behavioral strategy and find an alternative way to achieve the goal.  
A typical example of lack of intelligence, within this cognitive 
descriptive frame, is the rigid behavioral pattern exhibited by the dung 
beetle. The beetle digs a nest and lays its eggs. Then, it goes for a ball of 
dung and carries it toward the nest. The observer assumes that the beetle’s 
purpose is to supply enough food for the future larvae. Then, while the beetle 
is dragging the ball, the observer removes the ball from its grasp and sees 
what happens. An intelligent reaction, to her eyes, would be reinitiate the 
action and go for another ball. The beetle, however, goes on with its routine 
and pantomimes plugging its nest as if the ball was still there. The observer 
repeats the experience several times and the beetle never ‘learns’ the lesson, 
thus evidencing, to her eyes, a very low level of intelligence. The (cognitive) 
observer comments: “Evolution has built an assumption into the beetle’s 
behavior, and when it is violated, unsuccessful behavior results”, or “[the 
organism] is unable to learn that its innate plan is failing, and thus will not 
change it” (Russell and Norvig, 2010, p. 39. Emphasis added).  
A dung beetle, in normal conditions, is successful in its behavior and 
manages to plug its nest with the ball. But that, for the cognitive observer, is 
not genuine intelligence. The beetle is successful just because it happens that 
all the environmental conditions it ‘assumes’ as given (according to its 
innate ‘plan’), are in place. If the ‘assumption’ is ‘violated’, the beetle is 
revealed as an extremely fragile cognitive agent, unable to learn and modify 





In light of the previous example offered by Sperry, wherein the frog 
never changes its behavior and, in a sense, ‘pantomimes’ catching a fly 
where there is no fly at all, it might seem that assuming structural 
determinism in living beings might explain, at most, cases of ‘stupid’ 
behavioral rigidity, or cases where there is successful behavior but only 
thanks to that all the ‘assumed’ conditions are given.  
Like Sperry’s frog, the dung beetle persists in a sensorimotor routine that, 
from the adaptive point of view, goes nowhere. It is as if the beetle’s nervous 
system operated locked up in its own internal affairs, entirely disconnected 
from the behavioral consequences of its sensorimotor routines; all of which, 
admittedly, is consistent with the idea that the nervous system is a 
structurally determined system that operates in the dark without having the 
external world in view. Is this the kind of behavior that PSD aims to explain?  
In the previous section we explained why, in spite of the structurally 
determined character of its sensorimotor system, the frog, in normal 
conditions and within its natural niche, succeeds in catching a fly. However, 
the action of catching a fly, someone might say, tells us almost nothing about 
learning and intelligence. The frog’s action is successful, true, but only 
because, as in the case of the dung beetle, all the ‘assumed’ ecological 
conditions are in place. Is this the explanatory scope of PSD? 
Sperry’s study is an extreme case of sensorimotor rewiring. Under less 
violent or extreme manipulations, the frog’s nervous system is able to 
‘correct’, after some time, its patterns of activity and produce what the 
observer appraises as the ‘right’ kind of behavior. Actually, in natural 
conditions, the animal’s nervous system is constantly, at minimal scales, 
changing its structural composition and system of connections. There is, so 
to speak, a continuous process of ‘smooth and fine rewiring’ which is 
contingent to the history of the organism’s structural coupling, and that is the 
base of those phenomena that we call ‘learning’.  
Does all this contradict the structural determination of the sensorimotor 
system? No, it does not. That a system is structurally determined does not 
mean that its structure cannot change; it just means that all its structural 
changes, either externally triggered or internally generated, are specified by 





learning processes in living beings?  
Learning, understood in the cognitive sense of ‘intelligence’, is not 
merely behavioral modification, but behavioral modification in the ‘right’ 
direction. A sensorimotor system is able, in principle, to undergo many 
structural changes and rewiring processes, generating many forms of internal 
correlation and behavior in the organism. If the sensorimotor system 
operates in a vacuum, only ‘concerned’ with its own structural states, 
without having in view the external results of its dynamic, how does it 
happen that only certain correlations are consolidated, and that they are 
precisely those that produce the ‘right’ kind of behavior for the organism? 
How can a system that lacks a pilot, that is drifting through the world 
without any purpose or control, that has no idea about what is going on 
outside, ‘learn’ and generate the right kind of behavior?   
Contrary to the case of the dung beetle, a paradigmatic case of intelligent 
behavior in animals is that of rats’ spatial orientation. Let us take Tolman’s 
classical studies (Tolman, 1948; Tolman & Honzik, 1930). Greatly 
simplified, in these studies a rat is put in a maze for a couple of days and left 
to freely explore the space. The maze has several alternative ways out (A, B, 
C). Then, the rat is deprived food and hungry, is put back in the maze.  At 
the exit of the maze, this time, there is food. The rat finds, after a couple of 
‘errors’ but without much difficulty, a way out, say A, and eats the food. Just 
luck? Next time the experimenter blocks the way out A. The rat goes toward 
it, finds it blocked, then reorients its movements in different directions, finds 
an alternative way out, again without much difficulty, and eats the food.  
How can the rat do that? Tolman’s classical answer, an early precursor of 
cognitivism, was basically that 1) the rat, during the exploratory period, had 
built an ‘internal map’ or spatial representation of the maze, and 2) that the 
rat’s behavior was not ruled by simple stimulus-response mechanisms but by 
goals and purposes (Tolman, 1948, 1932).  
How might a structurally determined system, with all the restrictions we 
have detailed, be able to generate that kind of intelligent behavior?  
This is a good question. In fact, it is a question that exceeds the limits of 
the sensorimotor system. To properly address it we need to contextualize the 





integrated unity, and ultimately, within the organism as a thermodynamic 




5.3 Back to the biological ‘roots’ 
 
The sensorimotor system is one division of the nervous system. It is a first-
order feedback mechanism that closes on itself through the environment. But 
the nervous system has other senso-effector divisions (e.g., the autonomic 
division), some of which operate upon essential physiological variables (in 
mammals, generally through connections with the endocrine system at the 
level of basal ganglia or equivalent structures). These subsystems operate, 
with respect to the sensorimotor system, as second-order feedback 
mechanisms. That is, they maintain a set of essential physiological variables 
within specific ranges, in part, and indirectly, through operations upon the 
sensorimotor system (constituting what Ashby called ‘ultrastable systems’).  
Now, the so called essential variables are ‘essential’ because they have to 
do, ultimately, with the thermodynamic stability of the organism as a 
dissipative system; i.e., with the availability of matter and energy for the 
tissues and cells of the organism, and for their respective metabolic 
processes (e.g., chemical energy through meals, oxygen concentration, 
hydration, heat conduction and dissipation).  
Animals in general (rats, frogs, dogs, dolphins, etc.) are complex 
dissipative structures composed by billions of autopoietic unities, each one a 
dissipative structure itself. As with any dissipative structure, animals are 
thermodynamic systems that exhibit stability in far-from-equilibrium 
conditions. That is, they are constantly compensating for the different 
disturbances that affect their respective thermodynamic balances. Their 
peculiarity among dissipative structures lies in the possession of specific 
stability mechanisms, among which the feedback mechanisms embodied in 
their nervous system are a key element.  





physiological variables, in part, operating upon the sensorimotor division of 
the animal’s nervous system; activating and deactivating changes in the 
sensorimotor correlations. The sensorimotor system, which in principle may 
generate many different forms of internal correlations, and thus a great 
variety of behaviors, is restricted in its operations by these second-order 
feedback mechanisms.  
Importantly, the presence and influence of these second-order 
mechanisms over the sensorimotor system is variable among the different 
animal species, and is limited in line with the specific behavior and the 
concrete anatomical and physiological conditions of the animal (as it is 
evident in the experiments of Sperry or in the case of the dung beetle). But in 
normal conditions, and every time the behavior is immediately critical 
regarding the thermodynamic stability of the organism, these mechanisms 
always modulate the activity of the sensorimotor system so that the 
metabolic integrity of the animal is conserved. 
Let us go back to the example of the dung beetle. The behavior of rolling 
a dung ball with the legs towards the nest is, for the observer, a very 
important behavior, but not an immediately critical behavior for the beetle’s 
thermodynamic balance. If the ball is removed, there seems to be no special 
second-order mechanism ready to activate new sensorimotor correlations 
and modify the behavior. What we see is a rigid behavioral pattern without 
correction capability. However, if we remove the dung ball not when the 
beetle is rolling it with its legs but eating it with its mandibles, the result is 
different. The beetle does not continue ‘biting air’ and pantomiming chewing 
movements. Why? In this case, the sensorimotor routine that generates the 
action of eating, which is immediately critical for the animal’s 
thermodynamic balance, is penetrated by second-order mechanisms able to 
activate new correlations and modify the behavior (e.g., go for another ball). 
The (cognitive) observer, witnessing this correction capability, perhaps 
would comment: “I knew the beetle could not be that stupid”.  
The sensorimotor system generates certain variability of behaviors, but 
most of the time within the margins imposed by the second-order feedback 
mechanisms. That is, under the selective pressure of the thermodynamic 





operating within the strict confines of its structural determinism, 
systematically stabilizes internal correlations that result in what the observer 
sees as ‘adaptive’ or ‘successful’ behaviors.  
When Tolman’s rat is deprived of food, its energetic balance is displaced 
from the normal physiological values. Since the rat is a stable 
thermodynamic system, this very condition activates second-order feedback 
mechanisms which, indirectly through the activation of the sensorimotor 
system, operate as compensatory thermodynamic forces. The rat’s 
sensorimotor correlations, under the pressure of the second-order feedback 
mechanisms, generate the series of movements that we see as the purposeful 
behavior of ‘looking for food’. This sensorimotor activation, which operates 
without ‘having in view’ the maze or the future consequences of its dynamic, 
does not stop until the rat’s energetic values are brought back to their 
physiological values and the second-order mechanisms are deactivated. 
What we see as a result of this dynamic is that the rat, in spite of obstacles 
(e.g., blocked paths), persists in its search and varies its behavior until it 
finds a way out. (There are more elements to take into account in the 
explanation of the rat’s behavior, but for now these considerations are 
enough to make our point. We will come back to Tolman’s rat in the next 
section). 
Let us go back to our questions. If the sensorimotor system operates in a 
vacuum, only ‘concerned’ with its own structural states, without having in 
view the external results of its dynamic, how does it happen that only certain 
correlations are consolidated, and that they are precisely those that produce 
the ‘right’ kind of behavior for the organism? How can a system that lacks a 
pilot, that is drifting through the world without any purpose or control, that 
has no idea about what is going on outside, ‘learn’ and generate the right 
kind of behavior?   
The answer, I think, is that learning phenomena have to do with the fact 
that the sensorimotor system operates under the stabilizing force of 
ultrastable mechanisms linked to the thermodynamic demands of the 
organism as a dissipative structure. It is this particular functional 
organization of the organism and its nervous system that explains, in good 





conserve its adaptation.  
The exact anatomical and functional details of these complex 
mechanisms still need to be clarified, but their operational logic, at least in 
abstract terms, is relatively clear. More importantly, their functioning is 
entirely intelligible within the deterministic metaphysical principles assumed 
in this thesis to be valid for living beings as natural systems.  
Animals, as thermodynamic autopoietic machines, and their nervous 
systems, in all their divisions, are fully deterministic machines. Everything 
that is valid, in terms of structural determinism, for the sensorimotor system 
as a first-order feedback mechanism is also valid for second-order feedback 
mechanisms and for the nervous system in general. All the divisions of the 
nervous system are linked in one way or another, but none of them ‘has in 
view’ what is going on in the others, or estimates the consequences of its 
activity for the organism. There is no general plan or purpose in their 
functioning.  
Second-order feedback mechanisms do not work, as it might seem, in 
order to ensure the survival of the animal (we have examined this point in 
detail in Chapter 3). They are just stability mechanisms operating upon 
certain physiological variables, able to trigger variations in the sensorimotor 
correlations of the nervous system.  
The behavioral flexibility exhibited by animals, usually interpreted as 
intelligent and purposeful, is the result of a complex but strictly deterministic 
form of thermodynamic ultrastability in far-from-equilibrium conditions. No 
need for helmsmen or pilots that control the animal’s behavior according to 
internal maps, plans or purposes. The notion of structural drift, although 
counterintuitive at first glance, now appears as a valid alternative for 
explaining the behavior of living beings. 
 
 
5.4 The importance of good ‘logical accounting’  
 
The emphasis Maturana, in discussions of perception and action, puts on the 





has been criticized, quite often, as excessively internalist (Godfrey-Smith, 
1996), idealist (Johnson, 1991) or frankly solipsist and anti-realist (Searle, 
1995; Zolo, 1991).  
Initially, when hearing Maturana talking about living beings (with the 
metaphor of the nervous system as a man locked up in a ship), it would seem 
that the external world is completely absent and plays no role in a living 
being’s behavior; that its presence is entirely irrelevant, that all that counts is 
the internal structure of organisms.   
However, on a second reading, trying to properly grasp the metaphysical 
meaning of PSD, one can see that this is not the case. To avoid 
misinterpretations it is crucial, as Maturana recommends, to maintain clear 
‘logical accounting’ with respect to our observational domain and 
explanatory practices.  
PSD aims to clarify the metaphysical nature of the interactions that a 
system holds with its environment, not to deny the existence of such 
interactions or declare them as dispensable for our explanatory practices. 
When Maturana assumes PSD as a metaphysical condition of living beings, 
he never draws the conclusion that, since living beings are structurally 
determined systems, all we need to explain living beings’ adaptation and 
behavior is the study of their internal structure. It is one thing to say that the 
environment cannot specify or instruct the structural changes of a system, 
and another to say that the environment is therefore irrelevant.  
Maturana starts, as we did in Chapter 1, by presenting living beings as 
dynamic systems that exist in continuous structural coupling with the 
environment. That is, as adaptive systems: 
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As we saw in Chapter 1, all interacting dynamic systems endowed with 
structural plasticity, natural or artificial, living or not, are adaptive systems. 
Some of them exhibit passive adaptation, some of them active adaptation. 
Living beings have interesting peculiarities among active adaptive systems 
(ultrastability, far-from-equilibrium thermodynamic regime, autopoiesis), 
but none of them, as we have seen in this thesis, place them outside PSD.  
PSD does not claim that the vertical arrows in the diagram above are a 
myth invented by the observer (that such interactions do not exist). What 
PSD claims, ultimately, is that those arrows must be understood as strictly 
structural interactions (not as instructive, informational, semantic, epistemic 
or intentional interactions).   
This is quite different from saying that the environment does not exist, or 
that external factors are irrelevant to the structural drift of living beings.  
That living beings exist in structural coupling implies that the 
environment is constantly triggering structural changes in them, and that, 
consequently, the environment forms part of their history of structural drift. 
Every living being, at each moment, is where it is and has the structural state 
that it has as a result of its particular structural drift; a structural drift that is 
shaped, moment after moment, by its own internal dynamic and by the 
structural changes triggered by the environment (Maturana, 2003).  
In this sense, the structural present of the living being, as with any 
adaptive system, is always the embodiment of its history of structural 
coupling. And in this sense too, none of the interactions of the living being 
with the environment is trivial for its structural drift (Maturana, 2003, 1987). 
None of its encounters with the environment, so to speak, vanishes into the 
air; everything is embodied in its structure. But here is where we face a 
dangerous bend in our analysis, and where Maturana asks us to reduce our 
speed, to pause, and maintain as clearly as we can the ‘logical accounting’ of 
our descriptive and explanatory exercises (Maturana and Varela, 1987).  
In Chapter 2 we saw that living beings are machines (i.e., state-dependent 
systems), and that as such, they exist as actuality (AP). Ashby, with his 
discussion of the concept of memory, showed us that a machine strictly 
operates in its structural present, and that its past or history has no 





when, as we are seeing now, the structural present of the machine is 
effectively the result or embodiment of its history. How can we coordinate 
these two aspects?  
When Ashby and Maturana emphasize that living beings are machines, 
what they mean is that the structural states that explain the behavior of a 
living being at a given moment are just those which are present at that 
moment, irrespective of the way in which they have come about. A dog, to 
return to Ashby’s example, runs away when the noise of a car engine is 
heard. Its owner explains “He was run over by a car six months ago”. With 
this comment we understand that the particular behavior of the dog is not an 
innate response but a (dramatically) learnt response; i.e., the product of a 
particular history of structural coupling. What happened six months ago has, 
to some extent, changed or rewired the structure of the dog’s nervous system 
in such a way that now the noise of a car engine is an external factor that 
triggers this particular sensorimotor response. The dog’s history, thus, is 
crucial to understanding its behavior. Nonetheless, we also know that the 
dog’s behavior in the present is a direct function of the structure of its 
nervous system in the present, not of his history. If we build, molecule by 
molecule, an instant copy of the dog, its response to the engine noise will be 
exactly the same, no matter the total absence of a history of structural 
coupling.   
Machines, living or not, always operate in their structural present, and 
their history, when there is one, is just that, history. It is the observer, not the 
machine, who can take the machine’s history and put it in relation to the 
observed behavior.  
 
[H]istory becomes embodied both in the structure of the 
living system and in the structure of the medium, even 
though both systems necessarily, as structure-determined 
systems, always operate in the present through locally 
determined processes. Therefore, although from the 
cognitive point of view adequate behavior as a case of 
adaptation cannot be understood without reference to history 





behavior is only an expression of a structural matching in 
the present between organism and medium, in which history 
does not participate as an operative component. History is 
necessary to explain how a given system or phenomenon 
came to be, but it does not participate in the explanation of 
the operation of the system or phenomenon in the present. 
(Maturana, 1978a, p. 39) 
 
‘Logical accounting’, in Maturana’s jargon (Maturana and Varela, 1987), 
means keeping the structural plane of the operational effectiveness of the 
observed system separate from the descriptive/explanatory plane belonging 
to the observer. When we keep these two planes separate, we can recognize 
their respective validity without confusing them.  
We do not need to deny that the structural present of the system is the 
result or embodiment of its history of structural coupling, and that in said 
history the participation of the environment has been crucial. On the other 
hand, we do not need to deny that even when the structural present of the 
system is the result of its particular history of structural coupling, the system 
as such only operates according to its structural present, regardless its history 
of structural coupling. The living being, as a machine, does not ‘take into 
account’ its history of structural coupling in its behavior; it rather finds itself, 
moment after moment, with a given structural configuration, and reacts or 
operates from there. It is the observer who can, and many times needs to, in 
order to explain the living beings’ behavior, take into account the history of 
its structural coupling.  
When the observer misses this point, as Ashby’s incomplete observer did 
in the case of the dog (see section 2.1.1), she puts herself into a trap. She 
puts herself before the pseudo-problem of explaining how the organism, or 
its nervous system, handles or manipulates something that happened six 
months ago, something that belongs to the past. She raises the pseudo-
problem of explaining how the organism’s nervous system, as Clark (2001) 
says, ‘makes contact’ with an absent state of affairs. The trap is that, since 
this ‘contact’ cannot be explained in physical or structural terms, the 





intentional) factors or dimensions. The observer, thus, ends by building what 
Clark calls a ‘representation-hungry problem’ (Clark, 2001). This 
‘representation-hungry problem’, according to all we have said in this thesis 
about the functioning of living beings as structurally determined machines, is 
in reality a pseudo-problem; a problem that only arises thanks to the 
observer’s bad logical accounting.  
The same runs for the topic of perception. If we keep our logical 
accounting clear, we can affirm the structurally determined character of the 
sensory system without denying the existence of external factors impinging 
on its structural dynamic. We can recognize that such and such structural 
state in the sensory system is consistently triggered by such and such 
environmental configuration, and at the same time understand that the 
sensory system, for the effects of its structural dynamic, never distinguishes 
or ‘takes into account’ the external origin of said structural state. (It is not a 
bad exercise, if the reader has the energy, to revisit the previous chapter and 
try to apply, to the case of the frog, the ‘logical accounting’ recommended 
by Maturana).   
In general, we fail in our logical accounting every time we project into 
the living being features or elements that belong to our 
descriptive/explanatory domain. When we do this we end, sooner or later, by 
transgressing the boundaries of Strict Naturalism, positing non-structural 
(i.e., intentional, semantic, representational, epistemic) properties in living 
beings’ internal dynamic.  
Tolman’s rat is another case in point. The notion of ‘internal map’ aims 
to explain what Tolman takes to be a sample of purposeful and intelligent 
behavior that involves some kind of memory mechanism or learning process; 
a process that Tolman understands in terms of ‘internalization’ of the 
environment. How does the rat ‘internalize’ and ‘keep in its memory’ the 
spatial layout of the maze? How does the rat manage to orient its behavior, 
in spite of obstacles, towards a future (i.e., absent) state of affairs (the 
presence of food at the exit of the maze)? Tolman faces, without doubt, a 
clear case of a ‘representation-hungry problem’. Yet the problem, again, is 
just a pseudo-problem.  





have any ‘internal map’ of the maze, nor does it ‘make contact’ with some 
absent state of affairs (its previous visits to the maze, or the future presence 
of food at the exit of the maze). The maze, as a spatial object that constitutes 
the ecological context of the rat, is something that Tolman clearly sees and 
distinguishes in his observation, but not, as we have argued before, 
something that appears for the rat’s nervous system. The rat’s nervous 
system, as a structurally determined system, only operates in the space of its 
own structural states, without distinguishing (let alone ‘internalizing’) the 
presence of an external maze.   
At the same time, although the rat’s nervous system has no idea about the 
existence of the maze, it is a fact that its structural present is the embodiment 
of a history of structural coupling wherein the maze, as a recurrent source of 
perturbations, has played a key role. The rat’s nervous system has not 
internalized an image, map or model of the maze, but its present 
sensorimotor configurations have been partially shaped, in a non-trivial way, 
by the recurrent encounters with the maze. Since the structural present of the 
rat and its nervous system is the product of a structural drift in which the 
maze has participated as a modulator element, it is not a surprise that, when 
put again in the maze, the rat reacts and behaves in ways that express and 
manifest this structural familiarity. That is what we call ‘learning’. 
We know, on the other hand, that the rat’s nervous system, as a biological 
machine, always operates from its structural present, without establishing 
any ‘contact’ with non-actual states of affairs. The temporal horizon, past 
and future, in which Tolman frames or contextualizes the present behavior of 
the rat, is a useful and legitimate descriptive dimension that belongs to his 
own observational domain, but not an operating element in the rat’s behavior 
as a biological machine. The rat’s history of structural coupling, including its 
previous encounters with the maze, has no operational presence in the 
generation of its behavior. This is so even when we know that, without that 
precise history of interactions with the maze, the rat’s nervous system would 
not have the structure and sensorimotor configurations that it has in the 
present, and would not be able to generate the kind of behavior that we 
appraise as intelligent.  





of the rat and some future state of affairs, and which he assumes reveal the 
presence of purposes or internal representations of goals, correspond to 
features and possibilities that he finds in his observational domain, not to 
operating elements in the structural dynamic of the rat. The goal-directed 
appearance of the rat’s behavior, we know, is a function of its particular and 
complex stability dynamic.  
Both the history and the ecological context are real aspects in the life of 
living beings, and we observers can, and need to, take them into account if 
we want to explain and understand their behavior. However, a certain 
discipline and epistemological vigilance is required. It is important, as 
Maturana says, to keep good logical accounting and remind ourselves that, 
although both history and ecological context are available for us as 
explanatory resources, none of them exists or has operational presence in the 





















Social phenomena, communicative 
behaviors and language: the social 
origins of mind  
 
 
What is the origin of mental phenomena? How do they appear in the natural 
world? The final chapter of this thesis explores these questions and tries to 
answer them by appealing to a sociolinguistic theory of mind. It is argued 
that some of the essential marks of the mental, such as representational 
content and intentionality, have their origin in language.  
In previous chapters we have reviewed the biological roots of animal 
cognition and showed that behind the intelligent and adaptive behavior of 
living beings, all that we find is a deterministic process of structural drift; a 
process wherein notions such as information transferring, intentionality and 
internal representations do not have a place. In general, and in a way that is 
relevant for our purposes here, we have argued that such notions, when 
applied to the internal structural dynamic of living beings, are nothing more 
than projections or logical accounting errors introduced by the observer.   
This non-representational and non-intentional picture of living beings 
leaves us, nonetheless, in front of a big question. If the intelligent behavior 
of living beings is just a matter of structural drift, if there are no such things 
as internal (neural) representations, where do mental representations come 
from? If there is nothing within the anatomical confines of the organism, 
nothing in its nervous system or brain that could be considered an intentional 





So far we have analyzed the behavior of living beings considering them 
as individual unities in interaction with their medium. Now it is time to 
expand the focus. In order to explore the origins of mental representations 
and their intentional properties we have to turn our attention to what happens 
when two or more living systems start to interact in a recurrent manner 
constituting new domains of structural coupling. In this chapter we are going 
to review the emergence of social phenomena and the nature of the 
communicative dynamics established by living beings. The purpose is to 
understand the peculiarities of language as a communicative system and the 
special kind of phenomena that it inaugurates in the natural world. The 
central hypothesis is that the emergence of language and the emergence of 
the intentional-representational ability in living systems is, essentially, one 
and the same phenomenon. A complementary hypothesis is that the mental 
experience emerges as a transformation or metamorphosis of language.  
In Chapter 1 we said that only creatures capable of language operate as 
observers, and that many of the explanatory elements traditionally used in 
relation to living beings’ behavior (intentionality, teleology, representation, 
control, normativity, agency) are nothing more that anthropomorphic 
projections or logical accounting errors introduced by the observer. Since we 
have identified the ability to observe with the ability to operate in language, 
this Chapter, in offering an explanatory hypothesis about language, offers at 
the same time an explanatory hypothesis about the observer. This Chapter 
may be viewed, thus, as an attempt to explain both the emergence of mental 
phenomena and the constitution of the observer.  
 
 
6.1 Origins and minds 
 
To say anything about the origins of something we need first to have at hand 
a more or less clear idea about that something whose origins we want to 
identify, and also a more or less clear idea about what it means to identify 
the origins of something. In our case, we need to agree to some criteria by 





also some criteria for deciding, after attempting a theory, whether or not we 
have successfully reconstructed the origins of such phenomena.  
So the first thing that we have to do in this chapter is to offer some 
criteria of individuation for mental phenomena. There are several criteria 
that philosophers use for this purpose, and in this chapter certainly we could 
not embrace all of them with the same detail. So I propose to take a more or 
less standard approach and to consider some traditional “marks” of the 
mental.  
We are asking for the origins of mind. But, what kind of “things” are 
minds? What is it to have a mind? We say, for example, that while John has 
a mind, the stone that he has in his hand does not have a mind. When we say 
that, what do we mean? The expression “having a mind” sounds like “having 
a heart”, “having a liver”, “having a brain”, etc. This kind of expression 
tends to promote a substantival view of mentality. The substantival view 
supposes that mind is more or less like an object in the world (like a car, a 
tree, a chair, etc.), a kind of substance with particular properties (e.g., being 
immaterial). Although popular some centuries ago, today almost nobody 
endorses this view. The reason is that the noun “mind” seems to be nothing 
more than the product of a linguistic turn known as nominalization. This 
linguistic move transforms verbs (actions) or adjectives (properties, 
attributes) into nouns (things, objects). For example, if a horse runs fast and 
gracefully, we say that the horse “has a good gallop”. If an athlete, a runner, 
is able to accelerate her velocity in a short period of time, we say that she 
“has a good acceleration”. The same with some adjectives or attributes: if a 
metal is hard, we can talk about “the hardness of the metal”. Interestingly, 
we can do the same with some relational attributes. For example, if two 
things are different, we can talk about “the difference between them”. We 
will see that the noun “mind” constitutes a general nominalization of certain 
attributes.  
 To reject this substantival view is not to deny that minds are real, but 
only that they are substances. The idea is that expressions like “he has a 
great mind”, “he lost his mind”, “he is out of his mind”, being 
nominalizations, should not be taken literally in the sense that there are 





of” (Kim, 2011).  
But if mind is not a substance, what is it? We could say that mind is 
basically an attribute of certain systems. When we say that an entity has a 
mind we mean that such entity has the property of undergoing certain states 
(uncertainty, wonder, frustration) or that is able to do certain things (believe, 
think, remember). “Having a mind” may be understood as having a set of 
mental capacities, like when we say that a horse has a good gallop or that an 
athlete has a good acceleration (Kim, 2011). Gallop and acceleration are not 
things or organs inside the horse or the athlete, though both the horse and the 
athlete have organs that, working in a certain way, participate in the 
generation of the movements that we call gallop and acceleration 
respectively. In the same way, mind is not a thing or an organ inside the 
persons. This is so even when we know that there are certain organs inside 
the persons (e.g., the brain) whose working is essential for generating the 
kind of phenomena that we identify as ‘mental’ (Ryle, 1949).   
In order to avoid falling into the trap of the substantival mind, every time 
we use the term “mind” the reader should translate it immediately into “the 
attribute of undergoing or performing mental phenomena”. But, what kind of 
phenomena are mental phenomena? Is there any “mark” of the mental?  
First, from an epistemic point of view, it is usually claimed that mental 
phenomena (states and events) are special because we have a privileged 
access to them from a first person perspective. This epistemic mark is 
articulated in different ways and degrees, and philosophers talk about 
immediacy of knowledge, privacy or first person privilege, transparency, 
infallibility and similar notions. But in general, and putting aside more 
complex technicalities, the idea is that the content of our mental states is 
private in the sense that, for example, we can entertain a desire that, at least 
in principle, if we decide never to communicate it, may remain forever 
unknown to anyone else. Suppose that a woman has a secret desire that she 
does not want to confess. She is aware of this desire and knows perfectly 
well that it is not socially accepted. Suppose she maintains the secret until 
her death. What has happened with the desire and its content? The desire 
was real and was well known by the woman, but nobody else knew about it 





was, and will remain forever, private for the knowledge of the rest of the 
people.  
We often take this privacy as if it were related to some physical 
specification. For example, we tend to think that this privacy has to do with 
the fact that our thoughts are located inside our skull, and that the other 
people cannot “see” through our cranium and “look at” them. 
Phenomenologically speaking, from the point of view of our subjective 
experience, when I think something without saying it loud, almost 
unavoidably the feeling is that the thought remains in a certain way “inside” 
me (e.g., in my head). If I decide to communicate the idea, to make it public, 
the feeling is that the idea is “going out” to the external world (e.g., through 
the mouth). Roughly stated, the intuition is that my thoughts remain private 
as long as they remain internal, while they become public as long as they are 
externalised.  
Following this experiential datum, mental phenomena are traditionally 
conceived as something essentially internal. Nonetheless, this inner 
character should not be identified with any spatial determination. 
Philosophers do not (or should not) interpret the inner character of mind in a 
literal concrete sense, but rather in an abstract metaphorical sense. We say 
that mental phenomena are inner just in terms of epistemic accessibility. A 
mental phenomenon is inside my mind in the sense that I, and only I, can 
access it by means of an introspective examination. Other people can, of 
course, have access to my mental contents too, but not by means of an 
introspective examination. They have to infer my mental states by observing 
my behavior, or they have to trust in me when I declare that I am in such and 
such mental state (they have to believe in my report). If they perform an 
introspective examination, what they are going to find is not my mind but 
their own mental experience!  
As van Gelder (2005a) says, my mind is something internal in the sense 
that its contents are always inside a boundary of epistemic accessibility that 
excludes all observers but one; I. Thus, in order to avoid possible 
misunderstandings the reader has to recall that the inner character of the 
mental concerns an epistemic space, not a physical one. Mental phenomena 





intracranial.   
Second, it is widely agreed that most of mental phenomena exhibit 
intentionality and representational content (Crane, 2001, 1998; Dretske, 
1995). Technically, intentionality and representational content are not 
exactly the same, but for our present purpose we can treat them as two 
aspects of the same thing.  
That a mental state is intentional means, basically, that it refers to 
something or that it is about something. Intentionality here does not have to 
do with the psychological distinction between intended (voluntary, 
purposive) and unintended (involuntary, non-purposive) actions. An event or 
act is mental not because it is, or it seems, oriented to some purpose or goal, 
but because it is about something (Brentano, 1874/1973). For example, if I 
believe that Santa Claus does not exist, my belief is about the existence of 
Santa Claus. If I think that Martin Scorsese is a good director, the contents of 
my thought are the qualities I attribute to Martin Scorsese as a film director. 
Every mental state seems to be directed to something; something that is the 
object of the intentional act (i.e. the object of my happiness, the object of my 
belief, the object of my desire, etc.). This directionality, to be clear, is not the 
conventional directionality that we distinguish in the physical world. We use 
the term “directionality” in a quite abstract and metaphorical sense, and it is 
not an uncommon error to forget this point (even among philosophers). This 
directionality is neither spatial nor temporal; it is not a property for which we 
can specify values in terms of space-time. If I think of the Middle East, my 
thought is not pointing, like a compass, toward the East. If I remember that 
yesterday was a sunny day, my mental state is not pointing, like a clock in 
reverse, to the past. The same runs for the present and the future as temporal 
categories of our experience. We say that mental states are directed rather in 
a semantic sense; that they make reference to some intentional object (that 
may or may not have a real correlate in the world). Conversely, if an event or 
phenomenon is directed to some spatial location (e.g., the clouds are going 
toward the coast, the dog is going to the door) that does not make it a mental 
phenomenon. If an event or phenomenon exhibits certain temporal 
directionality (e.g., this chemical reaction is irreversible, the system tends to 





important to keep in mind these distinctions and to avoid identifying the 




Another way of putting this is to say that mental states exhibit a certain 
content; a content that, again, is not physical (like the water contained in a 
glass) but rather referential or semantic. This is indeed what people 
understand as the representational content of mental states. Typically, 
mental events are viewed as phenomena that, accurately or inaccurately, 
correctly or wrongly, represent something. The specific nature or format of 
this representational function may be, sometimes, an object of debate among 
philosophers. For example, some people think that mental representations 
are symbolic (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988) 
while others think that they are subsymbolic or based on a different 
architecture (e.g. connectionist patterns; Clark, 1989; Smolensky, 1987). 
Some people think that the content of mental phenomena is exclusively 
conceptual, while others think that there are also non conceptual contents 
(Peacocke, 1998, 1992; Crane, 1992). Some philosophers think that the 
content of the representations is determined by causal-informational 
relations (e.g., Fodor, 1981; Dretske, 1981), while others think that what 
matters is the purpose for which such representations are recruited 
(teleological theories; Millikan, 1993, 1984). These are just some of the 
many discussions about the specific nature of mental representations. What 
is almost universally accorded, nevertheless, is that mental phenomena are 
representational phenomena. But just what is a representation? When can we 
say that such and such event is representing, or is a representation of, 
something else?  
There is a long discussion about what exactly a representation is and what 
its ontological properties are. Nonetheless, a more or less accepted view says 
that every representational phenomenon must exhibit at least three elements: 
(X) that which is represented (the ‘object’, concrete or abstract, real or 
fictitious, of the representation), (Y) that which is taken or interpreted as 
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 The philosophical notion of intentionality is a bit more complex than as presented 
here. There are additional features associated with intentionality such as ‘aspectual 
shape’ (Crane, 2001) or the capacity to ‘misrepresent’ (Dretske, 1995). Here, 





standing for (X) (the vehicle of the representation), and (Z) that which takes, 
uses or interprets (Y) as standing for (X) (the user of the representation) 
(Von Eckardt, 1995; Menary, 2007; Bechtel, 1998). This triadic composition 
constitutes basically a relational phenomenon. That is, a phenomenon that 
only exists as long as this triadic relation takes place (i.e., no one of the 
elements can be absent) or, equivalently, as long as these three components 
X, Y, and Z are effectively present and related in the adequate way. One 
could say, in the broadest sense, that something Y represents something else 
X, if there is something Z for which such Y designates, stands for, or means 
X.  
The important point is that, although these elements are all equally 
indispensable, only one of them is that one that defines the triadic relation as 
a representational relation: Z, the user. The dyadic relationship between X 
and Y, considered in itself, is never a representational relation. It is Z that 
establishes the representational relation between X and Y, that “takes” Y as 
standing for X and that constitutes Y as a representational vehicle. Y, by 
itself, is never a representational vehicle; it becomes one as soon as some Z 
uses it to designate some X.  
For example, the smoke is caused by the fire. The relation between these 
events is purely causal. Nonetheless, if some Z takes the smoke as an 
indicator of fire, then, and only then, the smoke emerges as a 
representational vehicle (an index) and the fire as an object of representation 
(an X). Previous to the constitution of the triad (previous to the incorporation 
of Z), smoke and fire are just two physical events causally linked, nothing 
more. The same occurs when the shape of a cloud resembles the shape of, 
say, an animal. The cloud, by itself, is not a representation of any animal; it 
becomes such (an icon) when it evokes in some Z the idea of an animal.  
The general idea is that a representation is a triadic relation that is 
constituted when a Z takes something (Y) as standing for something else 
(X).  
So if mental phenomena are representational phenomena, we should be 
able to identify in them, with certain clarity, the triadic structure 
aforementioned. And especially, due to its important constituent role, we 





representational user.  
As it is easy to note, intentionality and representation are intimately 
linked. After all, every representation is always about something that is 
being represented, and the referential relation entailed in intentionality is, 
certainly, a semantic like relation. Some philosophers recognize this fact by 
using two different senses of intentionality: referential intentionality and 
content intentionality (Kim, 2011). The first one concerns the aboutness of 
our mental states and the second one emphasizes the fact that our mental 
states have meanings or semantic contents. 
Intentionality and representation are not bad candidates for individuating 
mental phenomena because, apart from language, no other type of 
phenomenon (state or event) seems to possess such properties as intrinsic 
aspects. Physical states are what they are without being themselves, in the 
technical philosophical sense aforementioned, about other things (Brentano, 
1874/1973). Physical states do not relate in referential or semantic terms; 
they just connect in causal terms. If the ambient temperature goes down to 
minus 3 C° degrees, water will pass from a liquid state to a solid state. We 
can appreciate a causal connection between these events, but neither is the 
ambient temperature about the water nor the solid state of water about the 
ambient temperature. The ambient temperature is not the referential content 
of the solid state of water and the solid state of water is not the referential 
content of the ambient temperature. They, as physical events, simply do not 
entertain semantic contents at all.  
Another completely different thing is that I, as a representing system, 
may observe the solid state of water and take it as an indicator, a sign, or 
evidence that allows me to infer other facts, as for example, that the ambient 
temperature must have descended at least to zero degrees. But the one who 
establishes the referential connection here is me, not the physical states. The 
freezing of water is not, by itself, a representation of the ambient 
temperature; it is just one of the many natural effects produced by the falling 
of the ambient temperature. Yet I can treat the causal connection as a 
semantic relation and say “The water is frozen. That means that the ambient 
temperature must have fallen down at least to zero degrees”. I can interpret a 





answer has to do with the very topic of our enquiry. I can do that because I 
have a mind, and having a mind is, at least for the most part, just to be able 
to assign certain meaning to things, events or phenomena.  
If the ideas of intentionality and representation are clear enough, then we 
could take them as criteria for individuating mental phenomena. That is, we 
could say that identifying the origins of mental phenomena consists in 
identifying the origins of intentionality and representational phenomena. The 
question could be formulated as: How do intentional relations emerge in a 
world of causal relations? How do representational phenomena emerge in 
the physical world? 
Our second requirement is about the notion of origin. When and under 
what circumstances can we say that we have exposed the origins of 
something? I propose as a criterion the following idea: to identify the origins 
of a certain phenomenon is to expose the conditions under which the 
phenomenon in question appears as a natural result. That is, one has to show 
those conditions that, once given, bring as a result the phenomenon under 
consideration. For example, if I ask “How do earthquakes originate?” a 
proper answer has to give the geomechanic and energetic conditions under 
which earthquakes appear as a natural result. A stronger formulation of this 
idea would say that one has exposed the origins of a phenomenon when one 
has given the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of such 
phenomena.   
In our case, identifying the origins of mental phenomena would be 
equivalent to exposing the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of intentional and representational phenomena.  
In what follows, I shall try to offer a hypothesis about what has to happen 
in the natural world such that the result is the emergence of intentional and 
representational phenomena. No doubt, here I will not commit myself to 
giving the exhaustive set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
emergence of mind. My purpose is naturally much more modest. I just want 
to suggest some preliminary ideas for orienting further explorations on the 
origins of mind.  
The structure of the hypothesis is as follows. I consider the social 





communicative behaviors. I try to show that language is a special kind of 
communicative behavior; a recursive linguistic behavior. I do this in order to 
show that it is the recursive nature of language (understood in a cybernetic 
sense rather than in the classic Chomskyan generative sense) which 
inaugurates the semantic and representational phenomena in the natural 
world. Finally, I offer some general ideas about the way in which language, 
originally social, becomes an individual and more or less private experiential 
domain, constituting properly what we usually call our mind.  
 
 
6.2 Social coupling and communicative 
behaviors 
 
That language is, or works as, a representational system is something that 
cognitive scientists and philosophers hardly could deny. Language is 
typically considered, with good reason, as the paradigmatic example of 
every semantic or referential system. Using language we make reference to 
different aspects of our experience, we represent the world as being in such 
and such way, we talk about different things, we denote, designate, mean, 
etc.  
I will assume that the reader, like the cognitive experts, really does not 
need to be persuaded about this point. The semantic and representational 
power of language appears as something more or less evident in our 
quotidian life. Our task, accordingly, is not to discuss whether language 
works or not as a semantic system, but try to understand how such a 
semantic system appears as a natural phenomenon in the animal realm.  
Now, since mind is basically a representational system, it is not 
surprising that many philosophers have taken language as the model for 
understanding mental activity. A traditional line in philosophy of mind, 
championed by authors like Fodor, has conceived the mind basically as a 
language like system. And I would say that this intuition is essentially 
correct, insofar as it detects the strong ontological continuity that exists 





(e.g., Fodor’s LOT, 1975) develop this intuition seems to me, according to 
the autopoietic framework here defended, basically wrong. Although here 
we will not set an open debate against this kind of theory, the reader will 
easily appreciate the points of disagreement. We will see that: 1) taking as a 
constitutive rule what is just a feature of our quotidian psychological 
experience, these theories assume that mental representations are 
ontologically prior to linguistic representations. The autopoietic hypothesis, 
on the contrary, assumes that linguistic representations are a precondition for 
mental representations; 2) taking as a spatiotemporal specification what is 
just an epistemic distinction, these theories assume that mental activity takes 
place inside the head, i.e., in the brain. As opposed to this, the autopoietic 
hypothesis assumes that the mind is not in the head but in the recursive 
communicative dynamics of linguistic organisms. We will review these 
points soon. 
Before starting our analysis, some terminological specifications are 
needed. In the autopoietic theory, the structural coupling that a first-order 
autopoietic unity (a unicellular organism) holds with its environment is 
called first-order coupling (e.g., a bacterium in its aquatic medium). The 
structural coupling that a first-order autopoietic unity holds with one or more 
first-order autopoietic unities is called second-order coupling (e.g., a colony 
of bacteria). This second-order coupling may lead sometimes, although not 
always, to the constitution of second-order autopoietic unities. That is, to the 
constitution of multicellular organisms (e.g., hydras, ants, mice, gorillas). 
Finally, the structural coupling that a second-order autopoietic unity holds 
with one or more second-order autopoietic unities is called third-order 
coupling. For example, a colony of insects, a pack of wolves, a community 
of gorillas, are all systems constituted by third-order couplings.  Now, a 
colony of insects (termites, bees, ants), a family of wolves, a community of 
gorillas, are also typical examples of social systems. The autopoietic theory, 
accordingly, defines social systems as third-order coupling systems, or, 
equivalently, as third-order biological unities (Maturana and Varela, 1987).  
As a general rule, in a social system organisms coexist and communicate 
modulating their behaviors reciprocally. Communication, from this point of 





behaviors in a mutual way. Yet this behavioral coordination, according to all 
we have said before, cannot be understood as the result of information 
transmission processes or transference of semantic contents (Maturana, 
1978a). We face here another dangerous bend.  
We tend to associate the communicative phenomenon with a process in 
which “something” (a message, a content, a piece of information) “travels” 
from one place (the emitting source) to another (the receptor) through a kind 
of “channel” or conduit. This is a conventional metaphor that, though 
familiar to us, does not illuminate the biological phenomenon that we are 
addressing here. We must recall that communication, understood as an 
interactional phenomenon that takes place between second-order autopoietic 
systems, is just a particular version of structural co-drift; a process of 
structural change wherein, as we have seen before, there is no room for 
informational or semantic contents. Thus, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings in what follows, the reader should try to put aside, at least 
for a while, the familiar and traditional conceptions about communication. 
The idea is to keep in mind that when we talk about communication, we are 
talking about third-order structural coupling processes between living 
systems, nothing more. Nonetheless, it is better to make it explicit. Do I 
mean communication without information? Yes, I do. Do I mean 
communication without any semantic content or message to transmit? That 
is exactly what I mean.      
 
 
6.3 Communication and recursion 
 
A wide spectrum of living beings exhibit one or another way of 
communication or behavioral coordination. The concrete mechanism of 
structural coupling used by the organisms varies according to the different 
species. For example, the majority of the so called social insects coordinate 
their behavior through the interchange of chemical substances (e.g., 
throphallaxis in ants), but others prefer to use patterns of sound (e.g., 





their behavior through certain specific patterns of movements (the classical 
example of bee dances). Birds and whales elaborate quite sophisticated 
songs, and superior mammals exhibit very complex communicative patterns 
mixing all kind of sounds and movements.  
The way in which organisms coordinate their behaviors may be strongly 
specified by their phylogenic history, or may be the result of certain 
particular ontogenic co-drift. In the first case we assume that the 
communicative patterns are basically innate, while in the second case we say 
that the organisms have developed or acquired (learned) certain 
communicative patterns as a result of their particular history of structural 
coupling. In many cases the communicative behavior of the organisms is 
certainly a mix of these two conditions.  
Whatever the case, innate or learned, we tend to treat these 
communicative behaviors as semantic interactions. That is, as if the course 
of the interactions was determined by the meaning of certain “messages” and 
not by the dynamic of structural coupling of the interacting organisms. Just 
like in the fables, where animals speak and act in a human like way, we 
usually describe animal communication in semantic and intentional terms. 
These semantic descriptions, according to what we already know about 
structural coupling processes, are basically incorrect, yet they have a well 
founded origin: the fact that animal communication constitutes the prelude 
of human language. Human language and animal communication are indeed 
very close relatives, and in that sense, it is not an arbitrary error to treat 
animal communication as if it were a semantic phenomenon. The point is 
that, though somehow justified, an error is always an error.  
Now, if animal communication and human language are close relatives, 
where is the difference between them? We have said that certain organisms 
communicate in a very sophisticated way; why do not such communicative 
behaviors (e.g., the “language” of bees, the “language” of birds, the “songs” 
of whales) count as genuine language? Many linguists and philosophers have 
tried to provide one or another demarcation criterion with respect to this 
point. The autopoietic theory offers its own hypothesis: while 
communication is behavioral coordination, language is basically behavioral 





the domain of communicative behaviors (Maturana, 2000, 1978a). What 
does this mean? 
To understand the peculiarity of language as a communicative system we 
have to understand in a proper way the notion of recursion. The cybernetic 
notion of recursion used by Maturana has little to do with the syntactic 
notion of recursion used in linguistic theory. In linguistic theory (especially 
in Chomskyan generative grammar) it is said that a distinctive property of 
human language is its recursive power. That is, the ability of producing an 
infinite number of sentences by inserting new phrases (clauses) once and 
again within the same sentence. For example, if we have the sentence ‘Mary 
met a new boyfriend’, we can insert the sentence ‘Mary went to Italy’ to 
form a new one: ‘Mary, who went to Italy, met a new boyfriend’. We can go 
on inserting, for example, the sentence ‘Mary’s mother was born in Italy’ 
and obtain: ‘Mary, who went to Italy where her mother was borne, met a 
new boyfriend’. And so on and so forth. Recursion here is appealed to for 
accounting for the productivity of human language, which is usually viewed 
by the majority of linguists (not all of them) as one of its distinctive marks.  
Maturana’s cybernetic notion of recursion, by contrast, does not point to 
any property of language (i.e., productivity, compositionality) but to the 
process by which language emerges as a special kind of communicative 
pattern. Recursion here means the recurrence of an operation upon its own 
result. The idea is easy to see if we differentiate between recursion and 
repetition. For example, in the operation ‘√a² = a’ we apply an operator (√ 
square root) upon the operand (a²) and we obtain the result (a).  To repeat 
this operation is simply to replicate it: 
 
√a² = a 
√a² = a 
√a² = a 
 
In a recursive process, instead, we have to incorporate the result of the 
operation as the operand of the next operation: 
 














In a process of repetition there is no possibility of obtaining any new 
result. In a process of recursion, on the contrary, there exists the possibility 
of obtaining something new. In a sequence of repetition there is no historical 
connection among the operations. In a recursive sequence the operations are 
connected because they take as their operand the result of the previous 
operation. How novel may the results of this kind of recursive processes be? 
That depends on the particular domain in which the recursion takes place. 
Sometimes the novelty may be trivial or merely quantitative (in our example, 
‘a’ and ‘a
½
’ are different though not in an interesting way), and sometimes it 
can be notorious and qualitative (see some illustrations below). What is 
important to clarify, in order to avoid misunderstandings, is that this 
recursive novelty is not the recursive novelty of the linguistic productivity. 
The productive recursion makes a proposition grow only by inserting new 
elements in the same chain, say, always in a horizontal sense.  
To take our previous linguistic example, a cybernetic recursion of the 
sentence ‘Mary met a new boyfriend’ would be equivalent to applying to the 
sentence the same referential function that the sentence applies to a certain 
state of affairs in the world. The very sentence should be taken as the object 
of a new referential function. For example: ‘The sentence “Mary met a new 
boyfriend” contains two nouns and one verb’. In this case what we see is the 
emergence of a second-order referential level (a metalanguage) wherein the 
original sentence assumes the role of what philosophers call ‘object 
language’. This recursive transformation is qualitatively different from the 
productive syntactic one. The sentences ‘Mary met a new boyfriend’ and 
‘Mary, who went to Italy, met a new boyfriend’, though different, both 
remain in the same referential level (languageworld). Yet the proposition 
‘The sentence “Mary met a new boyfriend” contains two nouns and one 
verb’ is not only different from the sentence ‘Mary met a new boyfriend’, 
but also operates in a different referential level (metalanguagelanguage).  
 Now, the notion of recursion that Maturana has in mind is not restricted 





may exhibit interesting results. A quotidian illustration is to take a mobile 
mechanical toy in our hands, say a little robot, and turn it on. The robot starts 
to move its legs, but if we keep it suspended in the air, all that we see is a 
mere repetition of movements. In contrast, if we put the robot in contact with 
the ground, those very movements start to operate in a recursive manner. 
Every movement is applied over the result of the previous movement giving 
place to a historical sequence of displacements that we call “steps”, and 
whose overall outcome is the “walking” of the robot (Maturana and 
Pöersken, 2004).  
Interestingly, in this example we note that the difference between 
repetition and recursion does not lie in the system (the robot) per se.  Either 
suspended in the air or in contact with the ground, the robot performs 
basically the same movements using the same physical engine. Nonetheless, 
the results in one case and the other are qualitatively different. The 
difference does not lie in the structural composition of the robot. The 
difference does not lie in the pattern of movements either. What has changed 
is the way in which the movements relate. What is new is the recursive 
relation established between them.  
Let us review this example more in detail. It will help us to address the 
more abstract issue about the emergence of language and mind.  
Is the walking robot the same as the robot who moves its legs in the air? 
In one sense, yes, it is the same. We disassemble the toy and we cannot find 
anything new in its internal composition. In another sense, nonetheless, it is 
different. The walking robot is certainly doing something new. Yet, where 
does this new activity take place? Does it take place in some component of 
the robot, some internal engine, some structure? No. The walking takes place 
in the relation between the robot and the ground, and that which walks is the 
robot as a whole, not some of its parts. Does this mean that the physical 
structure of the robot is irrelevant? No, it does not. If the robot loses one of 
its legs it cannot walk. If the robot loses its motor mechanism it cannot walk 
either. Does that mean that the “centre” of the walking function is located in 
the leg, or in the internal motor of the robot? No, it does not. Walking is an 
activity that takes place in the behavioral domain of the robot, not in its 





the pattern of movements involved in that walking).  
What is important is to note that the robot cannot bring about the activity 
of walking by itself. It needs a ground, a certain surface to transform its 
repetitive movements into a recursive walking. Without interaction, without 
establishing certain relations, the system cannot create the recursive 
phenomenon. At the same time, once the robot is put in contact with the 
ground, the recursive phenomenon of walking emerges as a necessary 
outcome. The interaction between the movements of the robot and the 
surface of the ground cannot but produce the phenomenon of walking. 
Strictly speaking, there are no alternative possibilities. We also know that 
there are no purposes in this phenomenon either. The robot does not have 
any goal (it does not “want” to walk). The recursive phenomenon takes place 
simply as a natural result; as a deterministic phenomenon.  
Nonetheless, we have to consider that if the structural conditions of the 
robot and the surface were different, the recursive phenomenon might be less 
neat and obvious. What if there is a robot that has weak legs made of thin 
and feeble pieces of wood? What if its feet are too heavy (made of granite)? 
Could this robot walk? How far? Or, what if we put our robot in contact with 
a different surface? What if we put the robot in contact with a layer of thick 
honey or a gelatinous surface? Could it still walk? How far? We can imagine 
different situations in which the phenomenon of recursion might appear 
attenuated or just partially realized. We can imagine different situations in 
front of which we could not estimate with certainty the status of the robot: 
“is it really walking or not?”  
Whatever the case, when the robot is effectively walking, the robot is a 
new system. Not in terms of its physical constitution, but in terms of its 
doing. The walking robot opens a new range of phenomena because there is 
a set of events that can happen only when one is walking (bump into things, 
fall, get stuck), things that could not happen if the robot remained moving its 
legs in the air. The walking robot and the non-walking robot exist in 
different behavioral domains.  
Among the things that may happen only when the robot is walking, there 
is one that is especially interesting for our analysis: to leave a footprint on 





the robot leaves a trace. On walking, the robot draws a path; a path that does 
not pre-date the walking of the robot, but that is created by it. The robot, of 
course, does not have any purpose in doing that; it does not have as a goal to 
draw any path. The path is just the result of the structural coupling between 
the robot and the land. What is more, the robot cannot avoid leaving that 
trace. Given its structural constitution and the structural constitution of the 
dusty ground, the marks are unavoidable and the final result will be a path 
drawn on the land.  
 
 
6.4 Language, representation and original 
intentionality 
 
Having all these elements in mind, we can come back now to the autopoietic 
hypothesis about language. We have said that language emerges basically as 
a recursive phenomenon in the domain of communicative behaviors among 
living beings, and we have previously defined communication as behavioral 
coordination. In other words, the autopoietic hypothesis contends that 
language arises when a group of organisms start to coordinate their 
behavioral coordination establishing a second-order communicative pattern 
(Maturana, 1978a). As in the case of the robot, this process of recursion is 
nothing mysterious (recursion is a natural outcome under certain conditions), 
but we certainly can expect some qualitatively novel results. The autopoietic 
hypothesis contends that when organisms start to operate recursively upon 
their communicative behaviors: a) the semantic-intentional domain arises as 
a new domain of social coupling, and b) organisms acquire the social ability 
to represent or establish referential relations between distinct aspects of their 
experience. In other words, the organisms become interpreters or “Zs” (the 
key element in our representational triad “X – Y – Z”). They start to “walk”, 
like the toy robot, but instead of drawing a path on the land, they start to 
create a world of shared (socially constructed) meanings.   
We have said in previous sections that a representation is always a triadic 





for something else (X). We have also said that in this structure the “semantic 
motor” is Z; that which is able to establish semantic relations between non-
semantic things or events. At the same time, we have reviewed the question 
about the ontological status of Z: What exactly is Z? What kind of thing or 
system in the world may be considered a Z? Our answer now, after having 
discarded some popular candidates for assuming the role of Z (e.g., the 
nervous system and the brain), is that Z is a system that operates recursively 
in the domain of communicative behaviors; Z is essentially a linguistic 
system. To say this is tantamount to saying that the emergence of the 
representational phenomena in the natural world coincides with the 
emergence of language. Let us examine this idea.  
We have said that when the organisms start to operate in language, they 
become Zs or interpreters. What does that mean? Does it mean that they 
acquire any new structural component, some new organ in their body? No, it 
does not. Like the toy robot, the difference is not about any physical 
constitution but about a new doing, a new behavioral domain. It is the new 
recursive character of the social communicative relations that makes the 
difference. Does this mean that the structural constitution of the organism 
does not matter, that it is an irrelevant point? No, it does not. We know that 
if we remove the brain from the organism, it will not be able to participate in 
any dynamic of social coupling, recursive or not (assuming, for the sake of 
the philosophical argument, that the organism could remain alive without its 
brain). Certainly, it will not be able to develop the ability to use language at 
all. Does this mean then that the “centre” of language is in the brain? Does 
this mean that there is some region in the brain performing or “controlling” 
the key recursive mechanism involved in language? No, it does not. We saw 
in our example that the recursive phenomenon of ‘walking” took place in the 
interaction between the robot and the ground, not in any of the robot’s 
structures. The “walking” was not in its legs, though without its legs the 
robot could not walk at all. In the same way, we see that language is a 
phenomenon that arises and takes place in the behavioral interactions 
among living beings, not in their respective internal dynamics. This is the 
case even when we know perfectly well that these internal dynamics are 





generating the behavioral patterns involved in such communicative 
interactions. But from the fact that a healthy nervous system is a necessary 
condition for the recursive phenomenon of language, it does not follow that 
the ontological place of such recursive phenomenon is in the brain.  
Z is usually called “user” or “consumer” of representations, but now we 
start to see that these denominations probably are not the best ones. The 
notion of user or consumer presupposes the pre-existence of that which that 
is used or consumed. The table is there as something already fabricated, and 
I can use it in such and such way. The energy is there in the world, and we 
humans consume it in such and such way. Yet the action of Z does not look 
like the action of a consumer, but rather like the action of a creator, or, to be 
more precise, of a social co-creator. In the same way that the path was not 
there on the land waiting for the robot, the representations (representational 
vehicles or representational relations) are not there in the world waiting for 
consumers or users. It is not the case that Z encounters the meanings out 
there in the world, say, like the animal encounters fruits hanging from trees. 
Like the robot that creates a path in walking, so the representing organisms 
create meaning by interacting recursively in their social coupling dynamics.  
Now, we should note that this creative (representing) activity is not an 
optional hobby for Z. Once the systems start to operate in language, once 
they become consolidated interpreters (Zs), they actually cannot avoid 
establishing semantic relations. We saw that the walking robot could not 
avoid leaving a trace on the land, that it could not avoid drawing a path. In 
the same way, representing systems cannot avoid interpreting the world, and 
everything that is contained in it, in a meaningful way. The ‘objects’ appear 
as linguistic distinctions within the experiential flow. The smoke is 
perceived as meaning “fire” or “danger”, the clouds are perceived as 
meaning “rain” or something else. What is more, representing systems tend 
to make sense of natural phenomena in semantic and intentional terms. All 
of the mythological systems in primitive and ancient civilizations have to do 
with this projective tendency. Today few people interpret natural forces in 
semantic-intentional terms, but the tendency persists in the interpretation of 
animal communication: the dog is telling me “take me out”; the bee is 





out of here!” and so on and so forth.  
The overall result is that the whole experience becomes a semantic 
network of meanings. We said that when the robot starts to walk, it starts to 
exist in a “walkable” world. In the same way, when the organisms start to 
create meaning, they start to create and inhabit a meaningful world. They 
create a semantic niche. 
We have to underline that this representational activity emerges as a 
particular way of social coupling. When the organisms start to operate 
recursively in the domain of their communicative behaviors, they start to 
constitute, in a collective dynamic, the meanings of such interactions 
(Maturana, 1978). We saw that the robot cannot create the recursive 
phenomenon by itself; that it needs to establish certain interaction with a 
proper surface. In the same way, no single individual organism can produce 
by itself (alone on an island) the recursive dynamics that generate the 
semantic-intentional domains. It is only as a participant in the domain of 
social interactions that an organism can become a Z. This is why the 
representational phenomena are, in their origin, social phenomena.  
So finally, what exactly is a Z? What has changed in a system once it has 
become Z? We say that what has changed is its relational doing; its condition 
as a communicative system. A little piece of wood is nothing more than a 
piece of wood, but if we put it on the second row of a chessboard, it becomes 
a pawn. It is the logic of the game, and not some intrinsic property in the 
piece, that transforms a mere piece of wood into a pawn. In a similar way, an 
organism becomes a Z as soon as it starts to participate in (if the linguistic 
community is already constituted, as it has been for every one of us), or co-
create with its peers (if the linguistic community does not exist yet, as was 
the case with primitive communities of hominids), the game of recursive 
communications that constitute language. Without participating in this 
particular game the organism cannot become a Z, no matter how healthy and 
powerful its brain may be. As some extraordinary cases of feral children 
have shown, a life outside of every linguistic community (for instance, in a 
wolf pack) produces organisms who are able to communicate in an effective 
way, but that cannot establish recursive relations upon such communicative 





communicative system that is able to establish recursive communications 
within a network of social couplings.   
Although the emergence of the representational (semantic) phenomena 
associated with a community of Zs is something really novel and 
conspicuous, we have to keep in mind that, being a version of social 
coupling, language is, ultimately, just another form of coexistence among 
living beings. Language is a form of behavioral coordination through which 
certain living beings conserve their adaptation constituting a third-order 
biological unity. In other words, language is a biological phenomenon and 
cannot be conceived, in spite of its novel properties, as something separate 
(discontinuous) from life. Strictly speaking, nothing that living beings do is 
independent from their condition as living systems. To be clear, social 
phenomena, as long as they are realized through the behaviors of living 
beings, are biological phenomena. In that sense, as language is something 
that we, human living beings, do, language is a biological phenomenon too. 
Language and its semantic properties are not a biological anomaly but a 
natural phenomenon that takes place within certain dynamics of social 
coupling. Language does not emerge from nowhere, but from the 
communicative practices of social animals as a recursive phenomenon within 
such practices.  
That this is the case seems more or less clear if we see the kind of 
communicative interaction that we can build with certain superior primates 
under specific training conditions. When higher primates interact closely 
with humans maintaining a recurrent communicative dynamic for a 
relatively long time, they are able to manage a certain kind of 
communicative behavior that, though very limited compared to human 
language, exhibits some recursive features (Gardner & Gardner, 1971; 
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986). This is a more or less predictable result since, 
first, higher primates are our closest evolutionary relatives (we humans are 
in fact just a subclass of primates), and second, we know that the 
phenomenon of recursion may appear, under certain conditions, in attenuated 
or transient forms. In our previous toy robot example we saw that there were 
certain conditions, such as those brought about by changing the robustness 





phenomenon of recursion could appear in a very limited way. Certain higher 
primates exhibit, after a period of training, communicative behaviors that 
seem recursive. Nonetheless, like the robot that had to walk on a surface of 
sticky honey, these animals can perform only a limited range of recursive 
interactions and cannot develop, at any rate, a full and systematic linguistic 
system. But beyond these considerations, perhaps the key difference between 
the communicative achievements of these animals and we human beings is 
that they cannot generate, spontaneously and by themselves (by means of 
their own dynamics of social coupling), any recursive system of 
communications. They can participate in some limited recursive 
communicative interactions only as a result of a prolonged interaction with 
humans (humans specially dedicated to promote linguistic interactions with 
them). Without a human to constantly induce linguistic interactions, primates 
and animals in general do not develop recursive communications in their 
natural niches.  
In our lives language is a powerful tool, yet as a natural phenomenon 
language arises in the evolutionary history without any specific purpose. 
Semantic and representational phenomena are part of language, but they are 
not its raison d'être. Mother Nature did not create language for endowing 
certain animals with representational and semantic capacities (such 
capacities were never necessary for the survival of any animal, social or not). 
In our previous toy robot example we saw that both the recursive process of 
walking and the path drawn by it emerged as natural results of the interaction 
between the movements of the robot and the ground. That is, as purposeless 
outcomes. In the same way, language emerges in the natural history of living 
beings as a peculiar version of coexistence and social coupling, without any 
evolutionary purpose.   
 
 
6.5 Mind and language: a dialectical 
internalization 
 





autopoietic theory of cognition, we formulated the question about the origins 
of mental representations. We asked: if the intelligent behavior of living 
beings is just a matter of structural drift, if there are no such things as 
internal (neural) representations, where do mental representations come 
from? If there is nothing within the anatomical confines of the organism, 
nothing in its nervous system or brain that could be considered an intentional 
phenomenon, where do the intentional phenomena come from?  
Our answer was: intentional and representational phenomena, the core 
features of mental activity, arise and come from language.  
We have also said at the beginning of this chapter that to point out the 
origin of mental phenomena is tantamount to pointing out the origin of 
intentional and representational phenomena. Well, in the previous section we 
have just presented a socio-linguistic hypothesis about such an origin. If the 
reader has taken the hypothesis at least as a plausible one, then we have 
provided a plausible hypothesis about the origins of mind. But, have we 
really provided a reconstruction of the mind? It looks like we still have to 
face the following question: if language seems to have all that is essential for 
having a mind, namely intentional and representational properties, where is 
the difference between language and mind? Are representations and 
intentionality all that we need for having a mind?  
Here is where the epistemic mark of the mental, its inner character, plays 
a relevant role. Certainly, language and mind share intentional and 
representational properties, but while language is a phenomenon that takes 
place in the public domain of social communicative behavior, mental activity 
takes place in the private domain of the individual life. Language is 
essentially an inter-personal dynamic, while mind is an intra-personal one. 
Mind, but not language, appears to us as something essentially private.  
In this last section we are going to outline some general ideas about the 
process by which language, a social public phenomenon, may give rise to the 
inner domain of mental experience. Our guide here will be the Marxist 
psychology of Lev Vygotsky and its “sociogenetic view of human 
cognition” (Valsiner and Van der Veer, 1988), interpreted within the broader 
framework of the autopoietic theory.   





occur? Our Vygotskyan hypothesis says that mind emerges as an 
“internalization” of language. To properly set this hypothesis we need to 
consider the following points with respect to the notion of internalization. 
First, we need to remind ourselves of the precise sense in which we say that 
the mind is something inner. Second, we need to take into account the 
Marxist framework of Vygotsky’s theory and interpret the process of 
internalization as a dialectical phenomenon.   
The reader must recall that the inner character of our minds concerns the 
distinctive form of epistemic access that every one of us has toward her or 
his own mental contents. When we say that language is internalized, we do 
not mean that language, coming from the outside, traverses the skull of 
persons and embeds itself in specific regions of their brain. We allude rather 
to the distinction between the public and the private domains as spheres of 
epistemic accessibility.  
Vygotsky’s work is well known, among other things, by his famous study 
on the relationship between language (speech, in his words) and thought 
(problem solving ability). Vygotsky’s account (1962) argues that language, 
being initially a social communicative phenomenon (inter-psychological) 
becomes an inner phenomenon (intra-psychological) through a process of 
internalization. But the notion of “internalization”, in a Marxist thinker like 
Vygotsky, cannot but mean a dialectical process, and we have to understand 
that meaning.  
From a non-dialectical point of view, internalization means simply that 
something moves from one place (the external space) to another place (the 
internal space). On the one hand, this movement is just a displacement, a 
change of location, and on the other hand, the internal space toward which 
that something is moving is an already constituted domain, a space that is 
there waiting for the arrival of something. In our case, the internalization of 
language would mean that language is simply “transferred” from an external 
domain to an internal domain, and that this internal domain is an already 
constituted space waiting for the arrival of language. This view is referred to 
by Wertsch (1985) as the “transfer model of internalization”.  
In contrast, the dialectical approach understands the process of 





constitutive. The internalization transforms the process itself (Vygotsky, 
1981) and creates the internal domain through this very transformation 
(Leontiev, 1981). Taking this dialectical approach, we see the internalization 
of language as a process in which: 1) language does not merely “move” from 
one domain to another but suffers a deep transformation (a metamorphosis), 
2) the very process of internalization creates or constitutes the internal 
domain in which language, so transformed, starts to work. When we say that 
mind emerges as an internalization of language, what we mean is that mind 
emerges as a transformation of language, and that the private (inner) 
character of the mental is constituted by this very process of internalization. 
From this viewpoint, language does not join an already constituted mind that 
it is waiting to become a “linguistic mind”. Language, in being internalized, 
generates the mental space as a new experiential domain in the organism. 
The mental does not pre-exist the linguistic; it is rather its transformation or 
metamorphosis.  
When something suffers a transformation, the result is something that 
conserves certain features from its previous state but that bears new 
characteristics too. In short, after a process of transformation, that something 
is something different. How different? Well, that depends on the particulars 
of the case. A transformation may be more or less superficial, more or less 
profound. The image of the caterpillar turning into a chrysalis, and the 
chrysalis turning into a butterfly, may be useful for visualizing our 
hypothesis about the relation between language and mind.  
Which and how many features can you recognize in the butterfly as 
coming from the caterpillar? If you see a caterpillar walking on a leaf and a 
butterfly flying above you, could you deduce, by the mere observation of 
their bodies and behaviors, that one of them is nothing more than the mature 
version of the other? That is unlikely. What you need is to observe the 
process of metamorphosis (the development, the history, the genesis) that 
leads the caterpillar toward the butterfly. Once you have done that, you can 
see that despite the deep transformation suffered by the caterpillar, there are 
still some essential features that are conserved in the butterfly.  
We see the relation between mind and language in a similar way. 





we know that metamorphosis is a process in which, although many things 
change in a dramatic way, some essential features are conserved. Which 
features of language are lost and which ones are conserved in the 
constitution of mind? Our Vygotskyan hypothesis contends that, when 
internalized, language dramatically changes its syntactic structure and its 
forms of semantic articulation, conserving its representational (referential, 
intentional) power.  
First, if the transformative process of language is really profound, as we 
think it is, then it should not be easy to appreciate, at least at first sight, the 
genetic continuity between language and mind. I think that is precisely the 
case when we examine our mental dynamic. Unless we are performing inner 
speech or thinking verbally in a propositional way, most of the times our 
mental experience does not reveal its linguistic credentials. As with the 
butterfly and the caterpillar, mind does not show its linguistic origins in an 
easy way. Why? Basically because the internalized language suffers a severe 
process of structural abbreviation (simplification) whose result is an almost 
unrecognizable syntax (almost absent), wherein what predominates is rather 
the free flow of oversaturated semantic contents. Let us see these ideas 
briefly. 
Vygotsky (1962) saw this process of abbreviation basically as a 
predicative tendency–the tendency of propositions to lose their subject and 
conserve only the predicate. For instance, if I ask you “What time is it?” you 
might simply respond “Five” rather than “The time is five”. The subject “the 
time” has been suppressed and only the predicate “five” remains. Though 
this predicative tendency is effective, I tend to think that the syntactic 
transformation of language goes deeper than this. Our mental experience, in 
processes like perception and action, does not show any linguistic character 
at all; we do not feel an internal ‘voice’ commenting on our perceptions and 
actions in terms of concepts or predicates. Yet our perceptions and actions 
appear as meaningful phenomena. This meaningful aspect, according to our 
hypothesis, is what remains from language once internalized. Language loses 
its syntactic envelope but conserves its semantic essence, and that 
continuous flow of semanticity so internalized constitutes what we call our 





intentional states in a private or intrapersonal field.  
We have said that when language is transformed into an individual 
phenomenon, it undergoes an important structural transformation that deeply 
changes its syntactic configuration. Why? What is the difference between 
public and private language? Basically, the transformation of the original 
dialogical structure of language has to do with the fact that, the more 
recurrent and familiar the relation between the linguistic participants, the 
more recursive and codified their interactions become. The structure of the 
language, the economy of its signs, changes radically as the familiarity 
between the communicative agents is maximal.  
Originally, language is built through the interaction between different 
organisms. Insofar as this process takes place among different organisms 
whose different structures entail different experiential domains, language 
arises effectively as coordination of different experiential domains. Now, the 
more different the experiential domains, or, equivalently, the less shared the 
experiences, the more explicit (specified) the linguistic coordination needs to 
be. On the other hand, the more shared a background of experiences, the less 
explicit or specified the linguistic coordination needs to be. Think of the way 
in which you communicate with a person that you meet for the first time, and 
compare it to the way in which you communicate with someone whom you 
have known for a long time (e.g., an old friend, a long term partner). With an 
old friend you may need a couple of words, sometimes just a couple of 
gestures, to achieve a perfect and complex communication. Sometimes, 
people who have lived together for years need only one look to coordinate a 
complex array of actions. On the contrary, with an unknown person you 
usually need to articulate full sentences using an explicit grammar in order to 
communicate something. What is the difference? The difference is that with 
familiar people you have a rich history of recurrent communicative 
interactions such that you have co-created further recursive levels of 
coordination. That is, you have created some communicative codes 
(behavioral linguistic coordination that refers to other linguistic 
coordination) that remain intelligible only for those who have shared that 
peculiar history of interactions. This is what allows you to abbreviate the 





The epistemically private character of certain linguistic interactions refers 
to a communicative space that is restricted only to those who know the 
recursive rule behind such interactions. This can happen with people who 
deliberately agree a code so that other people cannot access the meaning of a 
communication (like spies and secret agents), or may be the spontaneous 
result of a history of shared experiences that generates in the participants a 
sort of secret code (like you and your old friend). These communicative 
spaces are epistemically opaque for everyone else; only the internal 
participants have access to the semantic rules.  
The peculiarity of our mental experience is that in this case the familiarity 
of the communicative participants is maximal, since it is one and the same 
person who establishes the communicative phenomenon within an 
experiential flow that is always continuous (without epistemic gaps). The 
abbreviation is maximal, the code ultra-condensed, and the semantic space 
completely private in the individual sense. This transformation is profound, 
like a metamorphosis. Consequently, the subjective experience shows almost 
no trace of language, almost no trace of some inner communicative dialogue. 
What appears is a meaningful experiential flow without trace of words or 
sentences.  
The syntactic envelope of language has almost completely disappeared to 
leave room only for its recursive core; such is the semantic, representational 





















In this thesis we have tried to answer two fundamental questions: 
 
1) What kinds of natural systems are living beings such that they 
behave in ways that we observers qualify as intelligent, cognitive, 
purposeful or intentional?  
2) How do mental phenomena arise in the life of certain living beings?  
 
We have answered the first question by saying that living beings are: 
 
1) Adaptive dynamic systems  
2) Deterministic machines of closed transitions 
3) Multistable dissipative systems, and 
4) Organizationally closed systems with respect to their sensorimotor 
activity and their autopoietic dynamic 
 
We have answered the second question by saying that mental phenomena, 
basically understood as representational and intentional phenomena, arise 
with language, and that language, in turn, arises as a recursive phenomenon 
in the communicative domain of third-order biological systems. 
Additionally, and in a more speculative vein, we have tried to explain the 
epistemically private character of mental phenomena by appealing to a 
dialectical process of internalization of language.  
The distinctive mark of these answers, as I see it, is that they have been 
built on the basis of a Strict Naturalistic framework. In this framework living 
beings are conceived of as metaphysically ordinary natural systems, and 
studied by applying the same ontological assumptions and explanatory 
principles applied in the study of any other natural system. This fundamental 





‘structural drift’.  
In assuming that living beings are systems in structural drift, we have 
rejected a series of assumptions and explanatory notions that, though 
relatively popular in cognitive sciences, overlook or violate this 
metaphysical condition. Conspicuously, we have rejected the idea that living 
beings, or subsystems such as the nervous system operate: 
 
1. As cognitive agents that relate with the environment in epistemic terms 
2. With the aim of fulfilling tasks, solving problems or meeting goals  
3. As control systems that regulate the behavior according to the 
requirements of 2 
4. On the basis of plans, models, maps or any form of internal representation  
5. With a certain margin or degree of freedom to act 
6. Intentionally open or oriented to (having in view, concerned about) the 
external world  
 
In this thesis we have not directly confronted this view with any cognitive 
theory in particular, but it should be apparent that, if we did it, our Strict 
Naturalistic stance would easily find a considerable number of opponents. 
This is because what we object to, to a large extent, is a series of 
fundamental assumptions which are more or less shared by a wide spectrum 
of cognitive theories.  
For example, points 1 and 6 refer to a fundamental assumption in 
cognitive science; the assumption that living beings make ‘cognitive’ 
contact, or establish an epistemic and intentional relationship, with the 
environment.  
Most cognitive theories understand this epistemic and intentional 
relationship in terms of information. The basic idea is that organisms are 
informed ‘about’ the environment through their sensory ‘windows’; i.e., 
organisms are informavore systems (Pylyshyn, 1984). Different approaches 
may disagree about, for example, whether this information is simply 
collected and directly used to produce some action (Gibson, 1966, 1979; 
Chemero, 2009; McDowell, 1994), or processed to build some form of 





a minority, may even disagree with the idea that the epistemic and 
intentional relationship that the organism establishes with its environment is 
informational in character. Enactivist and some Heideggerian authors, for 
example, prefer to see this relationship in phenomenological terms; i.e., as 
meaning creation or sense-making (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991; 
Gallagher, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Hutto, 2011; Dreyfus, 2008).  
What our thesis questions, nonetheless, is the intentional and epistemic 
relationship itself, regardless of the way it is understood.   
Another example is points 2 and 3. The idea that the organism, or its 
nervous system, is able to control the behavior according to certain adaptive 
goals is shared by both representational (Clark, 1997; Wheeler 2005; Grush 
2004; Clark and Grush, 1999) and non-representational (enactive) cognitive 
theories (Di Paolo, 2005; Froese and Ziemke, 2009). Both of them assume 
that the organism or its nervous system anticipates, monitors, and regulates 
the actions in order to meet some adaptive goal.  
What our thesis questions is this very assumption, regardless of whether 
it is, or is not, spelled out in representational terms (Maturana, 2008).  
The reader might find, I am sure, several other examples of potential 
theoretical confrontations. If this thesis has motivated the reader to search 
for such confrontations, or to think (Why not?) of possible philosophical 
allies, then the thesis has met one of its goals.   
 
Future directions of research 
 
There are many aspects that were not addressed in this thesis, or that were 
too superficially addressed, and that might be explored in future works. 
Among them, perhaps the most important is human mental activity and 
experience. 
For example, when analyzing the process of perception in animals we 
argued that the environment, as an object of perception, exists only for the 
observer, not for the animals. Well, what happens when the one who 
perceives is not an animal but the observer? What is the case with our 
perceptual experience as observers? If our brain is a structurally determined 





this thesis, what do we perceive when we perceive? Can we humans assert 
the existence of an external world, an independent reality populated, among 
other things, by animals and environments?   
When applied to our own perceptual experience, PSD seems to lead us, 
perhaps unavoidably, toward a kind of skepticism. Is this an unavoidable 
result?  
We have argued that living systems, including the nervous system, do not 
operate on the basis of intentional and representational elements. On the 
other hand, we have said that intentional and representational phenomena 
arise with language, and that language emerges in humans as a recursive 
communicative phenomenon. Thus, in this thesis we have not denied the 
existence of intentional and representational phenomena, rather we have 
placed them outside the internal structural dynamic of living systems; more 
concretely, outside the brain. Where? It is not clear at all.  
Strict Naturalism, recall, distinguishes between two different Natural 
domains: the domain of natural phenomena and systems (rivers, stars, 
volcanoes), and the domain of human or cultural phenomena and systems 
(social institutions, symbols, mental phenomena). It asks us not to conflate 
these domains, and avoid any form of over-naturalization, 
anthropomorphism and observational projection. Rivers and stars are natural 
entities. They do not have minds; therefore, they do not have interests, 
purposes, temporal experience, epistemic states, etc. We humans are 
observers and have mental life; therefore, we have epistemic states, interests, 
purposes, temporal categories, etc. But where does all this mental activity 
take place? We cannot answer “In our brains”, for our brains are just natural 
systems like rivers and stars.  
Chapter 6 tried to elaborate some vague ideas, mainly through metaphors 
and analogies, about this point. They are, however, clearly insufficient. 
Much more philosophical work needs to be done in order to make legitimate 
room, within a Strict Naturalistic picture of the world, for our mental 
experience and its intentional and representational phenomena.  
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